import hmac import os import sys import warnings from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify from hashlib import md5, sha1, sha256
from ..exceptions import (
InsecurePlatformWarning,
ProxySchemeUnsupported,
SNIMissingWarning,
SSLError,
) from ..packages import six from .url import BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE, IPV4_RE
# Maps the length of a digest to a possible hash function producing this digest
HASHFUNC_MAP = {32: md5, 40: sha1, 64: sha256}
def _const_compare_digest_backport(a, b): """
Compare two digests of equal length in constant time.
The digests must be of type str/bytes.
Returns Trueif the digests match, andFalse otherwise. """
result = abs(len(a) - len(b)) for left, right in zip(bytearray(a), bytearray(b)):
result |= left ^ right return result == 0
try: # OP_NO_TICKET was added in Python 3.6 from ssl import OP_NO_TICKET except ImportError:
OP_NO_TICKET = 0x4000
# A secure default. # Sources for more information on TLS ciphers: # # - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS # - https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/index.html # - https://hynek.me/articles/hardening-your-web-servers-ssl-ciphers/ # # The general intent is: # - prefer cipher suites that offer perfect forward secrecy (DHE/ECDHE), # - prefer ECDHE over DHE for better performance, # - prefer any AES-GCM and ChaCha20 over any AES-CBC for better performance and # security, # - prefer AES-GCM over ChaCha20 because hardware-accelerated AES is common, # - disable NULL authentication, MD5 MACs, DSS, and other # insecure ciphers for security reasons. # - NOTE: TLS 1.3 cipher suites are managed through a different interface # not exposed by CPython (yet!) and are enabled by default if they're available.
DEFAULT_CIPHERS = ":".join(
[ "ECDHE+AESGCM", "ECDHE+CHACHA20", "DHE+AESGCM", "DHE+CHACHA20", "ECDH+AESGCM", "DH+AESGCM", "ECDH+AES", "DH+AES", "RSA+AESGCM", "RSA+AES", "!aNULL", "!eNULL", "!MD5", "!DSS",
]
)
try: from ssl import SSLContext # Modern SSL? except ImportError:
class SSLContext(object): # Platform-specific: Python 2 def __init__(self, protocol_version):
self.protocol = protocol_version # Use default values from a real SSLContext
self.check_hostname = False
self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
self.ca_certs = None
self.options = 0
self.certfile = None
self.keyfile = None
self.ciphers = None
def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False):
warnings.warn( "A true SSLContext object is not available. This prevents " "urllib3 from configuring SSL appropriately and may cause " "certain SSL connections to fail. You can upgrade to a newer " "version of Python to solve this. For more information, see " "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/1.26.x/advanced-usage.html" "#ssl-warnings",
InsecurePlatformWarning,
)
kwargs = { "keyfile": self.keyfile, "certfile": self.certfile, "ca_certs": self.ca_certs, "cert_reqs": self.verify_mode, "ssl_version": self.protocol, "server_side": server_side,
} return wrap_socket(socket, ciphers=self.ciphers, **kwargs)
def assert_fingerprint(cert, fingerprint): """
Checks if given fingerprint matches the supplied certificate.
:param cert:
Certificate as bytes object.
:param fingerprint:
Fingerprint as string of hexdigits, can be interspersed by colons. """
# We need encode() here for py32; works on py2 and p33.
fingerprint_bytes = unhexlify(fingerprint.encode())
cert_digest = hashfunc(cert).digest()
ifnot _const_compare_digest(cert_digest, fingerprint_bytes): raise SSLError( 'Fingerprints did not match. Expected "{0}", got "{1}".'.format(
fingerprint, hexlify(cert_digest)
)
)
def resolve_cert_reqs(candidate): """
Resolves the argument to a numeric constant, which can be passed to
the wrap_socket function/method from the ssl module.
Defaults to :data:`ssl.CERT_REQUIRED`. If given a string it is assumed to be the name of the constant in the
:mod:`ssl` module or its abbreviation.
(So you can specify `REQUIRED` instead of `CERT_REQUIRED`. If it's neither `None` nor a string we assume it is already the numeric
constant which can directly be passed to wrap_socket. """ if candidate isNone: return CERT_REQUIRED
if isinstance(candidate, str):
res = getattr(ssl, candidate, None) if res isNone:
res = getattr(ssl, "CERT_" + candidate) return res
return candidate
def resolve_ssl_version(candidate): """
like resolve_cert_reqs """ if candidate isNone: return PROTOCOL_TLS
if isinstance(candidate, str):
res = getattr(ssl, candidate, None) if res isNone:
res = getattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_" + candidate) return res
return candidate
def create_urllib3_context(
ssl_version=None, cert_reqs=None, options=None, ciphers=None
): """All arguments have the same meaning as ``ssl_wrap_socket``.
By default, this function does a lot of the same work that
``ssl.create_default_context`` does on Python 3.4+. It:
- Disables SSLv2, SSLv3, and compression
- Sets a restricted set of server ciphers
If you wish to enable SSLv3, you can do::
from urllib3.util import ssl_
context = ssl_.create_urllib3_context()
context.options &= ~ssl_.OP_NO_SSLv3
You can do the same to enable compression (substituting ``COMPRESSION`` for ``SSLv3`` in the last line above).
:param ssl_version:
The desired protocol version to use. This will default to
PROTOCOL_SSLv23 which will negotiate the highest protocol that both
the server and your installation of OpenSSL support.
:param cert_reqs:
Whether to require the certificate verification. This defaults to
``ssl.CERT_REQUIRED``.
:param options:
Specific OpenSSL options. These default to ``ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2``,
``ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3``, ``ssl.OP_NO_COMPRESSION``, and ``ssl.OP_NO_TICKET``.
:param ciphers:
Which cipher suites to allow the server to select.
:returns:
Constructed SSLContext object with specified options
:rtype: SSLContext """ # PROTOCOL_TLS is deprecated in Python 3.10 ifnot ssl_version or ssl_version == PROTOCOL_TLS:
ssl_version = PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT
context = SSLContext(ssl_version)
context.set_ciphers(ciphers or DEFAULT_CIPHERS)
# Setting the default here, as we may have no ssl module on import
cert_reqs = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED if cert_reqs isNoneelse cert_reqs
if options isNone:
options = 0 # SSLv2 is easily broken and is considered harmful and dangerous
options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 # SSLv3 has several problems and is now dangerous
options |= OP_NO_SSLv3 # Disable compression to prevent CRIME attacks for OpenSSL 1.0+ # (issue #309)
options |= OP_NO_COMPRESSION # TLSv1.2 only. Unless set explicitly, do not request tickets. # This may save some bandwidth on wire, and although the ticket is encrypted, # there is a risk associated with it being on wire, # if the server is not rotating its ticketing keys properly.
options |= OP_NO_TICKET
context.options |= options
# Enable post-handshake authentication for TLS 1.3, see GH #1634. PHA is # necessary for conditional client cert authentication with TLS 1.3. # The attribute is None for OpenSSL <= 1.1.0 or does not exist in older # versions of Python. We only enable on Python 3.7.4+ or if certificate # verification is enabled to work around Python issue #37428 # See: https://bugs.python.org/issue37428 if (cert_reqs == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED or sys.version_info >= (3, 7, 4)) and getattr(
context, "post_handshake_auth", None
) isnotNone:
context.post_handshake_auth = True
def disable_check_hostname(): if (
getattr(context, "check_hostname", None) isnotNone
): # Platform-specific: Python 3.2 # We do our own verification, including fingerprints and alternative # hostnames. So disable it here
context.check_hostname = False
# The order of the below lines setting verify_mode and check_hostname # matter due to safe-guards SSLContext has to prevent an SSLContext with # check_hostname=True, verify_mode=NONE/OPTIONAL. This is made even more # complex because we don't know whether PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT will be used # or not so we don't know the initial state of the freshly created SSLContext. if cert_reqs == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED:
context.verify_mode = cert_reqs
disable_check_hostname() else:
disable_check_hostname()
context.verify_mode = cert_reqs
# Enable logging of TLS session keys via defacto standard environment variable # 'SSLKEYLOGFILE', if the feature is available (Python 3.8+). Skip empty values. if hasattr(context, "keylog_filename"):
sslkeylogfile = os.environ.get("SSLKEYLOGFILE") if sslkeylogfile:
context.keylog_filename = sslkeylogfile
return context
def ssl_wrap_socket(
sock,
keyfile=None,
certfile=None,
cert_reqs=None,
ca_certs=None,
server_hostname=None,
ssl_version=None,
ciphers=None,
ssl_context=None,
ca_cert_dir=None,
key_password=None,
ca_cert_data=None,
tls_in_tls=False,
): """
All arguments exceptfor server_hostname, ssl_context, and ca_cert_dir have
the same meaning as they do when using :func:`ssl.wrap_socket`.
:param server_hostname:
When SNI is supported, the expected hostname of the certificate
:param ssl_context:
A pre-made :class:`SSLContext` object. Ifnoneis provided, one will
be created using :func:`create_urllib3_context`.
:param ciphers:
A string of ciphers we wish the client to support.
:param ca_cert_dir:
A directory containing CA certificates in multiple separate files, as
supported by OpenSSL's -CApath flag or the capath argument to
SSLContext.load_verify_locations().
:param key_password:
Optional password if the keyfile is encrypted.
:param ca_cert_data:
Optional string containing CA certificates in PEM format suitable for
passing as the cadata parameter to SSLContext.load_verify_locations()
:param tls_in_tls:
Use SSLTransport to wrap the existing socket. """
context = ssl_context if context isNone: # Note: This branch of code and all the variables in it are no longer # used by urllib3 itself. We should consider deprecating and removing # this code.
context = create_urllib3_context(ssl_version, cert_reqs, ciphers=ciphers)
if ca_certs or ca_cert_dir or ca_cert_data: try:
context.load_verify_locations(ca_certs, ca_cert_dir, ca_cert_data) except (IOError, OSError) as e: raise SSLError(e)
elif ssl_context isNoneand hasattr(context, "load_default_certs"): # try to load OS default certs; works well on Windows (require Python3.4+)
context.load_default_certs()
# Attempt to detect if we get the goofy behavior of the # keyfile being encrypted and OpenSSL asking for the # passphrase via the terminal and instead error out. if keyfile and key_password isNoneand _is_key_file_encrypted(keyfile): raise SSLError("Client private key is encrypted, password is required")
if certfile: if key_password isNone:
context.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile) else:
context.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, key_password)
try: if hasattr(context, "set_alpn_protocols"):
context.set_alpn_protocols(ALPN_PROTOCOLS) except NotImplementedError: # Defensive: in CI, we always have set_alpn_protocols pass
# If we detect server_hostname is an IP address then the SNI # extension should not be used according to RFC3546 Section 3.1
use_sni_hostname = server_hostname andnot is_ipaddress(server_hostname) # SecureTransport uses server_hostname in certificate verification.
send_sni = (use_sni_hostname and HAS_SNI) or (
IS_SECURETRANSPORT and server_hostname
) # Do not warn the user if server_hostname is an invalid SNI hostname. ifnot HAS_SNI and use_sni_hostname:
warnings.warn( "An HTTPS request has been made, but the SNI (Server Name " "Indication) extension to TLS is not available on this platform. " "This may cause the server to present an incorrect TLS " "certificate, which can cause validation failures. You can upgrade to " "a newer version of Python to solve this. For more information, see " "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/1.26.x/advanced-usage.html" "#ssl-warnings",
SNIMissingWarning,
)
def is_ipaddress(hostname): """Detects whether the hostname given is an IPv4 or IPv6 address.
Also detects IPv6 addresses with Zone IDs.
:param str hostname: Hostname to examine.
:return: Trueif the hostname is an IP address, False otherwise. """ ifnot six.PY2 and isinstance(hostname, bytes): # IDN A-label bytes are ASCII compatible.
hostname = hostname.decode("ascii") return bool(IPV4_RE.match(hostname) or BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE.match(hostname))
def _is_key_file_encrypted(key_file): """Detects if a key file is encrypted or not.""" with open(key_file, "r") as f: for line in f: # Look for Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED if"ENCRYPTED"in line: returnTrue
returnFalse
def _ssl_wrap_socket_impl(sock, ssl_context, tls_in_tls, server_hostname=None): if tls_in_tls: ifnot SSLTransport: # Import error, ssl is not available. raise ProxySchemeUnsupported( "TLS in TLS requires support for the 'ssl' module"
)
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