(* Title: HOL/Auth/Message.thy
Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge
Datatypes of agents and messages;
Inductive relations "parts", "analz" and "synth"
*)
section\<open>Theory of Agents and Messages for Security Protocols\<close>
theory Message
imports Main
begin
(*Needed occasionally with spy_analz_tac, e.g. in analz_insert_Key_newK*)
lemma [simp] : "A \ (B \ A) = B \ A"
by blast
type_synonym
key = nat
consts
all_symmetric :: bool \<comment> \<open>true if all keys are symmetric\<close>
invKey :: "key\key" \ \inverse of a symmetric key\
specification (invKey)
invKey [simp]: "invKey (invKey K) = K"
invKey_symmetric: "all_symmetric \ invKey = id"
by (rule exI [of _ id], auto)
text\<open>The inverse of a symmetric key is itself; that of a public key
is the private key and vice versa\<close>
definition symKeys :: "key set" where
"symKeys == {K. invKey K = K}"
datatype \<comment> \<open>We allow any number of friendly agents\<close>
agent = Server | Friend nat | Spy
datatype
msg = Agent agent \<comment> \<open>Agent names\<close>
| Number nat \<comment> \<open>Ordinary integers, timestamps, ...\<close>
| Nonce nat \<comment> \<open>Unguessable nonces\<close>
| Key key \<comment> \<open>Crypto keys\<close>
| Hash msg \<comment> \<open>Hashing\<close>
| MPair msg msg \<comment> \<open>Compound messages\<close>
| Crypt key msg \<comment> \<open>Encryption, public- or shared-key\<close>
text\<open>Concrete syntax: messages appear as \<open>\<lbrace>A,B,NA\<rbrace>\<close>, etc...\<close>
syntax
"_MTuple" :: "['a, args] \ 'a * 'b" ("(2\_,/ _\)")
translations
"\x, y, z\" \ "\x, \y, z\\"
"\x, y\" \ "CONST MPair x y"
definition HPair :: "[msg,msg] \ msg" ("(4Hash[_] /_)" [0, 1000]) where
\<comment> \<open>Message Y paired with a MAC computed with the help of X\<close>
"Hash[X] Y == \Hash\X,Y\, Y\"
definition keysFor :: "msg set \ key set" where
\<comment> \<open>Keys useful to decrypt elements of a message set\<close>
"keysFor H == invKey ` {K. \X. Crypt K X \ H}"
subsubsection\<open>Inductive Definition of All Parts" of a Message\<close>
inductive_set
parts :: "msg set \ msg set"
for H :: "msg set"
where
Inj [intro]: "X \ H ==> X \ parts H"
| Fst: "\X,Y\ \ parts H ==> X \ parts H"
| Snd: "\X,Y\ \ parts H ==> Y \ parts H"
| Body: "Crypt K X \ parts H ==> X \ parts H"
text\<open>Monotonicity\<close>
lemma parts_mono: "G \ H ==> parts(G) \ parts(H)"
apply auto
apply (erule parts.induct)
apply (blast dest: parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)+
done
text\<open>Equations hold because constructors are injective.\<close>
lemma Friend_image_eq [simp]: "(Friend x \ Friend`A) = (x\A)"
by auto
lemma Key_image_eq [simp]: "(Key x \ Key`A) = (x\A)"
by auto
lemma Nonce_Key_image_eq [simp]: "(Nonce x \ Key`A)"
by auto
subsubsection\<open>Inverse of keys\<close>
lemma invKey_eq [simp]: "(invKey K = invKey K') = (K=K')"
by (metis invKey)
subsection\<open>keysFor operator\<close>
lemma keysFor_empty [simp]: "keysFor {} = {}"
by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
lemma keysFor_Un [simp]: "keysFor (H \ H') = keysFor H \ keysFor H'"
by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
lemma keysFor_UN [simp]: "keysFor (\i\A. H i) = (\i\A. keysFor (H i))"
by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
text\<open>Monotonicity\<close>
lemma keysFor_mono: "G \ H ==> keysFor(G) \ keysFor(H)"
by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
lemma keysFor_insert_Agent [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Agent A) H) = keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_insert_Nonce [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Nonce N) H) = keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_insert_Number [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Number N) H) = keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_insert_Key [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Key K) H) = keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_insert_Hash [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Hash X) H) = keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_insert_MPair [simp]: "keysFor (insert \X,Y\ H) = keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_insert_Crypt [simp]:
"keysFor (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (invKey K) (keysFor H)"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma keysFor_image_Key [simp]: "keysFor (Key`E) = {}"
by (unfold keysFor_def, auto)
lemma Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor: "Crypt K X \ H ==> invKey K \ keysFor H"
by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
subsection\<open>Inductive relation "parts"\<close>
lemma MPair_parts:
"[| \X,Y\ \ parts H;
[| X \<in> parts H; Y \<in> parts H |] ==> P |] ==> P"
by (blast dest: parts.Fst parts.Snd)
declare MPair_parts [elim!] parts.Body [dest!]
text\<open>NB These two rules are UNSAFE in the formal sense, as they discard the
compound message. They work well on THIS FILE.
\<open>MPair_parts\<close> is left as SAFE because it speeds up proofs.
The Crypt rule is normally kept UNSAFE to avoid breaking up certificates.\<close>
lemma parts_increasing: "H \ parts(H)"
by blast
lemmas parts_insertI = subset_insertI [THEN parts_mono, THEN subsetD]
lemma parts_empty [simp]: "parts{} = {}"
apply safe
apply (erule parts.induct, blast+)
done
lemma parts_emptyE [elim!]: "X\ parts{} ==> P"
by simp
text\<open>WARNING: loops if H = {Y}, therefore must not be repeated!\<close>
lemma parts_singleton: "X\ parts H ==> \Y\H. X\ parts {Y}"
by (erule parts.induct, fast+)
subsubsection\<open>Unions\<close>
lemma parts_Un_subset1: "parts(G) \ parts(H) \ parts(G \ H)"
by (intro Un_least parts_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)
lemma parts_Un_subset2: "parts(G \ H) \ parts(G) \ parts(H)"
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule parts.induct, blast+)
done
lemma parts_Un [simp]: "parts(G \ H) = parts(G) \ parts(H)"
by (intro equalityI parts_Un_subset1 parts_Un_subset2)
lemma parts_insert: "parts (insert X H) = parts {X} \ parts H"
by (metis insert_is_Un parts_Un)
text\<open>TWO inserts to avoid looping. This rewrite is better than nothing.
But its behaviour can be strange.\<close>
lemma parts_insert2:
"parts (insert X (insert Y H)) = parts {X} \ parts {Y} \ parts H"
by (metis Un_commute Un_empty_right Un_insert_right insert_is_Un parts_Un)
lemma parts_UN_subset1: "(\x\A. parts(H x)) \ parts(\x\A. H x)"
by (intro UN_least parts_mono UN_upper)
lemma parts_UN_subset2: "parts(\x\A. H x) \ (\x\A. parts(H x))"
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule parts.induct, blast+)
done
lemma parts_UN [simp]:
"parts (\x\A. H x) = (\x\A. parts (H x))"
by (intro equalityI parts_UN_subset1 parts_UN_subset2)
lemma parts_image [simp]:
"parts (f ` A) = (\x\A. parts {f x})"
apply auto
apply (metis (mono_tags, hide_lams) image_iff parts_singleton)
apply (metis empty_subsetI image_eqI insert_absorb insert_subset parts_mono)
done
text\<open>Added to simplify arguments to parts, analz and synth.
NOTE: the UN versions are no longer used!\<close>
text\<open>This allows \<open>blast\<close> to simplify occurrences of
\<^term>\<open>parts(G\<union>H)\<close> in the assumption.\<close>
lemmas in_parts_UnE = parts_Un [THEN equalityD1, THEN subsetD, THEN UnE]
declare in_parts_UnE [elim!]
lemma parts_insert_subset: "insert X (parts H) \ parts(insert X H)"
by (blast intro: parts_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
subsubsection\<open>Idempotence and transitivity\<close>
lemma parts_partsD [dest!]: "X\ parts (parts H) ==> X\ parts H"
by (erule parts.induct, blast+)
lemma parts_idem [simp]: "parts (parts H) = parts H"
by blast
lemma parts_subset_iff [simp]: "(parts G \ parts H) = (G \ parts H)"
by (metis parts_idem parts_increasing parts_mono subset_trans)
lemma parts_trans: "[| X\ parts G; G \ parts H |] ==> X\ parts H"
by (metis parts_subset_iff subsetD)
text\<open>Cut\<close>
lemma parts_cut:
"[| Y\ parts (insert X G); X\ parts H |] ==> Y\ parts (G \ H)"
by (blast intro: parts_trans)
lemma parts_cut_eq [simp]: "X\ parts H ==> parts (insert X H) = parts H"
by (metis insert_absorb parts_idem parts_insert)
subsubsection\<open>Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages\<close>
lemmas parts_insert_eq_I = equalityI [OF subsetI parts_insert_subset]
lemma parts_insert_Agent [simp]:
"parts (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (parts H)"
apply (rule parts_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
done
lemma parts_insert_Nonce [simp]:
"parts (insert (Nonce N) H) = insert (Nonce N) (parts H)"
apply (rule parts_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
done
lemma parts_insert_Number [simp]:
"parts (insert (Number N) H) = insert (Number N) (parts H)"
apply (rule parts_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
done
lemma parts_insert_Key [simp]:
"parts (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (parts H)"
apply (rule parts_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
done
lemma parts_insert_Hash [simp]:
"parts (insert (Hash X) H) = insert (Hash X) (parts H)"
apply (rule parts_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
done
lemma parts_insert_Crypt [simp]:
"parts (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (parts (insert X H))"
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
apply (blast intro: parts.Body)
done
lemma parts_insert_MPair [simp]:
"parts (insert \X,Y\ H) =
insert \<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> (parts (insert X (insert Y H)))"
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule parts.induct, auto)
apply (blast intro: parts.Fst parts.Snd)+
done
lemma parts_image_Key [simp]: "parts (Key`N) = Key`N"
by auto
text\<open>In any message, there is an upper bound N on its greatest nonce.\<close>
lemma msg_Nonce_supply: "\N. \n. N\n \ Nonce n \ parts {msg}"
proof (induct msg)
case (Nonce n)
show ?case
by simp (metis Suc_n_not_le_n)
next
case (MPair X Y)
then show ?case \<comment> \<open>metis works out the necessary sum itself!\<close>
by (simp add: parts_insert2) (metis le_trans nat_le_linear)
qed auto
subsection\<open>Inductive relation "analz"\<close>
text\<open>Inductive definition of "analz" -- what can be broken down from a set of
messages, including keys. A form of downward closure. Pairs can
be taken apart; messages decrypted with known keys.\<close>
inductive_set
analz :: "msg set \ msg set"
for H :: "msg set"
where
Inj [intro,simp]: "X \ H ==> X \ analz H"
| Fst: "\X,Y\ \ analz H ==> X \ analz H"
| Snd: "\X,Y\ \ analz H ==> Y \ analz H"
| Decrypt [dest]:
"\Crypt K X \ analz H; Key(invKey K) \ analz H\ \ X \ analz H"
text\<open>Monotonicity; Lemma 1 of Lowe's paper\<close>
lemma analz_mono: "G\H ==> analz(G) \ analz(H)"
apply auto
apply (erule analz.induct)
apply (auto dest: analz.Fst analz.Snd)
done
text\<open>Making it safe speeds up proofs\<close>
lemma MPair_analz [elim!]:
"[| \X,Y\ \ analz H;
[| X \<in> analz H; Y \<in> analz H |] ==> P
|] ==> P"
by (blast dest: analz.Fst analz.Snd)
lemma analz_increasing: "H \ analz(H)"
by blast
lemma analz_subset_parts: "analz H \ parts H"
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule analz.induct, blast+)
done
lemmas analz_into_parts = analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD]
lemmas not_parts_not_analz = analz_subset_parts [THEN contra_subsetD]
lemma parts_analz [simp]: "parts (analz H) = parts H"
by (metis analz_increasing analz_subset_parts equalityI parts_mono parts_subset_iff)
lemma analz_parts [simp]: "analz (parts H) = parts H"
apply auto
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemmas analz_insertI = subset_insertI [THEN analz_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
subsubsection\<open>General equational properties\<close>
lemma analz_empty [simp]: "analz{} = {}"
apply safe
apply (erule analz.induct, blast+)
done
text\<open>Converse fails: we can analz more from the union than from the
separate parts, as a key in one might decrypt a message in the other\<close>
lemma analz_Un: "analz(G) \ analz(H) \ analz(G \ H)"
by (intro Un_least analz_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)
lemma analz_insert: "insert X (analz H) \ analz(insert X H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
subsubsection\<open>Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages\<close>
lemmas analz_insert_eq_I = equalityI [OF subsetI analz_insert]
lemma analz_insert_Agent [simp]:
"analz (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (analz H)"
apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma analz_insert_Nonce [simp]:
"analz (insert (Nonce N) H) = insert (Nonce N) (analz H)"
apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma analz_insert_Number [simp]:
"analz (insert (Number N) H) = insert (Number N) (analz H)"
apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma analz_insert_Hash [simp]:
"analz (insert (Hash X) H) = insert (Hash X) (analz H)"
apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
text\<open>Can only pull out Keys if they are not needed to decrypt the rest\<close>
lemma analz_insert_Key [simp]:
"K \ keysFor (analz H) ==>
analz (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (analz H)"
apply (unfold keysFor_def)
apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma analz_insert_MPair [simp]:
"analz (insert \X,Y\ H) =
insert \<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> (analz (insert X (insert Y H)))"
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
apply (erule analz.induct)
apply (blast intro: analz.Fst analz.Snd)+
done
text\<open>Can pull out enCrypted message if the Key is not known\<close>
lemma analz_insert_Crypt:
"Key (invKey K) \ analz H
==> analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (analz H)"
apply (rule analz_insert_eq_I)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma lemma1: "Key (invKey K) \ analz H ==>
analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) \<subseteq>
insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))"
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule_tac x = x in analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma lemma2: "Key (invKey K) \ analz H ==>
insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H)) \<subseteq>
analz (insert (Crypt K X) H)"
apply auto
apply (erule_tac x = x in analz.induct, auto)
apply (blast intro: analz_insertI analz.Decrypt)
done
lemma analz_insert_Decrypt:
"Key (invKey K) \ analz H ==>
analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) =
insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))"
by (intro equalityI lemma1 lemma2)
text\<open>Case analysis: either the message is secure, or it is not! Effective,
but can cause subgoals to blow up! Use with \<open>if_split\<close>; apparently
\<open>split_tac\<close> does not cope with patterns such as \<^term>\<open>analz (insert
(Crypt K X) H)\<close>\<close>
lemma analz_Crypt_if [simp]:
"analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) =
(if (Key (invKey K) \<in> analz H)
then insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))
else insert (Crypt K X) (analz H))"
by (simp add: analz_insert_Crypt analz_insert_Decrypt)
text\<open>This rule supposes "for the sake of argument" that we have the key.\<close>
lemma analz_insert_Crypt_subset:
"analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) \
insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))"
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
lemma analz_image_Key [simp]: "analz (Key`N) = Key`N"
apply auto
apply (erule analz.induct, auto)
done
subsubsection\<open>Idempotence and transitivity\<close>
lemma analz_analzD [dest!]: "X\ analz (analz H) ==> X\ analz H"
by (erule analz.induct, blast+)
lemma analz_idem [simp]: "analz (analz H) = analz H"
by blast
lemma analz_subset_iff [simp]: "(analz G \ analz H) = (G \ analz H)"
by (metis analz_idem analz_increasing analz_mono subset_trans)
lemma analz_trans: "[| X\ analz G; G \ analz H |] ==> X\ analz H"
by (drule analz_mono, blast)
text\<open>Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe\<close>
lemma analz_cut: "[| Y\ analz (insert X H); X\ analz H |] ==> Y\ analz H"
by (erule analz_trans, blast)
(*Cut can be proved easily by induction on
"Y: analz (insert X H) ==> X: analz H \<longrightarrow> Y: analz H"
*)
text\<open>This rewrite rule helps in the simplification of messages that involve
the forwarding of unknown components (X). Without it, removing occurrences
of X can be very complicated.\<close>
lemma analz_insert_eq: "X\ analz H ==> analz (insert X H) = analz H"
by (metis analz_cut analz_insert_eq_I insert_absorb)
text\<open>A congruence rule for "analz"\<close>
lemma analz_subset_cong:
"[| analz G \ analz G'; analz H \ analz H' |]
==> analz (G \<union> H) \<subseteq> analz (G' \<union> H')"
by (metis Un_mono analz_Un analz_subset_iff subset_trans)
lemma analz_cong:
"[| analz G = analz G'; analz H = analz H' |]
==> analz (G \<union> H) = analz (G' \<union> H')"
by (intro equalityI analz_subset_cong, simp_all)
lemma analz_insert_cong:
"analz H = analz H' ==> analz(insert X H) = analz(insert X H')"
by (force simp only: insert_def intro!: analz_cong)
text\<open>If there are no pairs or encryptions then analz does nothing\<close>
lemma analz_trivial:
"[| \X Y. \X,Y\ \ H; \X K. Crypt K X \ H |] ==> analz H = H"
apply safe
apply (erule analz.induct, blast+)
done
text\<open>These two are obsolete (with a single Spy) but cost little to prove...\<close>
lemma analz_UN_analz_lemma:
"X\ analz (\i\A. analz (H i)) ==> X\ analz (\i\A. H i)"
apply (erule analz.induct)
apply (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])+
done
lemma analz_UN_analz [simp]: "analz (\i\A. analz (H i)) = analz (\i\A. H i)"
by (blast intro: analz_UN_analz_lemma analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
subsection\<open>Inductive relation "synth"\<close>
text\<open>Inductive definition of "synth" -- what can be built up from a set of
messages. A form of upward closure. Pairs can be built, messages
encrypted with known keys. Agent names are public domain.
Numbers can be guessed, but Nonces cannot be.\<close>
inductive_set
synth :: "msg set => msg set"
for H :: "msg set"
where
Inj [intro]: "X \ H ==> X \ synth H"
| Agent [intro]: "Agent agt \ synth H"
| Number [intro]: "Number n \ synth H"
| Hash [intro]: "X \ synth H ==> Hash X \ synth H"
| MPair [intro]: "[|X \ synth H; Y \ synth H|] ==> \X,Y\ \ synth H"
| Crypt [intro]: "[|X \ synth H; Key(K) \ H|] ==> Crypt K X \ synth H"
text\<open>Monotonicity\<close>
lemma synth_mono: "G\H ==> synth(G) \ synth(H)"
by (auto, erule synth.induct, auto)
text\<open>NO \<open>Agent_synth\<close>, as any Agent name can be synthesized.
The same holds for \<^term>\<open>Number\<close>\<close>
inductive_simps synth_simps [iff]:
"Nonce n \ synth H"
"Key K \ synth H"
"Hash X \ synth H"
"\X,Y\ \ synth H"
"Crypt K X \ synth H"
lemma synth_increasing: "H \ synth(H)"
by blast
subsubsection\<open>Unions\<close>
text\<open>Converse fails: we can synth more from the union than from the
separate parts, building a compound message using elements of each.\<close>
lemma synth_Un: "synth(G) \ synth(H) \ synth(G \ H)"
by (intro Un_least synth_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)
lemma synth_insert: "insert X (synth H) \ synth(insert X H)"
by (blast intro: synth_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
subsubsection\<open>Idempotence and transitivity\<close>
lemma synth_synthD [dest!]: "X\ synth (synth H) ==> X\ synth H"
by (erule synth.induct, auto)
lemma synth_idem: "synth (synth H) = synth H"
by blast
lemma synth_subset_iff [simp]: "(synth G \ synth H) = (G \ synth H)"
by (metis subset_trans synth_idem synth_increasing synth_mono)
lemma synth_trans: "[| X\ synth G; G \ synth H |] ==> X\ synth H"
by (drule synth_mono, blast)
text\<open>Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe\<close>
lemma synth_cut: "[| Y\ synth (insert X H); X\ synth H |] ==> Y\ synth H"
by (erule synth_trans, blast)
lemma Crypt_synth_eq [simp]:
"Key K \ H ==> (Crypt K X \ synth H) = (Crypt K X \ H)"
by blast
lemma keysFor_synth [simp]:
"keysFor (synth H) = keysFor H \ invKey`{K. Key K \ H}"
by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
subsubsection\<open>Combinations of parts, analz and synth\<close>
lemma parts_synth [simp]: "parts (synth H) = parts H \ synth H"
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule parts.induct)
apply (blast intro: synth_increasing [THEN parts_mono, THEN subsetD]
parts.Fst parts.Snd parts.Body)+
done
lemma analz_analz_Un [simp]: "analz (analz G \ H) = analz (G \ H)"
apply (intro equalityI analz_subset_cong)+
apply simp_all
done
lemma analz_synth_Un [simp]: "analz (synth G \ H) = analz (G \ H) \ synth G"
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule analz.induct)
prefer 5 apply (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
apply (blast intro: analz.Fst analz.Snd analz.Decrypt)+
done
lemma analz_synth [simp]: "analz (synth H) = analz H \ synth H"
by (metis Un_empty_right analz_synth_Un)
subsubsection\<open>For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces\<close>
lemma parts_insert_subset_Un: "X\ G ==> parts(insert X H) \ parts G \ parts H"
by (metis UnCI Un_upper2 insert_subset parts_Un parts_mono)
text\<open>More specifically for Fake. See also \<open>Fake_parts_sing\<close> below\<close>
lemma Fake_parts_insert:
"X \ synth (analz H) ==>
parts (insert X H) \<subseteq> synth (analz H) \<union> parts H"
by (metis Un_commute analz_increasing insert_subset parts_analz parts_mono
parts_synth synth_mono synth_subset_iff)
lemma Fake_parts_insert_in_Un:
"\Z \ parts (insert X H); X \ synth (analz H)\
\<Longrightarrow> Z \<in> synth (analz H) \<union> parts H"
by (metis Fake_parts_insert subsetD)
text\<open>\<^term>\<open>H\<close> is sometimes \<^term>\<open>Key ` KK \<union> spies evs\<close>, so can't put
\<^term>\<open>G=H\<close>.\<close>
lemma Fake_analz_insert:
"X\ synth (analz G) ==>
analz (insert X H) \<subseteq> synth (analz G) \<union> analz (G \<union> H)"
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (subgoal_tac "x \ analz (synth (analz G) \ H)", force)
apply (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD] analz_mono [THEN synth_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
done
lemma analz_conj_parts [simp]:
"(X \ analz H \ X \ parts H) = (X \ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
lemma analz_disj_parts [simp]:
"(X \ analz H | X \ parts H) = (X \ parts H)"
by (blast intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
text\<open>Without this equation, other rules for synth and analz would yield
redundant cases\<close>
lemma MPair_synth_analz [iff]:
"(\X,Y\ \ synth (analz H)) =
(X \<in> synth (analz H) \<and> Y \<in> synth (analz H))"
by blast
lemma Crypt_synth_analz:
"[| Key K \ analz H; Key (invKey K) \ analz H |]
==> (Crypt K X \<in> synth (analz H)) = (X \<in> synth (analz H))"
by blast
lemma Hash_synth_analz [simp]:
"X \ synth (analz H)
==> (Hash\<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> \<in> synth (analz H)) = (Hash\<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> \<in> analz H)"
by blast
subsection\<open>HPair: a combination of Hash and MPair\<close>
subsubsection\<open>Freeness\<close>
lemma Agent_neq_HPair: "Agent A \ Hash[X] Y"
unfolding HPair_def by simp
lemma Nonce_neq_HPair: "Nonce N \ Hash[X] Y"
unfolding HPair_def by simp
lemma Number_neq_HPair: "Number N \ Hash[X] Y"
unfolding HPair_def by simp
lemma Key_neq_HPair: "Key K \ Hash[X] Y"
unfolding HPair_def by simp
lemma Hash_neq_HPair: "Hash Z \ Hash[X] Y"
unfolding HPair_def by simp
lemma Crypt_neq_HPair: "Crypt K X' \ Hash[X] Y"
unfolding HPair_def by simp
lemmas HPair_neqs = Agent_neq_HPair Nonce_neq_HPair Number_neq_HPair
Key_neq_HPair Hash_neq_HPair Crypt_neq_HPair
declare HPair_neqs [iff]
declare HPair_neqs [symmetric, iff]
lemma HPair_eq [iff]: "(Hash[X'] Y' = Hash[X] Y) = (X' = X \ Y'=Y)"
by (simp add: HPair_def)
lemma MPair_eq_HPair [iff]:
"(\X',Y'\ = Hash[X] Y) = (X' = Hash\X,Y\ \ Y'=Y)"
by (simp add: HPair_def)
lemma HPair_eq_MPair [iff]:
"(Hash[X] Y = \X',Y'\) = (X' = Hash\X,Y\ \ Y'=Y)"
by (auto simp add: HPair_def)
subsubsection\<open>Specialized laws, proved in terms of those for Hash and MPair\<close>
lemma keysFor_insert_HPair [simp]: "keysFor (insert (Hash[X] Y) H) = keysFor H"
by (simp add: HPair_def)
lemma parts_insert_HPair [simp]:
"parts (insert (Hash[X] Y) H) =
insert (Hash[X] Y) (insert (Hash\<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace>) (parts (insert Y H)))"
by (simp add: HPair_def)
lemma analz_insert_HPair [simp]:
"analz (insert (Hash[X] Y) H) =
insert (Hash[X] Y) (insert (Hash\<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace>) (analz (insert Y H)))"
by (simp add: HPair_def)
lemma HPair_synth_analz [simp]:
"X \ synth (analz H)
==> (Hash[X] Y \<in> synth (analz H)) =
(Hash \<lbrace>X, Y\<rbrace> \<in> analz H \<and> Y \<in> synth (analz H))"
by (auto simp add: HPair_def)
text\<open>We do NOT want Crypt... messages broken up in protocols!!\<close>
declare parts.Body [rule del]
text\<open>Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can
be pulled out using the \<open>analz_insert\<close> rules\<close>
lemmas pushKeys =
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Agent C"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Nonce N"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Number N"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Hash X"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "MPair X Y"]
insert_commute [of "Key K" "Crypt X K'"]
for K C N X Y K'
lemmas pushCrypts =
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Agent C"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Agent C"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Nonce N"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Number N"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "Hash X'"]
insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "MPair X' Y"]
for X K C N X' Y
text\<open>Cannot be added with \<open>[simp]\<close> -- messages should not always be
re-ordered.\<close>
lemmas pushes = pushKeys pushCrypts
subsection\<open>The set of key-free messages\<close>
(*Note that even the encryption of a key-free message remains key-free.
This concept is valuable because of the theorem analz_keyfree_into_Un, proved below. *)
inductive_set
keyfree :: "msg set"
where
Agent: "Agent A \ keyfree"
| Number: "Number N \ keyfree"
| Nonce: "Nonce N \ keyfree"
| Hash: "Hash X \ keyfree"
| MPair: "[|X \ keyfree; Y \ keyfree|] ==> \X,Y\ \ keyfree"
| Crypt: "[|X \ keyfree|] ==> Crypt K X \ keyfree"
declare keyfree.intros [intro]
inductive_cases keyfree_KeyE: "Key K \ keyfree"
inductive_cases keyfree_MPairE: "\X,Y\ \ keyfree"
inductive_cases keyfree_CryptE: "Crypt K X \ keyfree"
lemma parts_keyfree: "parts (keyfree) \ keyfree"
by (clarify, erule parts.induct, auto elim!: keyfree_KeyE keyfree_MPairE keyfree_CryptE)
(*The key-free part of a set of messages can be removed from the scope of the analz operator.*)
lemma analz_keyfree_into_Un: "\X \ analz (G \ H); G \ keyfree\ \ X \ parts G \ analz H"
apply (erule analz.induct, auto dest: parts.Body)
apply (metis Un_absorb2 keyfree_KeyE parts_Un parts_keyfree UnI2)
done
subsection\<open>Tactics useful for many protocol proofs\<close>
ML
\<open>
(*Analysis of Fake cases. Also works for messages that forward unknown parts,
but this application is no longer necessary if analz_insert_eq is used.
DEPENDS UPON "X" REFERRING TO THE FRADULENT MESSAGE *)
fun impOfSubs th = th RSN (2, @{thm rev_subsetD})
(*Apply rules to break down assumptions of the form
Y \<in> parts(insert X H) and Y \<in> analz(insert X H)
*)
fun Fake_insert_tac ctxt =
dresolve_tac ctxt [impOfSubs @{thm Fake_analz_insert},
impOfSubs @{thm Fake_parts_insert}] THEN'
eresolve_tac ctxt [asm_rl, @{thm synth.Inj}];
fun Fake_insert_simp_tac ctxt i =
REPEAT (Fake_insert_tac ctxt i) THEN asm_full_simp_tac ctxt i;
fun atomic_spy_analz_tac ctxt =
SELECT_GOAL
(Fake_insert_simp_tac ctxt 1 THEN
IF_UNSOLVED
(Blast.depth_tac
(ctxt addIs [@{thm analz_insertI}, impOfSubs @{thm analz_subset_parts}]) 4 1));
fun spy_analz_tac ctxt i =
DETERM
(SELECT_GOAL
(EVERY
[ (*push in occurrences of X...*)
(REPEAT o CHANGED)
(Rule_Insts.res_inst_tac ctxt [((("x", 1), Position.none), "X")] []
(insert_commute RS ssubst) 1),
(*...allowing further simplifications*)
simp_tac ctxt 1,
REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL (resolve_tac ctxt [allI,impI,notI,conjI,iffI])),
DEPTH_SOLVE (atomic_spy_analz_tac ctxt 1)]) i);
\<close>
text\<open>By default only \<open>o_apply\<close> is built-in. But in the presence of
eta-expansion this means that some terms displayed as \<^term>\<open>f o g\<close> will be
rewritten, and others will not!\<close>
declare o_def [simp]
lemma Crypt_notin_image_Key [simp]: "Crypt K X \ Key ` A"
by auto
lemma Hash_notin_image_Key [simp] :"Hash X \ Key ` A"
by auto
lemma synth_analz_mono: "G\H ==> synth (analz(G)) \ synth (analz(H))"
by (iprover intro: synth_mono analz_mono)
lemma Fake_analz_eq [simp]:
"X \ synth(analz H) ==> synth (analz (insert X H)) = synth (analz H)"
by (metis Fake_analz_insert Un_absorb Un_absorb1 Un_commute
subset_insertI synth_analz_mono synth_increasing synth_subset_iff)
text\<open>Two generalizations of \<open>analz_insert_eq\<close>\<close>
lemma gen_analz_insert_eq [rule_format]:
"X \ analz H \ \G. H \ G \ analz (insert X G) = analz G"
by (blast intro: analz_cut analz_insertI analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
lemma synth_analz_insert_eq [rule_format]:
"X \ synth (analz H)
\<Longrightarrow> \<forall>G. H \<subseteq> G \<longrightarrow> (Key K \<in> analz (insert X G)) = (Key K \<in> analz G)"
apply (erule synth.induct)
apply (simp_all add: gen_analz_insert_eq subset_trans [OF _ subset_insertI])
done
lemma Fake_parts_sing:
"X \ synth (analz H) ==> parts{X} \ synth (analz H) \ parts H"
by (metis Fake_parts_insert empty_subsetI insert_mono parts_mono subset_trans)
lemmas Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un = Fake_parts_sing [THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
method_setup spy_analz = \<open>
Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o spy_analz_tac)\
"for proving the Fake case when analz is involved"
method_setup atomic_spy_analz = \<open>
Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o atomic_spy_analz_tac)\
"for debugging spy_analz"
method_setup Fake_insert_simp = \<open>
Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o Fake_insert_simp_tac)\
"for debugging spy_analz"
end
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