/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/* The minimal required randomness is 64 bits */ /* EXP_BLINDING_RANDOMNESS_LEN is the length of the randomness in mp_digits */ /* for 32 bits platforts it is 2 mp_digits (= 2 * 32 bits), for 64 bits it is equal to 128 bits */ #define EXP_BLINDING_RANDOMNESS_LEN ((128 + MP_DIGIT_BIT - 1) / MP_DIGIT_BIT) #define EXP_BLINDING_RANDOMNESS_LEN_BYTES (EXP_BLINDING_RANDOMNESS_LEN * sizeof(mp_digit))
/* ** Number of times to attempt to generate a prime (p or q) from a random ** seed (the seed changes for each iteration).
*/ #define MAX_PRIME_GEN_ATTEMPTS 10 /* ** Number of times to attempt to generate a key. The primes p and q change ** for each attempt.
*/ #define MAX_KEY_GEN_ATTEMPTS 10
/* Blinding Parameters max cache size */ #define RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE 20
/* exponent should not be greater than modulus */ #define BAD_RSA_KEY_SIZE(modLen, expLen) \
((expLen) > (modLen) || (modLen) > RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS / 8 || \
(expLen) > RSA_MAX_EXPONENT_BITS / 8)
struct blindingParamsStr {
blindingParams *next;
mp_int f, g; /* blinding parameter */ int counter; /* number of remaining uses of (f, g) */
};
/* ** RSABlindingParamsStr ** ** For discussion of Paul Kocher's timing attack against an RSA private key ** operation, see http://www.cryptography.com/timingattack/paper.html. The ** countermeasure to this attack, known as blinding, is also discussed in ** the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 11.118-11.119.
*/ struct RSABlindingParamsStr { /* Blinding-specific parameters */
PRCList link; /* link to list of structs */
SECItem modulus; /* list element "key" */
blindingParams *free, *bp; /* Blinding parameters queue */
blindingParams array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE]; /* precalculate montegomery reduction value */
mp_digit n0i; /* n0i = -( n & MP_DIGIT) ** -1 mod mp_RADIX */
}; typedefstruct RSABlindingParamsStr RSABlindingParams;
/* ** RSABlindingParamsListStr ** ** List of key-specific blinding params. The arena holds the volatile pool ** of memory for each entry and the list itself. The lock is for list ** operations, in this case insertions and iterations, as well as control ** of the counter for each set of blinding parameters.
*/ struct RSABlindingParamsListStr {
PZLock *lock; /* Lock for the list */
PRCondVar *cVar; /* Condidtion Variable */ int waitCount; /* Number of threads waiting on cVar */
PRCList head; /* Pointer to the list */
};
/* Number of times to reuse (f, g). Suggested by Paul Kocher */ #define RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_REUSE 50
/* Global, allows optional use of blinding. On by default. */ /* Cannot be changed at the moment, due to thread-safety issues. */ staticconst PRBool nssRSAUseBlinding = PR_TRUE;
static SECStatus
rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, const mp_int *q,
mp_int *e, PRBool needPublicExponent,
mp_int *d, PRBool needPrivateExponent,
RSAPrivateKey *key, unsignedint keySizeInBits)
{
mp_int n, phi;
mp_int psub1, qsub1, tmp;
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&phi) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&qsub1) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&tmp) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&n));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&phi));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&qsub1));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&tmp)); /* p and q must be distinct. */ if (mp_cmp(p, q) == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
rv = SECFailure; goto cleanup;
} /* 1. Compute n = p*q */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(p, q, &n)); /* verify that the modulus has the desired number of bits */ if ((unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(&n) != keySizeInBits) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
rv = SECFailure; goto cleanup;
}
/* at least one exponent must be given */
PORT_Assert(!(needPublicExponent && needPrivateExponent));
/* 2. Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1)); if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi)); /* 3. Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */ /* or e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */ if (needPublicExponent) {
err = mp_invmod(d, &phi, e);
} else {
err = mp_invmod(e, &phi, d);
}
} else {
err = MP_OKAY;
} /* Verify that phi(n) and e have no common divisors */ if (err != MP_OKAY) { if (err == MP_UNDEF) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
err = MP_OKAY; /* to keep PORT_SetError from being called again */
rv = SECFailure;
} goto cleanup;
}
/* 4. Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena); /* 5. Compute exponent2 = d mod (q-1) */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &qsub1, &tmp));
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent2, key->arena); /* 6. Compute coefficient = q**-1 mod p */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(q, p, &tmp));
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->coefficient, key->arena);
SECStatus
generate_prime(mp_int *prime, int primeLen)
{
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; int piter; unsignedchar *pb = NULL;
pb = PORT_Alloc(primeLen); if (!pb) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto cleanup;
} for (piter = 0; piter < MAX_PRIME_GEN_ATTEMPTS; piter++) {
CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pb, primeLen));
pb[0] |= 0xC0; /* set two high-order bits */
pb[primeLen - 1] |= 0x01; /* set low-order bit */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(prime, pb, primeLen));
err = mpp_make_prime_secure(prime, primeLen * 8, PR_FALSE); if (err != MP_NO) goto cleanup; /* keep going while err == MP_NO */
}
cleanup: if (pb)
PORT_ZFree(pb, primeLen); if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
rv = SECFailure;
} return rv;
}
/* * make sure the key components meet fips186 requirements.
*/ static PRBool
rsa_fips186_verify(mp_int *p, mp_int *q, mp_int *d, int keySizeInBits)
{
mp_int pq_diff;
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
PRBool ret = PR_FALSE;
if (keySizeInBits < 250) { /* not a valid FIPS length, no point in our other tests */ /* if you are here, and in FIPS mode, you are outside the security
* policy */ return PR_TRUE;
}
/* p & q are already known to be greater then sqrt(2)*2^(keySize/2-1) */ /* we also know that gcd(p-1,e) = 1 and gcd(q-1,e) = 1 because the
* mp_invmod() function will fail. */ /* now check p-q > 2^(keysize/2-100) */
MP_DIGITS(&pq_diff) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&pq_diff)); /* NSS always has p > q, so we know pq_diff is positive */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(p, q, &pq_diff)); if ((unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(&pq_diff) < (keySizeInBits / 2 - 100)) { goto cleanup;
} /* now verify d is large enough*/ if ((unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(d) < (keySizeInBits / 2)) { goto cleanup;
}
ret = PR_TRUE;
cleanup:
mp_clear(&pq_diff); return ret;
}
/* ** Generate and return a new RSA public and private key. ** Both keys are encoded in a single RSAPrivateKey structure. ** "cx" is the random number generator context ** "keySizeInBits" is the size of the key to be generated, in bits. ** 512, 1024, etc. ** "publicExponent" when not NULL is a pointer to some data that ** represents the public exponent to use. The data is a byte ** encoded integer, in "big endian" order.
*/
RSAPrivateKey *
RSA_NewKey(int keySizeInBits, SECItem *publicExponent)
{ unsignedint primeLen;
mp_int p = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
mp_int q = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
mp_int e = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
mp_int d = { 0, 0, 0, NULL }; int kiter; int max_attempts;
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; int prerr = 0;
RSAPrivateKey *key = NULL;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; /* Require key size to be a multiple of 16 bits. */ if (!publicExponent || keySizeInBits % 16 != 0 ||
BAD_RSA_KEY_SIZE((unsignedint)keySizeInBits / 8, publicExponent->len)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return NULL;
} /* 1. Set the public exponent and check if it's uneven and greater than 2.*/
MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&e));
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*publicExponent, &e); if (mp_iseven(&e) || !(mp_cmp_d(&e, 2) > 0)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); goto cleanup;
} #ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED /* Check that the exponent is not smaller than 65537 */ if (mp_cmp_d(&e, 0x10001) < 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); goto cleanup;
} #endif
/* 2. Allocate arena & key */
arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (!arena) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto cleanup;
}
key = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, RSAPrivateKey); if (!key) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto cleanup;
}
key->arena = arena; /* length of primes p and q (in bytes) */
primeLen = keySizeInBits / (2 * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&d) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&d)); /* 3. Set the version number (PKCS1 v1.5 says it should be zero) */
SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
key->version.data[0] = 0;
kiter = 0;
max_attempts = 5 * (keySizeInBits / 2); /* FIPS 186-4 B.3.3 steps 4.7 and 5.8 */ do {
PORT_SetError(0);
CHECK_SEC_OK(generate_prime(&p, primeLen));
CHECK_SEC_OK(generate_prime(&q, primeLen)); /* Assure p > q */ /* NOTE: PKCS #1 does not require p > q, and NSS doesn't use any * implementation optimization that requires p > q. We can remove * this code in the future.
*/ if (mp_cmp(&p, &q) < 0)
mp_exch(&p, &q); /* Attempt to use these primes to generate a key */
rv = rsa_build_from_primes(&p, &q,
&e, PR_FALSE, /* needPublicExponent=false */
&d, PR_TRUE, /* needPrivateExponent=true */
key, keySizeInBits); if (rv == SECSuccess) { if (rsa_fips186_verify(&p, &q, &d, keySizeInBits)) { break;
}
prerr = SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM; /* retry with different values */
} else {
prerr = PORT_GetError();
}
kiter++; /* loop until have primes */
} while (prerr == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM && kiter < max_attempts);
/* run a Fermat test */
res = mpp_fermat(p, 2); if (res != MP_OKAY) { return res;
}
/* If that passed, run some Miller-Rabin tests */
res = mpp_pprime_secure(p, 2); return res;
}
/* * Factorize a RSA modulus n into p and q by using the exponents e and d. * * In: e, d, n * Out: p, q * * See Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 8.2.2(i). * * The algorithm is probabilistic, it is run 64 times and each run has a 50% * chance of succeeding with a runtime of O(log(e*d)). * * The returned p might be smaller than q.
*/ static mp_err
rsa_factorize_n_from_exponents(mp_int *e, mp_int *d, mp_int *p, mp_int *q,
mp_int *n)
{ /* lambda is the private modulus: e*d = 1 mod lambda */ /* so: e*d - 1 = k*lambda = t*2^s where t is odd */
mp_int klambda;
mp_int t, onetwentyeight; unsignedlong s = 0; unsignedlong i;
/* cand = a^(t * 2^i) mod n, next_cand = a^(t * 2^(i+1)) mod n */
mp_int a;
mp_int cand;
mp_int next_cand;
/* pick random bases a, each one has a 50% leading to a factorization */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_set_int(&a, 2)); /* The following is equivalent to for (a=2, a <= 128, a+=2) */ while (mp_cmp(&a, &onetwentyeight) <= 0) { /* compute the base cand = a^(t * 2^0) [i = 0] */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&a, &t, n, &cand));
for (i = 0; i < s; i++) { /* condition 1: skip the base if we hit a trivial factor of n */ if (mp_cmp(&cand, &n_minus_one) == 0 || mp_cmp_d(&cand, 1) == 0) { break;
}
/* increase i in a^(t * 2^i) by squaring the number */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod_d(&cand, 2, n, &next_cand));
/* condition 2: a^(t * 2^(i+1)) = 1 mod n */ if (mp_cmp_d(&next_cand, 1) == 0) { /* conditions verified, gcd(a^(t * 2^i) - 1, n) is a factor */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&cand, 1, &cand));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_gcd(&cand, n, p)); if (mp_cmp_d(p, 1) == 0) {
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add_d(&cand, 1, &cand)); break;
}
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_div(n, p, q, NULL)); goto cleanup;
}
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&next_cand, &cand));
}
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add_d(&a, 2, &a));
}
/* if we reach here it's likely (2^64 - 1 / 2^64) that d is wrong */
err = MP_RANGE;
/* * Try to find the two primes based on 2 exponents plus a prime. * * In: e, d and p. * Out: p,q. * * Step 1, Since d = e**-1 mod phi, we know that d*e == 1 mod phi, or * d*e = 1+k*phi, or d*e-1 = k*phi. since d is less than phi and e is * usually less than d, then k must be an integer between e-1 and 1 * (probably on the order of e). * Step 1a, We can divide k*phi by prime-1 and get k*(q-1). This will reduce * the size of our division through the rest of the loop. * Step 2, Loop through the values k=e-1 to 1 looking for k. k should be on * the order or e, and e is typically small. This may take a while for * a large random e. We are looking for a k that divides kphi * evenly. Once we find a k that divides kphi evenly, we assume it * is the true k. It's possible this k is not the 'true' k but has * swapped factors of p-1 and/or q-1. Because of this, we * tentatively continue Steps 3-6 inside this loop, and may return looking * for another k on failure. * Step 3, Calculate our tentative phi=kphi/k. Note: real phi is (p-1)*(q-1). * Step 4a, kphi is k*(q-1), so phi is our tenative q-1. q = phi+1. * If k is correct, q should be the right length and prime. * Step 4b, It's possible q-1 and k could have swapped factors. We now have a * possible solution that meets our criteria. It may not be the only * solution, however, so we keep looking. If we find more than one, * we will fail since we cannot determine which is the correct * solution, and returning the wrong modulus will compromise both * moduli. If no other solution is found, we return the unique solution. * * This will return p & q. q may be larger than p in the case that p was given * and it was the smaller prime.
*/ static mp_err
rsa_get_prime_from_exponents(mp_int *e, mp_int *d, mp_int *p, mp_int *q,
mp_int *n, unsignedint keySizeInBits)
{
mp_int kphi; /* k*phi */
mp_int k; /* current guess at 'k' */
mp_int phi; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
mp_int r; /* remainder */
mp_int tmp; /* p-1 if p is given */
mp_err err = MP_OKAY; unsignedint order_k;
/* our algorithm looks for a factor k whose maximum size is dependent * on the size of our smallest exponent, which had better be the public * exponent (if it's the private, the key is vulnerable to a brute force * attack). * * since our factor search is linear, we need to limit the maximum * size of the public key. this should not be a problem normally, since * public keys are usually small. * * if we want to handle larger public key sizes, we should have * a version which tries to 'completely' factor k*phi (where completely * means 'factor into primes, or composites with which are products of * large primes). Once we have all the factors, we can sort them out and * try different combinations to form our phi. The risk is if (p-1)/2, * (q-1)/2, and k are all large primes. In any case if the public key * is small (order of 20 some bits), then a linear search for k is * manageable.
*/ if (mpl_significant_bits(e) > 23) {
err = MP_RANGE; goto cleanup;
}
/* kphi is (e*d)-1, which is the same as k*(p-1)(q-1) * d < (p-1)(q-1), therefor k must be less than e-1 * We can narrow down k even more, though. Since p and q are odd and both * have their high bit set, then we know that phi must be on order of * keySizeBits.
*/
order_k = (unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(&kphi) - keySizeInBits;
/* for (k=kinit; order(k) >= order_k; k--) { */ /* k=kinit: k can't be bigger than kphi/2^(keySizeInBits -1) */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_2expt(&k, keySizeInBits - 1));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_div(&kphi, &k, &k, NULL)); if (mp_cmp(&k, e) >= 0) { /* also can't be bigger then e-1 */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(e, 1, &k));
}
/* calculate our temp value */ /* This saves recalculating this value when the k guess is wrong, which
* is reasonably frequent. */ /* tmp = p-1 (used to calculate q-1= phi/tmp) */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &tmp));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_div(&kphi, &tmp, &kphi, &r)); if (mp_cmp_z(&r) != 0) { /* p-1 doesn't divide kphi, some parameter wasn't correct */
err = MP_RANGE; goto cleanup;
}
mp_zero(q); /* kphi is now k*(q-1) */
/* rest of the for loop */ for (; (err == MP_OKAY) && (mpl_significant_bits(&k) >= order_k);
err = mp_sub_d(&k, 1, &k)) {
CHECK_MPI_OK(err); /* looking for k as a factor of kphi */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_div(&kphi, &k, &phi, &r)); if (mp_cmp_z(&r) != 0) { /* not a factor, try the next one */ continue;
} /* we have a possible phi, see if it works */ if ((unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(&phi) != keySizeInBits / 2) { /* phi is not the right size */ continue;
} /* phi should be divisible by 2, since
* q is odd and phi=(q-1). */ if (mpp_divis_d(&phi, 2) == MP_NO) { /* phi is not divisible by 4 */ continue;
} /* we now have a candidate for the second prime */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add_d(&phi, 1, &tmp));
/* check to make sure it is prime */
err = rsa_is_prime(&tmp); if (err != MP_OKAY) { if (err == MP_NO) { /* No, then we still have the wrong phi */ continue;
} goto cleanup;
} /* * It is possible that we have the wrong phi if * k_guess*(q_guess-1) = k*(q-1) (k and q-1 have swapped factors). * since our q_quess is prime, however. We have found a valid * rsa key because: * q is the correct order of magnitude. * phi = (p-1)(q-1) where p and q are both primes. * e*d mod phi = 1. * There is no way to know from the info given if this is the * original key. We never want to return the wrong key because if * two moduli with the same factor is known, then euclid's gcd * algorithm can be used to find that factor. Even though the * caller didn't pass the original modulus, it doesn't mean the * modulus wasn't known or isn't available somewhere. So to be safe * if we can't be sure we have the right q, we don't return any. * * So to make sure we continue looking for other valid q's. If none * are found, then we can safely return this one, otherwise we just
* fail */ if (mp_cmp_z(q) != 0) { /* this is the second valid q, don't return either,
* just fail */
err = MP_RANGE; break;
} /* we only have one q so far, save it and if no others are found,
* it's safe to return it */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&tmp, q)); continue;
} if ((unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(&k) < order_k) { if (mp_cmp_z(q) == 0) { /* If we get here, something was wrong with the parameters we
* were given */
err = MP_RANGE;
}
}
cleanup:
mp_clear(&kphi);
mp_clear(&phi);
mp_clear(&k);
mp_clear(&r);
mp_clear(&tmp); return err;
}
/* * take a private key with only a few elements and fill out the missing pieces. * * All the entries will be overwritten with data allocated out of the arena * If no arena is supplied, one will be created. * * The following fields must be supplied in order for this function * to succeed: * one of either publicExponent or privateExponent * two more of the following 5 parameters. * modulus (n) * prime1 (p) * prime2 (q) * publicExponent (e) * privateExponent (d) * * NOTE: if only the publicExponent, privateExponent, and one prime is given, * then there may be more than one RSA key that matches that combination. * * All parameters will be replaced in the key structure with new parameters * Allocated out of the arena. There is no attempt to free the old structures. * Prime1 will always be greater than prime2 (even if the caller supplies the * smaller prime as prime1 or the larger prime as prime2). The parameters are * not overwritten on failure. * * How it works: * We can generate all the parameters from one of the exponents, plus the * two primes. (rsa_build_key_from_primes) * If we are given one of the exponents and both primes, we are done. * If we are given one of the exponents, the modulus and one prime, we * caclulate the second prime by dividing the modulus by the given * prime, giving us an exponent and 2 primes. * If we are given 2 exponents and one of the primes we calculate * k*phi = d*e-1, where k is an integer less than d which * divides d*e-1. We find factor k so we can isolate phi. * phi = (p-1)(q-1) * We can use phi to find the other prime as follows: * q = (phi/(p-1)) + 1. We now have 2 primes and an exponent. * (NOTE: if more then one prime meets this condition, the operation * will fail. See comments elsewhere in this file about this). * (rsa_get_prime_from_exponents) * If we are given 2 exponents and the modulus we factor the modulus to * get the 2 missing primes (rsa_factorize_n_from_exponents) *
*/
SECStatus
RSA_PopulatePrivateKey(RSAPrivateKey *key)
{
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
PRBool needPublicExponent = PR_TRUE;
PRBool needPrivateExponent = PR_TRUE;
PRBool hasModulus = PR_FALSE; unsignedint keySizeInBits = 0; int prime_count = 0; /* standard RSA nominclature */
mp_int p, q, e, d, n; /* remainder */
mp_int r;
mp_err err = 0;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
/* if the key didn't already have an arena, create one. */ if (key->arena == NULL) {
arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (!arena) { goto cleanup;
}
key->arena = arena;
}
/* load up the known exponents */ if (key->publicExponent.data) {
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent, &e);
needPublicExponent = PR_FALSE;
} if (key->privateExponent.data) {
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateExponent, &d);
needPrivateExponent = PR_FALSE;
} if (needPrivateExponent && needPublicExponent) { /* Not enough information, we need at least one exponent */
err = MP_BADARG; goto cleanup;
}
/* load up the known primes. If only one prime is given, it will be * assigned 'p'. Once we have both primes, well make sure p is the larger. * The value prime_count tells us howe many we have acquired.
*/ if (key->prime1.data) { int primeLen = key->prime1.len; if (key->prime1.data[0] == 0) {
primeLen--;
}
keySizeInBits = primeLen * 2 * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime1, &p);
prime_count++;
} if (key->prime2.data) { int primeLen = key->prime2.len; if (key->prime2.data[0] == 0) {
primeLen--;
}
keySizeInBits = primeLen * 2 * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime2, prime_count ? &q : &p);
prime_count++;
} /* load up the modulus */ if (key->modulus.data) { int modLen = key->modulus.len; if (key->modulus.data[0] == 0) {
modLen--;
}
keySizeInBits = modLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
hasModulus = PR_TRUE;
} /* if we have the modulus and one prime, calculate the second. */ if ((prime_count == 1) && (hasModulus)) { if (mp_div(&n, &p, &q, &r) != MP_OKAY || mp_cmp_z(&r) != 0) { /* p is not a factor or n, fail */
err = MP_BADARG; goto cleanup;
}
prime_count++;
}
/* If we didn't have enough primes try to calculate the primes from
* the exponents */ if (prime_count < 2) { /* if we don't have at least 2 primes at this point, then we need both
* exponents and one prime or a modulus*/ if (!needPublicExponent && !needPrivateExponent &&
(prime_count > 0)) {
CHECK_MPI_OK(rsa_get_prime_from_exponents(&e, &d, &p, &q, &n,
keySizeInBits));
} elseif (!needPublicExponent && !needPrivateExponent && hasModulus) {
CHECK_MPI_OK(rsa_factorize_n_from_exponents(&e, &d, &p, &q, &n));
} else { /* not enough given parameters to get both primes */
err = MP_BADARG; goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Assure p > q */ /* NOTE: PKCS #1 does not require p > q, and NSS doesn't use any * implementation optimization that requires p > q. We can remove * this code in the future.
*/ if (mp_cmp(&p, &q) < 0)
mp_exch(&p, &q);
/* we now have our 2 primes and at least one exponent, we can fill
* in the key */
rv = rsa_build_from_primes(&p, &q,
&e, needPublicExponent,
&d, needPrivateExponent,
key, keySizeInBits);
cleanup:
mp_clear(&p);
mp_clear(&q);
mp_clear(&e);
mp_clear(&d);
mp_clear(&n);
mp_clear(&r); if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
rv = SECFailure;
} if (rv && arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
key->arena = NULL;
} return rv;
}
/* ** An attack against RSA CRT was described by Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton in: ** "On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations", ** http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz ** ** As a defense against the attack, carry out the private key operation, ** followed up with a public key operation to invert the result. ** Verify that result against the input.
*/ static SECStatus
rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
{
mp_int n, e, v;
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&v) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&n));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&e));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&v));
CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, m, c));
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent, &e); /* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v)); if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
rv = SECFailure;
}
cleanup:
mp_clear(&n);
mp_clear(&e);
mp_clear(&v); if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
rv = SECFailure;
} return rv;
}
MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&e));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent, &e); /* generate random k < n */
kb = PORT_Alloc(modLen); if (!kb) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto cleanup;
}
CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(kb, modLen));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, modLen)); /* k < n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&k, n, &k)); /* f = k**e mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&k, &e, n, f)); /* g = k**-1 mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, n, g)); /* g in montgomery form.. */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_mont(g, n, g));
cleanup: if (kb)
PORT_ZFree(kb, modLen);
mp_clear(&k);
mp_clear(&e); if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
rv = SECFailure;
} return rv;
}
static SECStatus
init_blinding_params(RSABlindingParams *rsabp, RSAPrivateKey *key,
mp_int *n, unsignedint modLen)
{
blindingParams *bp = rsabp->array; int i = 0;
/* Initialize the list pointer for the element */
PR_INIT_CLIST(&rsabp->link); for (i = 0; i < RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE; ++i, ++bp) {
bp->next = bp + 1;
MP_DIGITS(&bp->f) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&bp->g) = 0;
bp->counter = 0;
} /* The last bp->next value was initialized with out * of rsabp->array pointer and must be set to NULL
*/
rsabp->array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE - 1].next = NULL;
bp = rsabp->array;
rsabp->bp = NULL;
rsabp->free = bp;
do { if (blindingParamsList.lock == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure;
} /* Acquire the list lock */
PZ_Lock(blindingParamsList.lock);
holdingLock = PR_TRUE;
/* Walk the list looking for the private key */ for (el = PR_NEXT_LINK(&blindingParamsList.head);
el != &blindingParamsList.head;
el = PR_NEXT_LINK(el)) {
rsabp = (RSABlindingParams *)el;
cmp = SECITEM_CompareItem(&rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus); if (cmp >= 0) { /* The key is found or not in the list. */ break;
}
}
if (cmp) { /* At this point, the key is not in the list. el should point to ** the list element before which this key should be inserted.
*/
rsabp = PORT_ZNew(RSABlindingParams); if (!rsabp) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto cleanup;
}
rv = init_blinding_params(rsabp, key, n, modLen); if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_ZFree(rsabp, sizeof(RSABlindingParams)); goto cleanup;
}
/* Insert the new element into the list ** If inserting in the middle of the list, el points to the link ** to insert before. Otherwise, the link needs to be appended to ** the end of the list, which is the same as inserting before the ** head (since el would have looped back to the head).
*/
PR_INSERT_BEFORE(&rsabp->link, el);
}
/* We've found (or created) the RSAblindingParams struct for this key. * Now, search its list of ready blinding params for a usable one.
*/
*n0i = rsabp->n0i; while (0 != (bp = rsabp->bp)) { #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE /* Found a match and there are still remaining uses left */ /* Return the parameters */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->f, f));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->g, g));
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock); return SECSuccess; #else if (--(bp->counter) > 0) { /* Found a match and there are still remaining uses left */ /* Return the parameters */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->f, f));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->g, g));
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock); return SECSuccess;
} /* exhausted this one, give its values to caller, and * then retire it.
*/
mp_exch(&bp->f, f);
mp_exch(&bp->g, g);
mp_clear(&bp->f);
mp_clear(&bp->g);
bp->counter = 0; /* Move to free list */
rsabp->bp = bp->next;
bp->next = rsabp->free;
rsabp->free = bp; /* In case there're threads waiting for new blinding * value - notify 1 thread the value is ready
*/ if (blindingParamsList.waitCount > 0) {
PR_NotifyCondVar(blindingParamsList.cVar);
blindingParamsList.waitCount--;
}
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock); return SECSuccess; #endif
} /* We did not find a usable set of blinding params. Can we make one? */ /* Find a free bp struct. */ if ((bp = rsabp->free) != NULL) { /* unlink this bp */
rsabp->free = bp->next;
bp->next = NULL;
bpUnlinked = bp; /* In case we fail */
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
holdingLock = PR_FALSE; /* generate blinding parameter values for the current thread */
CHECK_SEC_OK(generate_blinding_params(key, f, g, n, modLen));
/* put the blinding parameter values into cache */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&bp->f));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&bp->g));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(f, &bp->f));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(g, &bp->g));
/* Put this at head of queue of usable params. */
PZ_Lock(blindingParamsList.lock);
holdingLock = PR_TRUE;
(void)holdingLock; /* initialize RSABlindingParamsStr */
bp->counter = RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_REUSE;
bp->next = rsabp->bp;
rsabp->bp = bp;
bpUnlinked = NULL; /* In case there're threads waiting for new blinding value * just notify them the value is ready
*/ if (blindingParamsList.waitCount > 0) {
PR_NotifyAllCondVar(blindingParamsList.cVar);
blindingParamsList.waitCount = 0;
}
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock); return SECSuccess;
} /* Here, there are no usable blinding parameters available, * and no free bp blocks, presumably because they're all * actively having parameters generated for them. * So, we need to wait here and not eat up CPU until some * change happens.
*/
blindingParamsList.waitCount++;
PR_WaitCondVar(blindingParamsList.cVar, PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT);
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
holdingLock = PR_FALSE;
(void)holdingLock;
} while (1);
cleanup: /* It is possible to reach this after the lock is already released. */ if (bpUnlinked) { if (!holdingLock) {
PZ_Lock(blindingParamsList.lock);
holdingLock = PR_TRUE;
}
bp = bpUnlinked;
mp_clear(&bp->f);
mp_clear(&bp->g);
bp->counter = 0; /* Must put the unlinked bp back on the free list */
bp->next = rsabp->free;
rsabp->free = bp;
} if (holdingLock) {
PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
} if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
}
*n0i = 0; return SECFailure;
}
/* ** Perform a raw private-key operation ** Length of input and output buffers are equal to key's modulus len.
*/ static SECStatus
rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key, unsignedchar *output, constunsignedchar *input,
PRBool check)
{ unsignedint modLen; unsignedint offset;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
mp_err err;
mp_int n, c, m;
mp_int f, g;
mp_digit n0i; if (!key || !output || !input) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure;
} /* check input out of range (needs to be in range [0..n-1]) */
modLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus); if (modLen == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure;
}
offset = (key->modulus.data[0] == 0) ? 1 : 0; /* may be leading 0 */ if (memcmp(input, key->modulus.data + offset, modLen) >= 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure;
}
MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&c) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&m) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&f) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&g) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&n));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&c));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&m));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&f));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
OCTETS_TO_MPINT(input, &c, modLen); /* If blinding, compute pre-image of ciphertext by multiplying by ** blinding factor
*/ if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g, &n0i)); /* c' = c*f mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&c, &f, &n, &c));
} /* Do the private key operation m = c**d mod n */ if (key->prime1.len == 0 ||
key->prime2.len == 0 ||
key->exponent1.len == 0 ||
key->exponent2.len == 0 ||
key->coefficient.len == 0) {
CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpNoCRT(key, &m, &c, &n, modLen));
} elseif (check) {
CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(key, &m, &c));
} else {
CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, &m, &c));
} /* If blinding, compute post-image of plaintext by multiplying by ** blinding factor
*/ if (nssRSAUseBlinding) { /* m = m'*g mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmontmodCT(&m, &g, &n, n0i, &m));
}
err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&m, output, modLen); if (err >= 0)
err = MP_OKAY;
cleanup:
mp_clear(&n);
mp_clear(&c);
mp_clear(&m);
mp_clear(&f);
mp_clear(&g); if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
rv = SECFailure;
} return rv;
}
/* * need a central place for this function to free up all the memory that * free_bl may have allocated along the way. Currently only RSA does this, * so I've put it here for now.
*/ void
BL_Cleanup(void)
{
RSA_Cleanup();
}
PRBool bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize;
/* * Set fork flag so it can be tested in SKIP_AFTER_FORK on relevant platforms.
*/ void
BL_SetForkState(PRBool forked)
{
bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize = forked;
}
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