/* * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions, * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses) * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers. * * Passing down mm_struct allows to define untagging rules on per-process * basis. * * It's defined as noop for architectures that don't support memory tagging.
*/ #ifndef untagged_addr #define untagged_addr(addr) (addr) #endif
/* * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user()) * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and * __copy_{to,from}_user{,_inatomic}(). * * raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) should copy up to size bytes and * return the amount left to copy. They should assume that access_ok() has * already been checked (and succeeded); they should *not* zero-pad anything. * No KASAN or object size checks either - those belong here. * * Both of these functions should attempt to copy size bytes starting at from * into the area starting at to. They must not fetch or store anything * outside of those areas. Return value must be between 0 (everything * copied successfully) and size (nothing copied). * * If raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) returns N, size - N bytes starting * at to must become equal to the bytes fetched from the corresponding area * starting at from. All data past to + size - N must be left unmodified. * * If copying succeeds, the return value must be 0. If some data cannot be * fetched, it is permitted to copy less than had been fetched; the only * hard requirement is that not storing anything at all (i.e. returning size) * should happen only when nothing could be copied. In other words, you don't * have to squeeze as much as possible - it is allowed, but not necessary. * * For raw_copy_from_user() to always points to kernel memory and no faults * on store should happen. Interpretation of from is affected by set_fs(). * For raw_copy_to_user() it's the other way round. * * Both can be inlined - it's up to architectures whether it wants to bother * with that. They should not be used directly; they are used to implement * the 6 functions (copy_{to,from}_user(), __copy_{to,from}_user_inatomic()) * that are used instead. Out of those, __... ones are inlined. Plain * copy_{to,from}_user() might or might not be inlined. If you want them * inlined, have asm/uaccess.h define INLINE_COPY_{TO,FROM}_USER. * * NOTE: only copy_from_user() zero-pads the destination in case of short copy. * Neither __copy_from_user() nor __copy_from_user_inatomic() zero anything * at all; their callers absolutely must check the return value. * * Biarch ones should also provide raw_copy_in_user() - similar to the above, * but both source and destination are __user pointers (affected by set_fs() * as usual) and both source and destination can trigger faults.
*/
might_fault();
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n); if (should_fail_usercopy()) return n;
check_object_size(to, n, false);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res); return res;
}
/** * __copy_to_user_inatomic: - Copy a block of data into user space, with less checking. * @to: Destination address, in user space. * @from: Source address, in kernel space. * @n: Number of bytes to copy. * * Context: User context only. * * Copy data from kernel space to user space. Caller must check * the specified block with access_ok() before calling this function. * The caller should also make sure he pins the user space address * so that we don't result in page fault and sleep.
*/ static __always_inline __must_check unsignedlong
__copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, constvoid *from, unsignedlong n)
{ if (should_fail_usercopy()) return n;
instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
check_object_size(from, n, true); return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
}
/* * Architectures that #define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER use this function * directly in the normal copy_to/from_user(), the other ones go * through an extern _copy_to/from_user(), which expands the same code * here. * * Rust code always uses the extern definition.
*/ staticinline __must_check unsignedlong
_inline_copy_from_user(void *to, constvoid __user *from, unsignedlong n)
{ unsignedlong res = n;
might_fault(); if (should_fail_usercopy()) goto fail; if (can_do_masked_user_access())
from = mask_user_address(from); else { if (!access_ok(from, n)) goto fail; /* * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is * finished:
*/
barrier_nospec();
}
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res); if (likely(!res)) return 0;
fail:
memset(to + (n - res), 0, res); return res;
} extern __must_check unsignedlong
_copy_from_user(void *, constvoid __user *, unsignedlong);
/* * These routines enable/disable the pagefault handler. If disabled, it will * not take any locks and go straight to the fixup table. * * User access methods will not sleep when called from a pagefault_disabled() * environment.
*/ staticinlinevoid pagefault_disable(void)
{
pagefault_disabled_inc(); /* * make sure to have issued the store before a pagefault * can hit.
*/
barrier();
}
staticinlinevoid pagefault_enable(void)
{ /* * make sure to issue those last loads/stores before enabling * the pagefault handler again.
*/
barrier();
pagefault_disabled_dec();
}
/* * Is the pagefault handler disabled? If so, user access methods will not sleep.
*/ staticinlinebool pagefault_disabled(void)
{ return current->pagefault_disabled != 0;
}
/* * The pagefault handler is in general disabled by pagefault_disable() or * when in irq context (via in_atomic()). * * This function should only be used by the fault handlers. Other users should * stick to pagefault_disabled(). * Please NEVER use preempt_disable() to disable the fault handler. With * !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT, this is like a NOP. So the handler won't be disabled. * in_atomic() will report different values based on !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT.
*/ #define faulthandler_disabled() (pagefault_disabled() || in_atomic())
/** * probe_subpage_writeable: probe the user range for write faults at sub-page * granularity (e.g. arm64 MTE) * @uaddr: start of address range * @size: size of address range * * Returns 0 on success, the number of bytes not probed on fault. * * It is expected that the caller checked for the write permission of each * page in the range either by put_user() or GUP. The architecture port can * implement a more efficient get_user() probing if the same sub-page faults * are triggered by either a read or a write.
*/ staticinline size_t probe_subpage_writeable(char __user *uaddr, size_t size)
{ return 0;
}
extern __must_check int check_zeroed_user(constvoid __user *from, size_t size);
/** * copy_struct_from_user: copy a struct from userspace * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be @ksize * bytes long. * @ksize: Size of @dst struct. * @src: Source address, in userspace. * @usize: (Alleged) size of @src struct. * * Copies a struct from userspace to kernel space, in a way that guarantees * backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments (as long as future * struct extensions are made such that all new fields are *appended* to the * old struct, and zeroed-out new fields have the same meaning as the old * struct). * * @ksize is just sizeof(*dst), and @usize should've been passed by userspace. * The recommended usage is something like the following: * * SYSCALL_DEFINE2(foobar, const struct foo __user *, uarg, size_t, usize) * { * int err; * struct foo karg = {}; * * if (usize > PAGE_SIZE) * return -E2BIG; * if (usize < FOO_SIZE_VER0) * return -EINVAL; * * err = copy_struct_from_user(&karg, sizeof(karg), uarg, usize); * if (err) * return err; * * // ... * } * * There are three cases to consider: * * If @usize == @ksize, then it's copied verbatim. * * If @usize < @ksize, then the userspace has passed an old struct to a * newer kernel. The rest of the trailing bytes in @dst (@ksize - @usize) * are to be zero-filled. * * If @usize > @ksize, then the userspace has passed a new struct to an * older kernel. The trailing bytes unknown to the kernel (@usize - @ksize) * are checked to ensure they are zeroed, otherwise -E2BIG is returned. * * Returns (in all cases, some data may have been copied): * * -E2BIG: (@usize > @ksize) and there are non-zero trailing bytes in @src. * * -EFAULT: access to userspace failed.
*/ static __always_inline __must_check int
copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, constvoid __user *src,
size_t usize)
{
size_t size = min(ksize, usize);
size_t rest = max(ksize, usize) - size;
/* Double check if ksize is larger than a known object size. */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ksize > __builtin_object_size(dst, 1))) return -E2BIG;
/* Deal with trailing bytes. */ if (usize < ksize) {
memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
} elseif (usize > ksize) { int ret = check_zeroed_user(src + size, rest); if (ret <= 0) return ret ?: -E2BIG;
} /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */ if (copy_from_user(dst, src, size)) return -EFAULT; return 0;
}
/** * copy_struct_to_user: copy a struct to userspace * @dst: Destination address, in userspace. This buffer must be @ksize * bytes long. * @usize: (Alleged) size of @dst struct. * @src: Source address, in kernel space. * @ksize: Size of @src struct. * @ignored_trailing: Set to %true if there was a non-zero byte in @src that * userspace cannot see because they are using an smaller struct. * * Copies a struct from kernel space to userspace, in a way that guarantees * backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments (as long as future * struct extensions are made such that all new fields are *appended* to the * old struct, and zeroed-out new fields have the same meaning as the old * struct). * * Some syscalls may wish to make sure that userspace knows about everything in * the struct, and if there is a non-zero value that userspce doesn't know * about, they want to return an error (such as -EMSGSIZE) or have some other * fallback (such as adding a "you're missing some information" flag). If * @ignored_trailing is non-%NULL, it will be set to %true if there was a * non-zero byte that could not be copied to userspace (ie. was past @usize). * * While unconditionally returning an error in this case is the simplest * solution, for maximum backward compatibility you should try to only return * -EMSGSIZE if the user explicitly requested the data that couldn't be copied. * Note that structure sizes can change due to header changes and simple * recompilations without code changes(!), so if you care about * @ignored_trailing you probably want to make sure that any new field data is * associated with a flag. Otherwise you might assume that a program knows * about data it does not. * * @ksize is just sizeof(*src), and @usize should've been passed by userspace. * The recommended usage is something like the following: * * SYSCALL_DEFINE2(foobar, struct foo __user *, uarg, size_t, usize) * { * int err; * bool ignored_trailing; * struct foo karg = {}; * * if (usize > PAGE_SIZE) * return -E2BIG; * if (usize < FOO_SIZE_VER0) * return -EINVAL; * * // ... modify karg somehow ... * * err = copy_struct_to_user(uarg, usize, &karg, sizeof(karg), * &ignored_trailing); * if (err) * return err; * if (ignored_trailing) * return -EMSGSIZE: * * // ... * } * * There are three cases to consider: * * If @usize == @ksize, then it's copied verbatim. * * If @usize < @ksize, then the kernel is trying to pass userspace a newer * struct than it supports. Thus we only copy the interoperable portions * (@usize) and ignore the rest (but @ignored_trailing is set to %true if * any of the trailing (@ksize - @usize) bytes are non-zero). * * If @usize > @ksize, then the kernel is trying to pass userspace an older * struct than userspace supports. In order to make sure the * unknown-to-the-kernel fields don't contain garbage values, we zero the * trailing (@usize - @ksize) bytes. * * Returns (in all cases, some data may have been copied): * * -EFAULT: access to userspace failed.
*/ static __always_inline __must_check int
copy_struct_to_user(void __user *dst, size_t usize, constvoid *src,
size_t ksize, bool *ignored_trailing)
{
size_t size = min(ksize, usize);
size_t rest = max(ksize, usize) - size;
/* Double check if ksize is larger than a known object size. */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ksize > __builtin_object_size(src, 1))) return -E2BIG;
/* Deal with trailing bytes. */ if (usize > ksize) { if (clear_user(dst + size, rest)) return -EFAULT;
} if (ignored_trailing)
*ignored_trailing = ksize < usize &&
memchr_inv(src + size, 0, rest) != NULL; /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */ if (copy_to_user(dst, src, size)) return -EFAULT; return 0;
}
long copy_from_kernel_nofault(void *dst, constvoid *src, size_t size); long notrace copy_to_kernel_nofault(void *dst, constvoid *src, size_t size);
long copy_from_user_nofault(void *dst, constvoid __user *src, size_t size); long notrace copy_to_user_nofault(void __user *dst, constvoid *src,
size_t size);
long strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(char *dst, constvoid *unsafe_addr, long count);
long strncpy_from_user_nofault(char *dst, constvoid __user *unsafe_addr, long count); long strnlen_user_nofault(constvoid __user *unsafe_addr, long count);
#ifndef __get_kernel_nofault #define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \ do { \
type __user *p = (type __force __user *)(src); \
type data; \ if (__get_user(data, p)) \ goto label; \
*(type *)dst = data; \
} while (0)
#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \ do { \
type __user *p = (type __force __user *)(dst); \
type data = *(type *)src; \ if (__put_user(data, p)) \ goto label; \
} while (0) #endif
/** * get_kernel_nofault(): safely attempt to read from a location * @val: read into this variable * @ptr: address to read from * * Returns 0 on success, or -EFAULT.
*/ #define get_kernel_nofault(val, ptr) ({ \ const typeof(val) *__gk_ptr = (ptr); \
copy_from_kernel_nofault(&(val), __gk_ptr, sizeof(val));\
})
Die Informationen auf dieser Webseite wurden
nach bestem Wissen sorgfältig zusammengestellt. Es wird jedoch weder Vollständigkeit, noch Richtigkeit,
noch Qualität der bereit gestellten Informationen zugesichert.
Bemerkung:
Die farbliche Syntaxdarstellung ist noch experimentell.