/* Check that the stack and regs on entry from user mode are sane. */ static __always_inline void arch_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) { /* * Make sure that the entry code gave us a sensible EFLAGS * register. Native because we want to check the actual CPU * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
*/ unsignedlong flags = native_save_fl(); unsignedlong mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
/* * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
*/ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask);
/* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs));
/* * All entries from user mode (except #DF) should be on the * normal thread stack and should have user pt_regs in the * correct location.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!on_thread_stack());
WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
}
} #define arch_enter_from_user_mode arch_enter_from_user_mode
staticinlinevoid arch_exit_work(unsignedlong ti_work)
{ if (ti_work & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
fire_user_return_notifiers();
if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_IO_BITMAP))
tss_update_io_bitmap();
if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
switch_fpu_return();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT /* * Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT. Make sure we clear it before * returning to user mode. We need to clear it *after* signal * handling, because syscall restart has a fixup for compat * syscalls. The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32 * selftest. * * We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386: the 32-bit tracer * special case only applies after poking regs and before the * very next return to user mode.
*/
current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif
/* * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10 * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler * when applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32) * low bits from any entropy chosen here. * * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 7 (x86_64) or * 8 (ia32) bits.
*/
choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_ibpb_exit_to_user' */ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
this_cpu_read(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user)) {
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, false);
}
} #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
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