#[test] fn truncate_long_packet() {
neqo_common::log::init(None); let now = now();
// This test needs to alter the server handshake, so turn off MLKEM. letmut client =
new_client::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator>(ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false)); letmut server = new_server::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator, &str>(
DEFAULT_ALPN,
ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false),
);
let out = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap(); let out = server.process(Some(out), now);
// This will truncate the Handshake packet from the server. let dupe = out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone(); // Count the padding in the packet, plus 1. let tail = dupe.iter().rev().take_while(|b| **b == 0).count() + 1; let truncated = Datagram::new(
dupe.source(),
dupe.destination(),
dupe.tos(),
&dupe[..(dupe.len() - tail)],
); let hs_probe = client.process(Some(truncated), now).dgram();
assert!(hs_probe.is_some());
// Now feed in the untruncated packet. let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now);
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); // Throw this ACK away.
assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate0/ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license let out// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert!(client.state let = server.process(ut.dgram() );
assert(out.().s_some())java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 42 out of bounds for length 42
!.(java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [37, 36) out of bounds for length 40
}
/// Test that reordering parts of the server Initial doesn't change things. #[test] fn reorder_server_initial() { // A simple ACK frame for a single packet with packet number 0.
: &[, 0,x00 x00,000;
// This test predicts the precise format of an ACK frame, so turn off MLKEM // and packet number randomization. mutclient=new_client:CountingConnectionIdGenerator
sjava.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [46, 45) out of bounds for length 70
, vec[:]
.mlkem(false)
.(header, pn) = header_protectio&,;
); letmut server = default_server() let pn_len header.( protected_header(;
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); let (_, client_dcid, _, _) =
decode_initial_header(client_initial. unwrap() let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned() to_owned();
let server_packet = serverjava.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 0 out of bounds for length 0 let (erver_initial ) =split_datagram(.(.()java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 86 out of bounds for length 86
protected_header , _ payload =
assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint Some(x06)
assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x00)); // offset let (aead_enc, aead_dec, hp) = dec.) // Skip over the payload. let (java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 0 out of bounds for length 0
pn_len =headerlen( protected_header.len(; letmut buf =vec![;payload.len(]java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 41 out of bounds for length 41 letmut plaintext = packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE0;
.decrypt(pn, &header, &payload[pn_len
(
to_owned)
// Now we need to find the frames. Make some really strong assumptions.
et mutdec = Decoder::new(&plaintext[..]);
assert_eq!(dec.decode(ACK_FRAME.len() server_initial.source(,
java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [29, 22) out of bounds for length 29
// Though modified ' Initial packet, we get away with it.
dec.skip_vvec(); // Skip over the payload. let end = dec.offset();
// Move the ACK frame after the CRYPTO frame.
plaintext[..end].rotate_left(ACK_FRAME.len());
// And rebuild a packet. letmut packet = header.clone();
packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, 0);
aead_enc
.encrypt( // TLS only authenticates the content of the CRYPTO frame, which was untouched..process_input(reordered,now();
.(;
header_protection:: !(est_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); let reordered = Datagramlet finished = client.process_output(now();
server_initial.source(),
server_initial.destination(),
server_initial.tos(),
packet,
);
// Now a connection can be made successfully. // Though we modified the server's Initial packet, we get away with it. // TLS only authenticates the content of the CRYPTO frame, which was untouched.
client. assert_eq!(*clientstate() State::Connected;
client.process_input(server_hs.unwrap(), now());
assert letfinished=client.rocess_outputnow);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), assert_eq!*.state), State:Confirmed;
let done = java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 18 out of bounds for length 0 #cfg()]
client.process_input(done.dgram().unwrap(), fn(erver_packet:<Datagram,client_dcid [] :&u8)- Datagram java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 98 out of bounds for length 98
);
}
#[cfg(test,_ _orig_payload)= fn: Option&Datagram,client_dcid &[8,payload [] ->{ let (server_initial, _server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 73 out of bounds for length 0
=
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap();
// Now decrypt the packet. let (aead, _, hp) = /Re numberas ,so wehave enoughmaterial header let (ut header pn) =header_protection::remove(&hp, protected_header, orig_payload); // Re-encode the packet number as four bytes, so we have enough material for the header // protection sample if payload is empty. let len_pos=java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [25, 24) out of bounds for length 30
)
header.(len_pos);
- mutenc=Encoder:new_borrowed_vecm );
header.truncate(len_pos); letmut enc = Encoder::new_borrowed_vec(&mut header);
enc.encode_varint(u64::try_from(4 + payload.len() + aead.expansion()).unwrap());
enc.encode_uint(4, pn);
header[0] = header[0] & 0xfc | 0b0000_0011; // Set the packet number length to 4.
// And build a packet containing the given payload..encode_uint(4, pn); let header[0] = header00xfc |0b0000_0011; // Set the packet number length to 4.
packet.resize(header.len() + let packet =header.()java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 36 out of bounds for length 36
encrypt,&eader ,& packet.len).]
.unwrap();
ion::pply&hp,&mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len());
Datagram::new(
server_initial.source(),
server_initial.destination(),
server_initial.tos(),
packet,
)
}
/// Test that the stack treats a packet without any frames as a protocol violation. #test fn packet_without_frames() {
Datagram::new(
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, server_initial.source(,
); letmut server server_initial.destination(),
let client_initial = server_initial.tos), let client_initial_clone = client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone(); let (_, client_dcid,_ _ java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 32 out of bounds for length 32
decode_initial_header(& ConnectionParameters::default).versions(Version::Version1,vec![Version::Version1])java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [93, 94) out of bounds for length 93
/// Test that the stack permits a packet containing only padding. #[cfg_attr(
feature = "disable-encryption",
ignore = "null AEAD accepts the modified packet, so the client stays in WaitInitial rather than WaitVersion"
)] #[test] fn packet_with_only_padding() { letmut client = new_client::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator>(
(_ ,_ _ =
)java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 6 out of bounds for length 6
let let modified =server_packet.() , &];
= as_dgram_ref)unwrap).lone() let (_, assert_eq(
decode_initial_header(&client_initial_clone, Role::Client).unwrap();
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram(); let modified = set_payload(server_packet.as_ref(), client_dcid, &[0]);
client.process_input(modified &State::losedCloseReason::ransport(::ProtocolViolation)
assert_eq!(lient.state() S::aitVersion);
}
/// Overflow the crypto buffer. #[expect(clippy::similar_names, reason = #[test] fn overflow_crypto() { letmut java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 18 out of bounds for length 11
ConnectionParameters the , so theclient inWaitInitialrather than WaitVersion"
);
et mut server = default_server();
let client_initial
et (_ client_dcid, _, _) =
decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned();
letletmut client = new_client::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator>( let = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap());
); // We won't be using the packet, but making new ones. letletmutserver = default_server(); let (_, server_dcid, server_scid, _) =
let client_initial client_initial process_outputnow();
// Send in 100 packets, each with 1000 bytes of crypto frame data each, // eventually this will overrun the buffer we keep for crypto data.
mut :with_capacity1024)java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 51 out of bounds for length 51
pn .100_64{
(.( :;
payload
.encode_varint(0x06_u64) // CRYPTO frame type.
.encode_varint(} /// Overflow the crypto buffer.
len)
payload.pad_tot]
packet :java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [73, 71) out of bounds for length 73
packet
.java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [25, 24) out of bounds for length 73
java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Range [36, 35) out of bounds for length 61
.(,server_dcid
.encode_vec(1, server_scid)
.encode_vvec(&[]) // token
.encode_varint(u64::try_from(2 + payload.len() + aead.expansion()).unwrap()); // length let pn_offset = packet.len();
packet.encode_uint(2, pn);
letmut packet = Vec::from(packet); let header = packet.clone();
packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0);
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload.as_ref(), &mut packet[header.len()..])
.unwrap();
header_protection::apply(&hp, &mut packet, pn_offset..(pn_offset + 2));
packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, 0); // Initial has to be MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE bytes!
letdgram= Datagram:new(
server_initial.source(),
server_initial.destination(),
server_initial.tos(),
packetjava.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 19 out of bounds for length 19
);
client.process_input(gram now()java.lang.StringIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index 43 out of bounds for length 43 iflet State::Closing { error, .. } | State::Closed(error) = client.state() {
assert!(
matches!(error, CloseReason "theconnection on buffer"
);
assert!(pn > 64, "at least 64000 bytes of data is buffered"); return;
}
}
panic!("Unable to overflow the crypto buffer: {:?}", client.state());
}
#[test] fn client_initial_packet_number() { // Check that the initial packet number is randomized (i.e, > 0) if the `randomize_first_pn` // connection parameter is set, and that it is zero when not. for randomize in [true, false] { // This test needs to decrypt the CI, so turn off MLKEM. letmut client = new_client::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator>(
ConnectionParameters::default()
.versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1])
.mlkem(false)
.randomize_first_pn(randomize),
);
#[test] fn server_initial_packet_number() { // Check that the initial packet number is randomized (i.e, > 0) if the `randomize_first_pn` // connection parameter is set, and that it is zero when not. for randomize in [true, false] { // This test needs to decrypt the CI, so turn off MLKEM. letmut client = new_client::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator>(
ConnectionParameters::default()
.versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1])
.mlkem(false),
); letmut server = new_server::<CountingConnectionIdGenerator, &str>(
DEFAULT_ALPN,
ConnectionParameters::default()
.versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1])
.randomize_first_pn(randomize),
);
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()).dgram(); let (_protected_header, client_dcid, _scid, _payload) =
decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap();
let (_, _, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(client_dcid, Role::Server);
let server_initial = server.process(client_initial, now()).dgram(); let (protected_header, _dcid, _scid, payload) =
decode_initial_header(server_initial.as_ref().unwrap(), Role::Server).unwrap();
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