/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
nsAutoCString blockData; while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
nsDependentCSubstring token = tokenizer.nextToken(); if (token.IsEmpty()) { continue;
} if (inBlock) { if (token.Equals(footer)) {
inBlock = false;
certFound = true; // base64 decode data, make certs, append to chain
nsAutoCString derString;
nsresult rv = Base64Decode(blockData, derString); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: decoding the signature failed")); return rv;
}
nsTArray<uint8_t> derBytes(derString.Data(), derString.Length());
aCertList.AppendElement(std::move(derBytes));
} else {
blockData.Append(token);
}
} elseif (token.Equals(header)) {
inBlock = true;
blockData = "";
}
} if (inBlock || !certFound) { // the PEM data did not end; bad data.
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: supplied chain contains bad data")); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
} return NS_OK;
}
// Given data to verify, a content signature header value, a string representing // a list of PEM-encoded certificates, and a hostname to validate the // certificates against, this function attempts to validate the certificate // chain, extract the signature from the header, and verify the data using the // key in the end-entity certificate from the chain. Returns NS_OK if everything // is satisfactory and a failing nsresult otherwise. The output parameters are // filled with telemetry data to report in the case of failures. static nsresult VerifyContentSignatureInternal( const nsACString& aData, const nsACString& aCSHeader, const nsACString& aCertChain, const nsACString& aHostname,
AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, /* out */
Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS& aErrorLabel, /* out */ nsACString& aCertFingerprint, /* out */ uint32_t& aErrorValue) {
nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> certList;
nsresult rv = ReadChainIntoCertList(aCertChain, certList); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv;
} if (certList.Length() < 1) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
} // The 0th element should be the end-entity that issued the content // signature.
nsTArray<uint8_t>& certBytes(certList.ElementAt(0));
Input certInput;
mozilla::pkix::Result result =
certInput.Init(certBytes.Elements(), certBytes.Length()); if (result != Success) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// Get EE certificate fingerprint for telemetry. unsignedchar fingerprint[SHA256_LENGTH] = {0};
SECStatus srv =
PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, fingerprint, certInput.UnsafeGetData(),
certInput.GetLength()); if (srv != SECSuccess) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
SECItem fingerprintItem = {siBuffer, fingerprint, SHA256_LENGTH};
UniquePORTString tmpFingerprintString(
CERT_Hexify(&fingerprintItem, false/* don't use colon delimiters */)); if (!tmpFingerprintString) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
aCertFingerprint.Assign(tmpFingerprintString.get());
nsTArray<Span<const uint8_t>> certSpans; // Collect just the CAs. for (size_t i = 1; i < certList.Length(); i++) {
Span<const uint8_t> certSpan(certList.ElementAt(i).Elements(),
certList.ElementAt(i).Length());
certSpans.AppendElement(std::move(certSpan));
}
AppTrustDomain trustDomain(std::move(certSpans));
rv = trustDomain.SetTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv;
} // Check the signerCert chain is good
result = BuildCertChain(
trustDomain, certInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr /*stapledOCSPResponse*/); if (result != Success) { // if there was a library error, return an appropriate error if (IsFatalError(result)) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
} // otherwise, assume the signature was invalid if (result == mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE) {
aErrorLabel =
Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err4;
aErrorValue = 4;
} elseif (result ==
mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE) {
aErrorLabel =
Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err5;
aErrorValue = 5;
} else { // Building cert chain failed for some other reason.
aErrorLabel =
Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err6;
aErrorValue = 6;
}
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: The supplied chain is bad (%s)",
MapResultToName(result))); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
// Check the SAN
Input hostnameInput;
result = hostnameInput.Init(
BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, constchar*>(aHostname.BeginReading()),
aHostname.Length()); if (result != Success) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput); if (result != Success) { // EE cert isnot valid for the given host name.
aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err7;
aErrorValue = 7; return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
pkix::BackCert backCert(certInput, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr);
result = backCert.Init(); // This should never fail, because we've already built a verified certificate // chain with this certificate. if (result != Success) {
aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err8;
aErrorValue = 8;
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: couldn't decode certificate to get spki")); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
Input spkiInput = backCert.GetSubjectPublicKeyInfo();
SECItem spkiItem = {siBuffer, const_cast<uint8_t*>(spkiInput.UnsafeGetData()),
spkiInput.GetLength()};
UniqueCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki(
SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spkiItem)); if (!spki) {
aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err8;
aErrorValue = 8;
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: couldn't decode spki")); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
mozilla::UniqueSECKEYPublicKey key(SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki.get())); if (!key) {
aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err8;
aErrorValue = 8;
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: unable to extract a key")); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
// Base 64 decode the signature
nsAutoCString rawSignature;
rv = Base64Decode(signature, rawSignature); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: decoding the signature failed")); return rv;
}
// get signature object
ScopedAutoSECItem signatureItem;
SECItem rawSignatureItem = {
siBuffer,
BitwiseCast<unsignedchar*, constchar*>(rawSignature.get()),
uint32_t(rawSignature.Length()),
}; // We have a raw ecdsa signature r||s so we have to DER-encode it first // Note that we have to check rawSignatureItem->len % 2 here as // DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen asserts this if (rawSignatureItem.len == 0 || rawSignatureItem.len % 2 != 0) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: signature length is bad")); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
} if (DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&signatureItem, &rawSignatureItem,
rawSignatureItem.len) != SECSuccess) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: encoding the signature failed")); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// this is the only OID we support for now
SECOidTag oid = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE;
mozilla::UniqueVFYContext cx(
VFY_CreateContext(key.get(), &signatureItem, oid, nullptr)); if (!cx) { // Creating context failed.
aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err9;
aErrorValue = 9; return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
static nsresult ParseContentSignatureHeader( const nsACString& aContentSignatureHeader, /* out */ nsCString& aSignature) { // We only support p384 ecdsa.
constexpr auto signature_var = "p384ecdsa"_ns;
aSignature.Truncate();
const nsCString& flatHeader = PromiseFlatCString(aContentSignatureHeader);
nsSecurityHeaderParser parser(flatHeader);
nsresult rv = parser.Parse(); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: could not parse ContentSignature header")); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
LinkedList<nsSecurityHeaderDirective>* directives = parser.GetDirectives();
for (nsSecurityHeaderDirective* directive = directives->getFirst();
directive != nullptr; directive = directive->getNext()) {
CSVerifier_LOG(
("CSVerifier: found directive '%s'", directive->mName.get())); if (directive->mName.EqualsIgnoreCase(signature_var)) { if (!aSignature.IsEmpty()) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: found two ContentSignatures")); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
} if (directive->mValue.isNothing()) {
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: found empty ContentSignature directive")); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: found a ContentSignature directive"));
aSignature.Assign(*(directive->mValue));
}
}
// we have to ensure that we found a signature at this point if (aSignature.IsEmpty()) {
CSVerifier_LOG(
("CSVerifier: got a Content-Signature header but didn't find a " "signature.")); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// Bug 769521: We have to change b64 url to regular encoding as long as we // don't have a b64 url decoder. This should change soon, but in the meantime // we have to live with this.
aSignature.ReplaceChar('-', '+');
aSignature.ReplaceChar('_', '/');
return NS_OK;
}
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