/* * Note, kvm_caps fields should *never* have default values, all fields must be * recomputed from scratch during vendor module load, e.g. to account for a * vendor module being reloaded with different module parameters.
*/ struct kvm_caps kvm_caps __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_caps);
/* tsc tolerance in parts per million - default to 1/2 of the NTP threshold */ static u32 __read_mostly tsc_tolerance_ppm = 250;
module_param(tsc_tolerance_ppm, uint, 0644);
/* * Restoring the host value for MSRs that are only consumed when running in * usermode, e.g. SYSCALL MSRs and TSC_AUX, can be deferred until the CPU * returns to userspace, i.e. the kernel can run with the guest's value.
*/ #define KVM_MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS 16
/* * The three MSR lists(msrs_to_save, emulated_msrs, msr_based_features) track * the set of MSRs that KVM exposes to userspace through KVM_GET_MSRS, * KVM_SET_MSRS, and KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST. msrs_to_save holds MSRs that * require host support, i.e. should be probed via RDMSR. emulated_msrs holds * MSRs that KVM emulates without strictly requiring host support. * msr_based_features holds MSRs that enumerate features, i.e. are effectively * CPUID leafs. Note, msr_based_features isn't mutually exclusive with * msrs_to_save and emulated_msrs.
*/
/* This part of MSRs should match KVM_MAX_NR_AMD_GP_COUNTERS. */
MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL2,
MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5,
MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2,
MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5,
/* * KVM always supports the "true" VMX control MSRs, even if the host * does not. The VMX MSRs as a whole are considered "emulated" as KVM * doesn't strictly require them to exist in the host (ignoring that * KVM would refuse to load in the first place if the core set of MSRs * aren't supported).
*/
MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC,
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS,
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS,
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS,
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS,
MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC,
MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0,
MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0,
MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM,
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC,
/* * List of MSRs that control the existence of MSR-based features, i.e. MSRs * that are effectively CPUID leafs. VMX MSRs are also included in the set of * feature MSRs, but are handled separately to allow expedited lookups.
*/ staticconst u32 msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[] = {
MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV,
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES,
MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES,
MSR_PLATFORM_INFO,
};
/* * All feature MSRs except uCode revID, which tracks the currently loaded uCode * patch, are immutable once the vCPU model is defined.
*/ staticbool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)
{ int i;
if (msr >= KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR && msr <= KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR) returntrue;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx); i++) { if (msr == msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[i]) return msr != MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV;
}
/* * Zero the data on read failures to avoid leaking stack data to the * guest and/or userspace, e.g. if the failure is ignored below.
*/
ret = msr_access_fn(vcpu, msr, data, host_initiated); if (ret && rw == MSR_TYPE_R)
*data = 0;
if (ret != KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED) return ret;
/* * Userspace is allowed to read MSRs, and write '0' to MSRs, that KVM * advertises to userspace, even if an MSR isn't fully supported. * Simply check that @data is '0', which covers both the write '0' case * and all reads (in which case @data is zeroed on failure; see above).
*/ if (host_initiated && !*data && kvm_is_advertised_msr(msr)) return 0;
if (!ignore_msrs) {
kvm_debug_ratelimited("unhandled %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n",
op, msr, *data); return ret;
}
if (report_ignored_msrs)
kvm_pr_unimpl("ignored %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", op, msr, *data);
/* * Disabling irqs at this point since the following code could be * interrupted and executed through kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu()
*/
local_irq_save(flags); if (msrs->registered) {
msrs->registered = false;
user_return_notifier_unregister(urn);
}
local_irq_restore(flags); for (slot = 0; slot < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++slot) {
values = &msrs->values[slot]; if (values->host != values->curr) {
wrmsrq(kvm_uret_msrs_list[slot], values->host);
values->curr = values->host;
}
}
}
staticint kvm_probe_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
{
u64 val; int ret;
preempt_disable();
ret = rdmsrq_safe(msr, &val); if (ret) goto out;
ret = wrmsrq_safe(msr, val);
out:
preempt_enable(); return ret;
}
int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
{
BUG_ON(kvm_nr_uret_msrs >= KVM_MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS);
if (msrs->registered)
kvm_on_user_return(&msrs->urn);
}
/* * Handle a fault on a hardware virtualization (VMX or SVM) instruction. * * Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a reboot turns * off virtualization while processes are running. Usually after catching the * fault we just panic; during reboot instead the instruction is ignored.
*/
noinstr void kvm_spurious_fault(void)
{ /* Fault while not rebooting. We want the trace. */
BUG_ON(!kvm_rebooting);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spurious_fault);
staticint exception_class(int vector)
{ switch (vector) { case PF_VECTOR: return EXCPT_PF; case DE_VECTOR: case TS_VECTOR: case NP_VECTOR: case SS_VECTOR: case GP_VECTOR: return EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY; default: break;
} return EXCPT_BENIGN;
}
if (WARN_ON(vector > 31 || vector == NMI_VECTOR)) return EXCPT_INTERRUPT;
mask = 1 << vector;
/* * #DBs can be trap-like or fault-like, the caller must check other CPU * state, e.g. DR6, to determine whether a #DB is a trap or fault.
*/ if (mask & (1 << DB_VECTOR)) return EXCPT_DB;
switch (ex->vector) { case DB_VECTOR: /* * "Certain debug exceptions may clear bit 0-3. The * remaining contents of the DR6 register are never * cleared by the processor".
*/
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS; /* * In order to reflect the #DB exception payload in guest * dr6, three components need to be considered: active low * bit, FIXED_1 bits and active high bits (e.g. DR6_BD, * DR6_BS and DR6_BT) * DR6_ACTIVE_LOW contains the FIXED_1 and active low bits. * In the target guest dr6: * FIXED_1 bits should always be set. * Active low bits should be cleared if 1-setting in payload. * Active high bits should be set if 1-setting in payload. * * Note, the payload is compatible with the pending debug * exceptions/exit qualification under VMX, that active_low bits * are active high in payload. * So they need to be flipped for DR6.
*/
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= ex->payload;
vcpu->arch.dr6 ^= ex->payload & DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
/* * The #DB payload is defined as compatible with the 'pending * debug exceptions' field under VMX, not DR6. While bit 12 is * defined in the 'pending debug exceptions' field (enabled * breakpoint), it is reserved and must be zero in DR6.
*/
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~BIT(12); break; case PF_VECTOR:
vcpu->arch.cr2 = ex->payload; break;
}
/* * If the exception is destined for L2, morph it to a VM-Exit if L1 * wants to intercept the exception.
*/ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->is_exception_vmexit(vcpu, nr, error_code)) {
kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(vcpu, nr, has_error, error_code,
has_payload, payload); return;
}
/* to check exception */
prev_nr = vcpu->arch.exception.vector; if (prev_nr == DF_VECTOR) { /* triple fault -> shutdown */
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu); return;
}
class1 = exception_class(prev_nr);
class2 = exception_class(nr); if ((class1 == EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY && class2 == EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY) ||
(class1 == EXCPT_PF && class2 != EXCPT_BENIGN)) { /* * Synthesize #DF. Clear the previously injected or pending * exception so as not to incorrectly trigger shutdown.
*/
vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
} else { /* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
exception */ goto queue;
}
}
/* * On VM-Entry, an exception can be pending if and only if event * injection was blocked by nested_run_pending. In that case, however, * vcpu_enter_guest() requests an immediate exit, and the guest * shouldn't proceed far enough to need reinjection.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu));
/* * Do not check for interception when injecting an event for L2, as the * exception was checked for intercept when it was original queued, and * re-checking is incorrect if _L1_ injected the exception, in which * case it's exempt from interception.
*/
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
/* * Async #PF in L2 is always forwarded to L1 as a VM-Exit regardless of * whether or not L1 wants to intercept "regular" #PF.
*/ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && fault->async_page_fault)
kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(vcpu, PF_VECTOR, true, fault->error_code, true, fault->address); else
kvm_queue_exception_e_p(vcpu, PF_VECTOR, fault->error_code,
fault->address);
}
/* * Invalidate the TLB entry for the faulting address, if it exists, * else the access will fault indefinitely (and to emulate hardware).
*/ if ((fault->error_code & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK) &&
!(fault->error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))
kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, fault_mmu, fault->address,
KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
/* * Load the pae pdptrs. Return 1 if they are all valid, 0 otherwise.
*/ int load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsignedlong cr3)
{ struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
gfn_t pdpt_gfn = cr3 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
gpa_t real_gpa; int i; int ret;
u64 pdpte[ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->pdptrs)];
/* * If the MMU is nested, CR3 holds an L2 GPA and needs to be translated * to an L1 GPA.
*/
real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(pdpt_gfn),
PFERR_USER_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK, NULL); if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA) return 0;
/* Note the offset, PDPTRs are 32 byte aligned when using PAE paging. */
ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa), pdpte,
cr3 & GENMASK(11, 5), sizeof(pdpte)); if (ret < 0) return 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pdpte); ++i) { if ((pdpte[i] & PT_PRESENT_MASK) &&
(pdpte[i] & pdptr_rsvd_bits(vcpu))) { return 0;
}
}
/* * Marking VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR dirty doesn't work for !tdp_enabled. * Shadow page roots need to be reconstructed instead.
*/ if (!tdp_enabled && memcmp(mmu->pdptrs, pdpte, sizeof(mmu->pdptrs)))
kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_NW) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_CD)) returnfalse;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)) returnfalse;
return kvm_x86_call(is_valid_cr0)(vcpu, cr0);
}
void kvm_post_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsignedlong old_cr0, unsignedlong cr0)
{ /* * CR0.WP is incorporated into the MMU role, but only for non-nested, * indirect shadow MMUs. If paging is disabled, no updates are needed * as there are no permission bits to emulate. If TDP is enabled, the * MMU's metadata needs to be updated, e.g. so that emulating guest * translations does the right thing, but there's no need to unload the * root as CR0.WP doesn't affect SPTEs.
*/ if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) == X86_CR0_WP) { if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) return;
if (tdp_enabled) {
kvm_init_mmu(vcpu); return;
}
}
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PG) {
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
/* * Clearing CR0.PG is defined to flush the TLB from the guest's * perspective.
*/ if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
}
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & KVM_MMU_CR0_ROLE_BITS)
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_post_set_cr0);
/* Only support XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK(xcr0) now */ if (index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK) return 1; if (!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_FP)) return 1; if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_YMM) && !(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)) return 1;
/* * Do not allow the guest to set bits that we do not support * saving. However, xcr0 bit 0 is always set, even if the * emulated CPU does not support XSAVE (see kvm_vcpu_reset()).
*/
valid_bits = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XFEATURE_MASK_FP; if (xcr0 & ~valid_bits) return 1;
if ((!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS)) !=
(!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR))) return 1;
if (xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) { if (!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_YMM)) return 1; if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) != XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) return 1;
}
int kvm_emulate_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* Note, #UD due to CR4.OSXSAVE=0 has priority over the intercept. */ if (kvm_x86_call(get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0 ||
__kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) {
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); return 1;
}
/* * If CR4.PCIDE is changed 0 -> 1, there is no need to flush the TLB * according to the SDM; however, stale prev_roots could be reused * incorrectly in the future after a MOV to CR3 with NOFLUSH=1, so we * free them all. This is *not* a superset of KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST * or KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, because the hardware TLB is not flushed, * so fall through.
*/ if (!tdp_enabled &&
(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE))
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
/* * The TLB has to be flushed for all PCIDs if any of the following * (architecturally required) changes happen: * - CR4.PCIDE is changed from 1 to 0 * - CR4.PGE is toggled * * This is a superset of KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT.
*/ if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE) ||
(!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
/* * The TLB has to be flushed for the current PCID if any of the * following (architecturally required) changes happen: * - CR4.SMEP is changed from 0 to 1 * - CR4.PAE is toggled
*/ elseif (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_PAE) ||
((cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP)))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)) { /* PCID can not be enabled when cr3[11:0]!=000H or EFER.LMA=0 */ if ((kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK) || !is_long_mode(vcpu)) return 1;
}
/* * MOV CR3 and INVPCID are usually not intercepted when using TDP, but * this is reachable when running EPT=1 and unrestricted_guest=0, and * also via the emulator. KVM's TDP page tables are not in the scope of * the invalidation, but the guest's TLB entries need to be flushed as * the CPU may have cached entries in its TLB for the target PCID.
*/ if (unlikely(tdp_enabled)) {
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu); return;
}
/* * If neither the current CR3 nor any of the prev_roots use the given * PCID, then nothing needs to be done here because a resync will * happen anyway before switching to any other CR3.
*/ if (kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu) == pcid) {
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
}
/* * If PCID is disabled, there is no need to free prev_roots even if the * PCIDs for them are also 0, because MOV to CR3 always flushes the TLB * with PCIDE=0.
*/ if (!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)) return;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) if (kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd) == pcid)
roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
/* PDPTRs are always reloaded for PAE paging. */ if (cr3 == kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) && !is_pae_paging(vcpu)) goto handle_tlb_flush;
/* * Do not condition the GPA check on long mode, this helper is used to * stuff CR3, e.g. for RSM emulation, and there is no guarantee that * the current vCPU mode is accurate.
*/ if (!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(vcpu, cr3)) return 1;
if (is_pae_paging(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, cr3)) return 1;
if (cr3 != kvm_read_cr3(vcpu))
kvm_mmu_new_pgd(vcpu, cr3);
vcpu->arch.cr3 = cr3;
kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3); /* Do not call post_set_cr3, we do not get here for confidential guests. */
handle_tlb_flush: /* * A load of CR3 that flushes the TLB flushes only the current PCID, * even if PCID is disabled, in which case PCID=0 is flushed. It's a * moot point in the end because _disabling_ PCID will flush all PCIDs, * and it's impossible to use a non-zero PCID when PCID is disabled, * i.e. only PCID=0 can be relevant.
*/ if (!skip_tlb_flush)
kvm_invalidate_pcid(vcpu, pcid);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr3);
int kvm_set_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsignedlong cr8)
{ if (cr8 & CR8_RESERVED_BITS) return 1; if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
kvm_lapic_set_tpr(vcpu, cr8); else
vcpu->arch.cr8 = cr8; return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr8);
static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
{
u64 data = kvm_host.arch_capabilities & KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP;
/* * If nx_huge_pages is enabled, KVM's shadow paging will ensure that * the nested hypervisor runs with NX huge pages. If it is not, * L1 is anyway vulnerable to ITLB_MULTIHIT exploits from other * L1 guests, so it need not worry about its own (L2) guests.
*/
data |= ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO;
/* * If we're doing cache flushes (either "always" or "cond") * we will do one whenever the guest does a vmlaunch/vmresume. * If an outer hypervisor is doing the cache flush for us * (ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH), we can safely pass that * capability to the guest too, and if EPT is disabled we're not * vulnerable. Overall, only VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER will * require a nested hypervisor to do a flush of its own.
*/ if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
data |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
data |= ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO; if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO; if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO; if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO; if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) { /* * If RTM=0 because the kernel has disabled TSX, the host might * have TAA_NO or TSX_CTRL. Clear TAA_NO (the guest sees RTM=0 * and therefore knows that there cannot be TAA) but keep * TSX_CTRL: some buggy userspaces leave it set on tsx=on hosts, * and we want to allow migrating those guests to tsx=off hosts.
*/
data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
} elseif (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
data |= ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
} else { /* * Nothing to do here; we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the * host so the guest can choose between disabling TSX or * using VERW to clear CPU buffers.
*/
}
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated())
data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO;
/* * Write @data into the MSR specified by @index. Select MSR specific fault * checks are bypassed if @host_initiated is %true. * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
*/ staticint __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data, bool host_initiated)
{ struct msr_data msr;
switch (index) { case MSR_FS_BASE: case MSR_GS_BASE: case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: case MSR_CSTAR: case MSR_LSTAR: if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(data, vcpu)) return 1; break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: /* * IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if * non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on * AMD (which ignores the top 32-bits, because it does * not implement 64-bit SYSENTER). * * 64-bit code should hence be able to write a non-canonical * value on AMD. Making the address canonical ensures that * vmentry does not fail on Intel after writing a non-canonical * value, and that something deterministic happens if the guest * invokes 64-bit SYSENTER.
*/
data = __canonical_address(data, max_host_virt_addr_bits()); break; case MSR_TSC_AUX: if (!kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX)) return 1;
if (!host_initiated &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID)) return 1;
/* * Per Intel's SDM, bits 63:32 are reserved, but AMD's APM has * incomplete and conflicting architectural behavior. Current * AMD CPUs completely ignore bits 63:32, i.e. they aren't * reserved and always read as zeros. Enforce Intel's reserved * bits check if the guest CPU is Intel compatible, otherwise * clear the bits. This ensures cross-vendor migration will * provide consistent behavior for the guest.
*/ if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu) && (data >> 32) != 0) return 1;
/* * Read the MSR specified by @index into @data. Select MSR specific fault * checks are bypassed if @host_initiated is %true. * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
*/ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data, bool host_initiated)
{ struct msr_data msr; int ret;
switch (index) { case MSR_TSC_AUX: if (!kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX)) return 1;
r = kvm_set_msr_with_filter(vcpu, msr, data); if (!r) {
trace_kvm_msr_write(msr, data);
} else { /* MSR write failed? See if we should ask user space */ if (kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, msr, KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, data,
complete_fast_msr_access, r)) return 0; /* Signal all other negative errors to userspace */ if (r < 0) return r;
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(msr, data);
}
int kvm_emulate_wrmsr_imm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int reg)
{ return __kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_wrmsr_imm);
int kvm_emulate_as_nop(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
int kvm_emulate_invd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* Treat an INVD instruction as a NOP and just skip it. */ return kvm_emulate_as_nop(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_invd);
/* * The fast path for frequent and performance sensitive wrmsr emulation, * i.e. the sending of IPI, sending IPI early in the VM-Exit flow reduces * the latency of virtual IPI by avoiding the expensive bits of transitioning * from guest to host, e.g. reacquiring KVM's SRCU lock. In contrast to the * other cases which must be called after interrupts are enabled on the host.
*/ staticint handle_fastpath_set_x2apic_icr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
{ if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || !apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic)) return 1;
switch (msr) { case APIC_BASE_MSR + (APIC_ICR >> 4):
data = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
handled = !handle_fastpath_set_x2apic_icr_irqoff(vcpu, data); break; case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
data = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
handled = !handle_fastpath_set_tscdeadline(vcpu, data); break; default:
handled = false; break;
}
if (handled) { if (!kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu))
ret = EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_USERSPACE; else
ret = EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
trace_kvm_msr_write(msr, data);
} else {
ret = EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
}
/* * Disallow writes to immutable feature MSRs after KVM_RUN. KVM does * not support modifying the guest vCPU model on the fly, e.g. changing * the nVMX capabilities while L2 is running is nonsensical. Allow * writes of the same value, e.g. to allow userspace to blindly stuff * all MSRs when emulating RESET.
*/ if (kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu) && kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(index) &&
(do_get_msr(vcpu, index, &val) || *data != val)) return -EINVAL;
static s64 get_kvmclock_base_ns(void)
{ /* Count up from boot time, but with the frequency of the raw clock. */ return ktime_to_ns(ktime_add(ktime_get_raw(), pvclock_gtod_data.offs_boot));
} #else static s64 get_kvmclock_base_ns(void)
{ /* Master clock not used, so we can just use CLOCK_BOOTTIME. */ return ktime_get_boottime_ns();
} #endif
staticvoid kvm_write_wall_clock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t wall_clock, int sec_hi_ofs)
{ int version; int r; struct pvclock_wall_clock wc;
u32 wc_sec_hi;
u64 wall_nsec;
if (!wall_clock) return;
r = kvm_read_guest(kvm, wall_clock, &version, sizeof(version)); if (r) return;
if (version & 1)
++version; /* first time write, random junk */
++version;
if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, wall_clock, &version, sizeof(version))) return;
wall_nsec = kvm_get_wall_clock_epoch(kvm);
wc.nsec = do_div(wall_nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC);
wc.sec = (u32)wall_nsec; /* overflow in 2106 guest time */
wc.version = version;
/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */ if (system_time & 1)
kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.pv_time, system_time & ~1ULL, sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info)); else
kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.pv_time);
/* tsc_khz can be zero if TSC calibration fails */ if (user_tsc_khz == 0) { /* set tsc_scaling_ratio to a safe value */
kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu, kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio); return -1;
}
/* Compute a scale to convert nanoseconds in TSC cycles */
kvm_get_time_scale(user_tsc_khz * 1000LL, NSEC_PER_SEC,
&vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift,
&vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult);
vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz = user_tsc_khz;
/* * Compute the variation in TSC rate which is acceptable * within the range of tolerance and decide if the * rate being applied is within that bounds of the hardware * rate. If so, no scaling or compensation need be done.
*/
thresh_lo = adjust_tsc_khz(tsc_khz, -tsc_tolerance_ppm);
thresh_hi = adjust_tsc_khz(tsc_khz, tsc_tolerance_ppm); if (user_tsc_khz < thresh_lo || user_tsc_khz > thresh_hi) {
pr_debug("requested TSC rate %u falls outside tolerance [%u,%u]\n",
user_tsc_khz, thresh_lo, thresh_hi);
use_scaling = 1;
} return set_tsc_khz(vcpu, user_tsc_khz, use_scaling);
}
/* * To use the masterclock, the host clocksource must be based on TSC * and all vCPUs must have matching TSCs. Note, the count for matching * vCPUs doesn't include the reference vCPU, hence "+1".
*/ bool use_master_clock = (ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc + 1 ==
atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->online_vcpus)) &&
gtod_is_based_on_tsc(gtod->clock.vclock_mode);
/* * Request a masterclock update if the masterclock needs to be toggled * on/off, or when starting a new generation and the masterclock is * enabled (compute_guest_tsc() requires the masterclock snapshot to be * taken _after_ the new generation is created).
*/ if ((ka->use_master_clock && new_generation) ||
(ka->use_master_clock != use_master_clock))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* * Multiply tsc by a fixed point number represented by ratio. * * The most significant 64-N bits (mult) of ratio represent the * integral part of the fixed point number; the remaining N bits * (frac) represent the fractional part, ie. ratio represents a fixed * point number (mult + frac * 2^(-N)). * * N equals to kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits.
*/ staticinline u64 __scale_tsc(u64 ratio, u64 tsc)
{ return mul_u64_u64_shr(tsc, ratio, kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits);
}
/* * If we are here because L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC then * according to the spec this should set L1's TSC (as opposed to * setting L1's offset for L2).
*/ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(
l1_offset,
kvm_x86_call(get_l2_tsc_offset)(vcpu),
kvm_x86_call(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu)); else
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = l1_offset;
/* Userspace is changing the multiplier while L2 is active */ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier(
l1_multiplier,
kvm_x86_call(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu)); else
vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = l1_multiplier;
if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control)
kvm_x86_call(write_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu);
}
staticinlinebool kvm_check_tsc_unstable(void)
{ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * TSC is marked unstable when we're running on Hyper-V, * 'TSC page' clocksource is good.
*/ if (pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK) returnfalse; #endif return check_tsc_unstable();
}
/* * Infers attempts to synchronize the guest's tsc from host writes. Sets the * offset for the vcpu and tracks the TSC matching generation that the vcpu * participates in.
*/ staticvoid __kvm_synchronize_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset, u64 tsc,
u64 ns, bool matched, bool user_set_tsc)
{ struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
if (vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected) return;
if (user_set_tsc)
vcpu->kvm->arch.user_set_tsc = true;
/* * We also track th most recent recorded KHZ, write and time to * allow the matching interval to be extended at each write.
*/
kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec = ns;
kvm->arch.last_tsc_write = tsc;
kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
kvm->arch.last_tsc_offset = offset;
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = tsc;
kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
if (!matched) { /* * We split periods of matched TSC writes into generations. * For each generation, we track the original measured * nanosecond time, offset, and write, so if TSCs are in * sync, we can match exact offset, and if not, we can match * exact software computation in compute_guest_tsc() * * These values are tracked in kvm->arch.cur_xxx variables.
*/
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation++;
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec = ns;
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write = tsc;
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset = offset;
kvm->arch.nr_vcpus_matched_tsc = 0;
} elseif (vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation != kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation) {
kvm->arch.nr_vcpus_matched_tsc++;
}
/* Keep track of which generation this VCPU has synchronized to */
vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation;
vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec;
vcpu->arch.this_tsc_write = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write;
if (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz) { if (data == 0) { /* * Force synchronization when creating a vCPU, or when * userspace explicitly writes a zero value.
*/
synchronizing = true;
} elseif (kvm->arch.user_set_tsc) {
u64 tsc_exp = kvm->arch.last_tsc_write +
nsec_to_cycles(vcpu, elapsed);
u64 tsc_hz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz * 1000LL; /* * Here lies UAPI baggage: when a user-initiated TSC write has * a small delta (1 second) of virtual cycle time against the * previously set vCPU, we assume that they were intended to be * in sync and the delta was only due to the racy nature of the * legacy API. * * This trick falls down when restoring a guest which genuinely * has been running for less time than the 1 second of imprecision * which we allow for in the legacy API. In this case, the first * value written by userspace (on any vCPU) should not be subject * to this 'correction' to make it sync up with values that only * come from the kernel's default vCPU creation. Make the 1-second * slop hack only trigger if the user_set_tsc flag is already set.
*/
synchronizing = data < tsc_exp + tsc_hz &&
data + tsc_hz > tsc_exp;
}
}
/* * For a reliable TSC, we can match TSC offsets, and for an unstable * TSC, we add elapsed time in this computation. We could let the * compensation code attempt to catch up if we fall behind, but * it's better to try to match offsets from the beginning.
*/ if (synchronizing &&
vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz == kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz) { if (!kvm_check_tsc_unstable()) {
offset = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset;
} else {
u64 delta = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu, elapsed);
data += delta;
offset = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu, data);
}
matched = true;
}
static u64 read_tsc(void)
{
u64 ret = (u64)rdtsc_ordered();
u64 last = pvclock_gtod_data.clock.cycle_last;
if (likely(ret >= last)) return ret;
/* * GCC likes to generate cmov here, but this branch is extremely * predictable (it's just a function of time and the likely is * very likely) and there's a data dependence, so force GCC * to generate a branch instead. I don't barrier() because * we don't actually need a barrier, and if this function * ever gets inlined it will generate worse code.
*/ asmvolatile (""); return last;
}
staticinline u64 vgettsc(struct pvclock_clock *clock, u64 *tsc_timestamp, int *mode)
{
u64 tsc_pg_val; long v;
if (*mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_NONE)
*tsc_timestamp = v = 0;
return v * clock->mult;
}
/* * As with get_kvmclock_base_ns(), this counts from boot time, at the * frequency of CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW (hence adding gtos->offs_boot).
*/ staticint do_kvmclock_base(s64 *t, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
{ struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data; unsignedlong seq; int mode;
u64 ns;
/* * This calculates CLOCK_MONOTONIC at the time of the TSC snapshot, with * no boot time offset.
*/ staticint do_monotonic(s64 *t, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
{ struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data; unsignedlong seq; int mode;
u64 ns;
/* * Calculates the kvmclock_base_ns (CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW + boot time) and * reports the TSC value from which it do so. Returns true if host is * using TSC based clocksource.
*/ staticbool kvm_get_time_and_clockread(s64 *kernel_ns, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
{ /* checked again under seqlock below */ if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode)) returnfalse;
/* * Calculates CLOCK_MONOTONIC and reports the TSC value from which it did * so. Returns true if host is using TSC based clocksource.
*/ bool kvm_get_monotonic_and_clockread(s64 *kernel_ns, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
{ /* checked again under seqlock below */ if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode)) returnfalse;
/* * Calculates CLOCK_REALTIME and reports the TSC value from which it did * so. Returns true if host is using TSC based clocksource. * * DO NOT USE this for anything related to migration. You want CLOCK_TAI * for that.
*/ staticbool kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread(struct timespec64 *ts,
u64 *tsc_timestamp)
{ /* checked again under seqlock below */ if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode)) returnfalse;
/* * * Assuming a stable TSC across physical CPUS, and a stable TSC * across virtual CPUs, the following condition is possible. * Each numbered line represents an event visible to both * CPUs at the next numbered event. * * "timespecX" represents host monotonic time. "tscX" represents * RDTSC value. * * VCPU0 on CPU0 | VCPU1 on CPU1 * * 1. read timespec0,tsc0 * 2. | timespec1 = timespec0 + N * | tsc1 = tsc0 + M * 3. transition to guest | transition to guest * 4. ret0 = timespec0 + (rdtsc - tsc0) | * 5. | ret1 = timespec1 + (rdtsc - tsc1) * | ret1 = timespec0 + N + (rdtsc - (tsc0 + M)) * * Since ret0 update is visible to VCPU1 at time 5, to obey monotonicity: * * - ret0 < ret1 * - timespec0 + (rdtsc - tsc0) < timespec0 + N + (rdtsc - (tsc0 + M)) * ... * - 0 < N - M => M < N * * That is, when timespec0 != timespec1, M < N. Unfortunately that is not * always the case (the difference between two distinct xtime instances * might be smaller then the difference between corresponding TSC reads, * when updating guest vcpus pvclock areas). * * To avoid that problem, do not allow visibility of distinct * system_timestamp/tsc_timestamp values simultaneously: use a master * copy of host monotonic time values. Update that master copy * in lockstep. * * Rely on synchronization of host TSCs and guest TSCs for monotonicity. *
*/
/* * If the host uses TSC clock, then passthrough TSC as stable * to the guest.
*/
host_tsc_clocksource = kvm_get_time_and_clockread(
&ka->master_kernel_ns,
&ka->master_cycle_now);
/* * Use the kernel's tsc_khz directly if the TSC is constant, otherwise use KVM's * per-CPU value (which may be zero if a CPU is going offline). Note, tsc_khz * can change during boot even if the TSC is constant, as it's possible for KVM * to be loaded before TSC calibration completes. Ideally, KVM would get a * notification when calibration completes, but practically speaking calibration * will complete before userspace is alive enough to create VMs.
*/ staticunsignedlong get_cpu_tsc_khz(void)
{ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) return tsc_khz; else return __this_cpu_read(cpu_tsc_khz);
}
/* Called within read_seqcount_begin/retry for kvm->pvclock_sc. */ staticvoid __get_kvmclock(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_clock_data *data)
{ struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch; struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info hv_clock;
/* both __this_cpu_read() and rdtsc() should be on the same cpu */
get_cpu();
read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags); while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock))) {
read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock))) return;
read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
}
guest_hv_clock = (void *)(gpc->khva + offset);
/* * This VCPU is paused, but it's legal for a guest to read another * VCPU's kvmclock, so we really have to follow the specification where * it says that version is odd if data is being modified, and even after * it is consistent.
*/
/* * If the host uses TSC clock, then passthrough TSC as stable * to the guest.
*/ do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&ka->pvclock_sc);
use_master_clock = ka->use_master_clock; if (use_master_clock) {
host_tsc = ka->master_cycle_now;
kernel_ns = ka->master_kernel_ns;
}
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&ka->pvclock_sc, seq));
/* Keep irq disabled to prevent changes to the clock */
local_irq_save(flags);
tgt_tsc_khz = get_cpu_tsc_khz(); if (unlikely(tgt_tsc_khz == 0)) {
local_irq_restore(flags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, v); return 1;
} if (!use_master_clock) {
host_tsc = rdtsc();
kernel_ns = get_kvmclock_base_ns();
}
tsc_timestamp = kvm_read_l1_tsc(v, host_tsc);
/* * We may have to catch up the TSC to match elapsed wall clock * time for two reasons, even if kvmclock is used. * 1) CPU could have been running below the maximum TSC rate * 2) Broken TSC compensation resets the base at each VCPU * entry to avoid unknown leaps of TSC even when running * again on the same CPU. This may cause apparent elapsed * time to disappear, and the guest to stand still or run * very slowly.
*/ if (vcpu->tsc_catchup) {
u64 tsc = compute_guest_tsc(v, kernel_ns); if (tsc > tsc_timestamp) {
adjust_tsc_offset_guest(v, tsc - tsc_timestamp);
tsc_timestamp = tsc;
}
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
/* With all the info we got, fill in the values */
/* If the host uses TSC clocksource, then it is stable */
hv_clock.flags = 0; if (use_master_clock)
hv_clock.flags |= PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT;
if (vcpu->pv_time.active) { /* * GUEST_STOPPED is only supported by kvmclock, and KVM's * historic behavior is to only process the request if kvmclock * is active/enabled.
*/ if (vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request) {
hv_clock.flags |= PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED;
vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = false;
}
kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(&hv_clock, v, &vcpu->pv_time, 0);
hv_clock.flags &= ~PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED;
}
kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(v->kvm, &hv_clock);
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN /* * For Xen guests we may need to override PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT as unless * explicitly told to use TSC as its clocksource Xen will not set this bit. * This default behaviour led to bugs in some guest kernels which cause * problems if they observe PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT in the pvclock flags. * * Note! Clear TSC_STABLE only for Xen clocks, i.e. the order matters!
*/ if (ka->xen.hvm_config.flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_PVCLOCK_TSC_UNSTABLE)
hv_clock.flags &= ~PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT;
if (vcpu->xen.vcpu_info_cache.active)
kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(&hv_clock, v, &vcpu->xen.vcpu_info_cache,
offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, time)); if (vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_cache.active)
kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(&hv_clock, v, &vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, 0); #endif return 0;
}
/* * The pvclock_wall_clock ABI tells the guest the wall clock time at * which it started (i.e. its epoch, when its kvmclock was zero). * * In fact those clocks are subtly different; wall clock frequency is * adjusted by NTP and has leap seconds, while the kvmclock is a * simple function of the TSC without any such adjustment. * * Perhaps the ABI should have exposed CLOCK_TAI and a ratio between * that and kvmclock, but even that would be subject to change over * time. * * Attempt to calculate the epoch at a given moment using the *same* * TSC reading via kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread() to obtain both * wallclock and kvmclock times, and subtracting one from the other. * * Fall back to using their values at slightly different moments by * calling ktime_get_real_ns() and get_kvmclock_ns() separately.
*/
uint64_t kvm_get_wall_clock_epoch(struct kvm *kvm)
{ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info hv_clock; struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch; unsignedlong seq, local_tsc_khz; struct timespec64 ts;
uint64_t host_tsc;
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&ka->pvclock_sc);
local_tsc_khz = 0; if (!ka->use_master_clock) break;
/* * The TSC read and the call to get_cpu_tsc_khz() must happen * on the same CPU.
*/
get_cpu();
local_tsc_khz = get_cpu_tsc_khz();
if (local_tsc_khz &&
!kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread(&ts, &host_tsc))
local_tsc_khz = 0; /* Fall back to old method */
put_cpu();
/* * These values must be snapshotted within the seqcount loop. * After that, it's just mathematics which can happen on any * CPU at any time.
*/
hv_clock.tsc_timestamp = ka->master_cycle_now;
hv_clock.system_time = ka->master_kernel_ns + ka->kvmclock_offset;
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&ka->pvclock_sc, seq));
/* * If the conditions were right, and obtaining the wallclock+TSC was * successful, calculate the KVM clock at the corresponding time and * subtract one from the other to get the guest's epoch in nanoseconds * since 1970-01-01.
*/ if (local_tsc_khz) {
kvm_get_time_scale(NSEC_PER_SEC, local_tsc_khz * NSEC_PER_USEC,
&hv_clock.tsc_shift,
&hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul); return ts.tv_nsec + NSEC_PER_SEC * ts.tv_sec -
__pvclock_read_cycles(&hv_clock, host_tsc);
} #endif return ktime_get_real_ns() - get_kvmclock_ns(kvm);
}
/* * kvmclock updates which are isolated to a given vcpu, such as * vcpu->cpu migration, should not allow system_timestamp from * the rest of the vcpus to remain static. Otherwise ntp frequency * correction applies to one vcpu's system_timestamp but not * the others. * * So in those cases, request a kvmclock update for all vcpus. * We need to rate-limit these requests though, as they can * considerably slow guests that have a large number of vcpus. * The time for a remote vcpu to update its kvmclock is bound * by the delay we use to rate-limit the updates.
*/
/* These helpers are safe iff @msr is known to be an MCx bank MSR. */ staticbool is_mci_control_msr(u32 msr)
{ return (msr & 3) == 0;
} staticbool is_mci_status_msr(u32 msr)
{ return (msr & 3) == 1;
}
/* * On AMD, HWCR[McStatusWrEn] controls whether setting MCi_STATUS results in #GP.
*/ staticbool can_set_mci_status(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* McStatusWrEn enabled? */ if (guest_cpuid_is_amd_compatible(vcpu)) return !!(vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr & BIT_ULL(18));
switch (msr) { case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
vcpu->arch.mcg_status = data; break; case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL: if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) &&
(data || !msr_info->host_initiated)) return 1; if (data != 0 && data != ~(u64)0) return 1;
vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl = data; break; case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank_num) - 1; if (msr > last_msr) return 1;
if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P) && (data || !msr_info->host_initiated)) return 1; /* An attempt to write a 1 to a reserved bit raises #GP */ if (data & ~(MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN | MCI_CTL2_CMCI_THRESHOLD_MASK)) return 1;
offset = array_index_nospec(msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2,
last_msr + 1 - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2);
vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[offset] = data; break; case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num) - 1; if (msr > last_msr) return 1;
/* * Only 0 or all 1s can be written to IA32_MCi_CTL, all other * values are architecturally undefined. But, some Linux * kernels clear bit 10 in bank 4 to workaround a BIOS/GART TLB * issue on AMD K8s, allow bit 10 to be clear when setting all * other bits in order to avoid an uncaught #GP in the guest. * * UNIXWARE clears bit 0 of MC1_CTL to ignore correctable, * single-bit ECC data errors.
*/ if (is_mci_control_msr(msr) &&
data != 0 && (data | (1 << 10) | 1) != ~(u64)0) return 1;
/* * All CPUs allow writing 0 to MCi_STATUS MSRs to clear the MSR. * AMD-based CPUs allow non-zero values, but if and only if * HWCR[McStatusWrEn] is set.
*/ if (!msr_info->host_initiated && is_mci_status_msr(msr) &&
data != 0 && !can_set_mci_status(vcpu)) return 1;
if (!tdp_enabled) { /* * A TLB flush on behalf of the guest is equivalent to * INVPCID(all), toggling CR4.PGE, etc., which requires * a forced sync of the shadow page tables. Ensure all the * roots are synced and the guest TLB in hardware is clean.
*/
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
kvm_mmu_sync_prev_roots(vcpu);
}
kvm_x86_call(flush_tlb_guest)(vcpu);
/* * Flushing all "guest" TLB is always a superset of Hyper-V's fine * grained flushing.
*/
kvm_hv_vcpu_purge_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
/* * Service "local" TLB flush requests, which are specific to the current MMU * context. In addition to the generic event handling in vcpu_enter_guest(), * TLB flushes that are targeted at an MMU context also need to be serviced * prior before nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit.
*/ void kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests);
if (kvm_xen_msr_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
kvm_xen_runstate_set_running(vcpu); return;
}
if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED)) return;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm != vcpu->kvm->mm)) return;
slots = kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm);
if (unlikely(slots->generation != ghc->generation ||
gpa != ghc->gpa ||
kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva) || !ghc->memslot)) { /* We rely on the fact that it fits in a single page. */
BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*st) - 1) & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS);
st = (struct kvm_steal_time __user *)ghc->hva; /* * Doing a TLB flush here, on the guest's behalf, can avoid * expensive IPIs.
*/ if (guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH)) {
u8 st_preempted = 0; int err = -EFAULT;
int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
/* * Do not allow host-initiated writes to trigger the Xen hypercall * page setup; it could incur locking paths which are not expected * if userspace sets the MSR in an unusual location.
*/ if (kvm_xen_is_hypercall_page_msr(vcpu->kvm, msr) &&
!msr_info->host_initiated) return kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page(vcpu, data);
switch (msr) { case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG: case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE: case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA: case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER: case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2: case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG: case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG: case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG: break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV: if (msr_info->host_initiated)
vcpu->arch.microcode_version = data; break; case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: if (!msr_info->host_initiated ||
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = data; break; case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES: if (!msr_info->host_initiated ||
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PDCM)) return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
if (data & ~kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap) return 1;
/* * Note, this is not just a performance optimization! KVM * disallows changing feature MSRs after the vCPU has run; PMU * refresh will bug the VM if called after the vCPU has run.
*/ if (vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities == data) break;
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) { if ((!guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu))) return 1;
if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
reserved_bits |= PRED_CMD_IBPB;
if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
reserved_bits |= PRED_CMD_SBPB;
}
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
reserved_bits |= PRED_CMD_IBPB;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
reserved_bits |= PRED_CMD_SBPB;
if (data & reserved_bits) return 1;
if (!data) break;
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, data); break;
} case MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) return 1;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) || (data & ~L1D_FLUSH)) return 1; if (!data) break;
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH); break; case MSR_EFER: return set_efer(vcpu, msr_info); case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
data &= ~(u64)0x8; /* ignore TLB cache disable */
/* * Allow McStatusWrEn and TscFreqSel. (Linux guests from v3.2 * through at least v6.6 whine if TscFreqSel is clear, * depending on F/M/S.
*/ if (data & ~(BIT_ULL(18) | BIT_ULL(24))) {
kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data); return 1;
}
vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr = data; break; case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE: if (data != 0) {
kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data); return 1;
} break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (!kvm_pat_valid(data)) return 1;
vcpu->arch.pat = data; break; case MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000: case MSR_MTRRdefType: return kvm_mtrr_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data); case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: return kvm_apic_set_base(vcpu, data, msr_info->host_initiated); case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff: return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data); case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data); break; case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST: if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST)) { if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
s64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adj); /* Before back to guest, tsc_timestamp must be adjusted * as well, otherwise guest's percpu pvclock time could jump.
*/
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
} break; case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE: {
u64 old_val = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr;
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) { /* RO bits */ if ((old_val ^ data) & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PMU_RO_MASK) return 1;
/* R bits, i.e. writes are ignored, but don't fault. */
data = data & ~MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON;
data |= old_val & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON;
}
if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT) &&
((old_val ^ data) & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT)) { if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XMM3)) return 1;
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true;
} else {
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
} break;
} case MSR_IA32_SMBASE: if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM) || !msr_info->host_initiated) return 1;
vcpu->arch.smbase = data; break; case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
vcpu->arch.msr_ia32_power_ctl = data; break; case MSR_IA32_TSC: if (msr_info->host_initiated) {
kvm_synchronize_tsc(vcpu, &data);
} elseif (!vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected) {
u64 adj = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu, data) - vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adj);
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr += adj;
} break; case MSR_IA32_XSS: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) return 1; /* * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than * XSAVES/XRSTORS to save/restore PT MSRs.
*/ if (data & ~kvm_caps.supported_xss) return 1;
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = data;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true; break; case MSR_SMI_COUNT: if (!msr_info->host_initiated) return 1;
vcpu->arch.smi_count = data; break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) return 1;
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data, 0); break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) return 1;
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data, 0); break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) return 1;
kvm_write_system_time(vcpu, data, false, msr_info->host_initiated); break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) return 1;
kvm_write_system_time(vcpu, data, true, msr_info->host_initiated); break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF)) return 1;
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data)) return 1; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT)) return 1;
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf_int(vcpu, data)) return 1; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT)) return 1; if (data & 0x1) {
vcpu->arch.apf.pageready_pending = false;
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
} break; case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) return 1;
if (unlikely(!sched_info_on())) return 1;
if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK) return 1;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED)) break;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
break; case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI)) return 1;
if (kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(vcpu, data, sizeof(u8))) return 1; break;
case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL)) return 1;
/* only enable bit supported */ if (data & (-1ULL << 1)) return 1;
vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control = data; break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL: case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr_info);
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3: case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR1: case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3: case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1: if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr)) return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
if (data)
kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data); break; case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL: /* * Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR. * Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors, * all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from * AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the * affected processor models on the command line, hence * the need to ignore the workaround.
*/ break; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15: case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER: case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS: case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4: case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL: case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG ... HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT: case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL: case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL: case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS: case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL: return kvm_hv_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr, data,
msr_info->host_initiated); #endif case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3: /* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr * counterpart for further detail.
*/
kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data); break; case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH: if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data; break; case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS: if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data; break; case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO: if (!msr_info->host_initiated) return 1;
vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = data; break; case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES: if (data & ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT ||
(data & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT &&
!supports_cpuid_fault(vcpu))) return 1;
vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables = data; break; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 case MSR_IA32_XFD: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD)) return 1;
if (data & ~kvm_guest_supported_xfd(vcpu)) return 1;
fpu_update_guest_xfd(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, data); break; case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD)) return 1;
if (data & ~kvm_guest_supported_xfd(vcpu)) return 1;
switch (msr) { case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR: case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
data = 0; break; case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
data = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap; break; case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL: if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) && !host) return 1;
data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl; break; case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
data = vcpu->arch.mcg_status; break; case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank_num) - 1; if (msr > last_msr) return 1;
if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P) && !host) return 1;
offset = array_index_nospec(msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2,
last_msr + 1 - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2);
data = vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[offset]; break; case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num) - 1; if (msr > last_msr) return 1;
int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{ switch (msr_info->index) { case MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID: case MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON: case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP: case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP: case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP: case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP: case MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG: case MSR_K8_TSEG_ADDR: case MSR_K8_TSEG_MASK: case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA: case MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG: case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG: case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE: case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2: case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL: case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG: case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG: case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG: /* * Intel Sandy Bridge CPUs must support the RAPL (running average power * limit) MSRs. Just return 0, as we do not want to expose the host * data here. Do not conditionalize this on CPUID, as KVM does not do * so for existing CPU-specific MSRs.
*/ case MSR_RAPL_POWER_UNIT: case MSR_PP0_ENERGY_STATUS: /* Power plane 0 (core) */ case MSR_PP1_ENERGY_STATUS: /* Power plane 1 (graphics uncore) */ case MSR_PKG_ENERGY_STATUS: /* Total package */ case MSR_DRAM_ENERGY_STATUS: /* DRAM controller */
msr_info->data = 0; break; case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3: case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3: case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR1: case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1: if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index)) return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
msr_info->data = 0; break; case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.microcode_version; break; case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities; break; case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES: if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PDCM)) return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities; break; case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_ia32_power_ctl; break; case MSR_IA32_TSC: { /* * Intel SDM states that MSR_IA32_TSC read adds the TSC offset * even when not intercepted. AMD manual doesn't explicitly * state this but appears to behave the same. * * On userspace reads and writes, however, we unconditionally * return L1's TSC value to ensure backwards-compatible * behavior for migration.
*/
u64 offset, ratio;
if (msr_info->host_initiated) {
offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
ratio = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio;
} else {
offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
ratio = vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio;
}
msr_info->data = kvm_scale_tsc(rdtsc(), ratio) + offset; break;
} case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.pat; break; case MSR_MTRRcap: case MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000: case MSR_MTRRdefType: return kvm_mtrr_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data); case 0xcd: /* fsb frequency */
msr_info->data = 3; break; /* * MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID * Conservative value valid for even the basic CPU models. * Models 0,1: 000 in bits 23:21 indicating a bus speed of * 100MHz, model 2 000 in bits 18:16 indicating 100MHz, * and 266MHz for model 3, or 4. Set Core Clock * Frequency to System Bus Frequency Ratio to 1 (bits * 31:24) even though these are only valid for CPU * models > 2, however guests may end up dividing or * multiplying by zero otherwise.
*/ case MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID:
msr_info->data = 1 << 24; break; case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apic_base; break; case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff: return kvm_x2apic_msr_read(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data); case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
msr_info->data = kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu); break; case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
msr_info->data = (u64)vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr; break; case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr; break; case MSR_IA32_SMBASE: if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM) || !msr_info->host_initiated) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.smbase; break; case MSR_SMI_COUNT:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.smi_count; break; case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS: /* TSC increment by tick */
msr_info->data = 1000ULL; /* CPU multiplier */
msr_info->data |= (((uint64_t)4ULL) << 40); break; case MSR_EFER:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.efer; break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock; break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock; break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time; break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_int_val; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT)) return 1;
msr_info->data = 0; break; case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val; break; case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val; break; case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control; break; case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR: case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE: case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP: case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL: case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: return get_msr_mce(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data,
msr_info->host_initiated); case MSR_IA32_XSS: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss; break; case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL: /* * Provide expected ramp-up count for K7. All other * are set to zero, indicating minimum divisors for * every field. * * This prevents guest kernels on AMD host with CPU * type 6, model 8 and higher from exploding due to * the rdmsr failing.
*/
msr_info->data = 0x20000000; break; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15: case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER: case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS: case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4: case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL: case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG ... HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT: case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL: case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL: case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS: case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL: return kvm_hv_get_msr_common(vcpu,
msr_info->index, &msr_info->data,
msr_info->host_initiated); #endif case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3: /* This legacy MSR exists but isn't fully documented in current * silicon. It is however accessed by winxp in very narrow * scenarios where it sets bit #19, itself documented as * a "reserved" bit. Best effort attempt to source coherent * read data here should the balance of the register be * interpreted by the guest: * * L2 cache control register 3: 64GB range, 256KB size, * enabled, latency 0x1, configured
*/
msr_info->data = 0xbe702111; break; case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH: if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.osvw.length; break; case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS: if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.osvw.status; break; case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!vcpu->kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info; break; case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables; break; case MSR_K7_HWCR:
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr; break; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 case MSR_IA32_XFD: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD)) return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; break; case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR: if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD)) return 1;
/* * Read or write a bunch of msrs. All parameters are kernel addresses. * * @return number of msrs set successfully.
*/ staticint __msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs *msrs, struct kvm_msr_entry *entries, int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data))
{ int i;
for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) if (do_msr(vcpu, entries[i].index, &entries[i].data)) break;
return i;
}
/* * Read or write a bunch of msrs. Parameters are user addresses. * * @return number of msrs set successfully.
*/ staticint msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs __user *user_msrs, int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data), int writeback)
{ struct kvm_msrs msrs; struct kvm_msr_entry *entries; unsigned size; int r;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&msrs, user_msrs, sizeof(msrs))) goto out;
r = -E2BIG; if (msrs.nmsrs >= MAX_IO_MSRS) goto out;
size = sizeof(struct kvm_msr_entry) * msrs.nmsrs;
entries = memdup_user(user_msrs->entries, size); if (IS_ERR(entries)) {
r = PTR_ERR(entries); goto out;
}
r = __msr_io(vcpu, &msrs, entries, do_msr);
if (writeback && copy_to_user(user_msrs->entries, entries, size))
r = -EFAULT;
int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
{ int r = 0;
switch (ext) { case KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP: case KVM_CAP_HLT: case KVM_CAP_MMU_SHADOW_CACHE_CONTROL: case KVM_CAP_SET_TSS_ADDR: case KVM_CAP_EXT_CPUID: case KVM_CAP_EXT_EMUL_CPUID: case KVM_CAP_CLOCKSOURCE: #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC case KVM_CAP_PIT: case KVM_CAP_PIT2: case KVM_CAP_PIT_STATE2: case KVM_CAP_REINJECT_CONTROL: #endif case KVM_CAP_NOP_IO_DELAY: case KVM_CAP_MP_STATE: case KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU: case KVM_CAP_USER_NMI: case KVM_CAP_IRQ_INJECT_STATUS: case KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD: case KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD_NO_LENGTH:
case KVM_CAP_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: case KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS: #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case KVM_CAP_HYPERV: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VAPIC: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SPIN: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_TIME: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_EVENTFD: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_TLBFLUSH: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SEND_IPI: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_CPUID: case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID: case KVM_CAP_SYS_HYPERV_CPUID: #endif case KVM_CAP_PCI_SEGMENT: case KVM_CAP_DEBUGREGS: case KVM_CAP_X86_ROBUST_SINGLESTEP: case KVM_CAP_XSAVE: case KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF: case KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF_INT: case KVM_CAP_GET_TSC_KHZ: case KVM_CAP_KVMCLOCK_CTRL: case KVM_CAP_IOAPIC_POLARITY_IGNORED: case KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER: case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS: case KVM_CAP_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID: case KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP: case KVM_CAP_IMMEDIATE_EXIT: case KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_FILTER: case KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_MASKED_EVENTS: case KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES: case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO: case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD: case KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT: case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG: case KVM_CAP_LAST_CPU: case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR: case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER: case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: #endif case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM: case KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM: case KVM_CAP_SREGS2: case KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE: case KVM_CAP_VCPU_ATTRIBUTES: case KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES: case KVM_CAP_VAPIC: case KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP: case KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES: case KVM_CAP_IRQFD_RESAMPLE: case KVM_CAP_MEMORY_FAULT_INFO: case KVM_CAP_X86_GUEST_MODE:
r = 1; break; case KVM_CAP_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY:
r = tdp_enabled; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS:
r = APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS_DEFAULT; break; case KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL:
r = KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK; break; case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2: return KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN case KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM:
r = KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_HYPERCALL_MSR |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_PVCLOCK_TSC_UNSTABLE |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO_HVA; if (sched_info_on())
r |= KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE |
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG; break; #endif case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
r = kvm_sync_valid_fields(kvm); break; case KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK:
r = KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS:
r = kvm_get_allowed_disable_exits(); break; case KVM_CAP_X86_SMM: if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)) break;
/* SMBASE is usually relocated above 1M on modern chipsets, * and SMM handlers might indeed rely on 4G segment limits, * so do not report SMM to be available if real mode is * emulated via vm86 mode. Still, do not go to great lengths * to avoid userspace's usage of the feature, because it is a * fringe case that is not enabled except via specific settings * of the module parameters.
*/
r = kvm_x86_call(has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE); break; case KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS:
r = min_t(unsignedint, num_online_cpus(), KVM_MAX_VCPUS); break; case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS; if (kvm)
r = kvm->max_vcpus; break; case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS; break; case KVM_CAP_PV_MMU: /* obsolete */
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_MCE:
r = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS; break; case KVM_CAP_XCRS:
r = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE); break; case KVM_CAP_TSC_CONTROL: case KVM_CAP_VM_TSC_CONTROL:
r = kvm_caps.has_tsc_control; break; case KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API:
r = KVM_X2APIC_API_VALID_FLAGS; break; case KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE:
r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state ?
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state(NULL, NULL, 0) : 0; break; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH:
r = kvm_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush != NULL; break; case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS:
r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->enable_evmcs != NULL; break; #endif case KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR:
r = (int) allow_smaller_maxphyaddr; break; case KVM_CAP_STEAL_TIME:
r = sched_info_on(); break; case KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT: if (kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit)
r = KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF |
KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT; else
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_XSAVE2: {
r = xstate_required_size(kvm_get_filtered_xcr0(), false); if (r < sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))
r = sizeof(struct kvm_xsave); break;
} case KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY:
r = enable_pmu ? KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK : 0; break; case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2:
r = kvm_caps.supported_quirks; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT:
r = kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit; break; case KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES:
r = kvm_caps.supported_vm_types; break; case KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM:
r = kvm ? kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) : 1; break; default: break;
} return r;
}
staticint __kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr, u64 *val)
{ if (attr->group) { if (kvm_x86_ops.dev_get_attr) return kvm_x86_call(dev_get_attr)(attr->group, attr->attr, val); return -ENXIO;
}
/* Address WBINVD may be executed by guest */ if (need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu)) { if (kvm_x86_call(has_wbinvd_exit)())
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask); elseif (vcpu->cpu != -1 && vcpu->cpu != cpu)
wbinvd_on_cpu(vcpu->cpu);
}
kvm_x86_call(vcpu_load)(vcpu, cpu);
if (vcpu != per_cpu(last_vcpu, cpu)) { /* * Flush the branch predictor when switching vCPUs on the same * physical CPU, as each vCPU needs its own branch prediction * domain. No IBPB is needed when switching between L1 and L2 * on the same vCPU unless IBRS is advertised to the vCPU; that * is handled on the nested VM-Exit path.
*/ if (static_branch_likely(&switch_vcpu_ibpb))
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
per_cpu(last_vcpu, cpu) = vcpu;
}
/* Save host pkru register if supported */
vcpu->arch.host_pkru = read_pkru();
/* Apply any externally detected TSC adjustments (due to suspend) */ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment)) {
adjust_tsc_offset_host(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment);
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment = 0;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
if (kvm_check_tsc_unstable()) {
u64 offset = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc);
kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset); if (!vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected)
vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup = 1;
}
if (kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu))
kvm_lapic_restart_hv_timer(vcpu);
/* * On a host with synchronized TSC, there is no need to update * kvmclock on vcpu->cpu migration
*/ if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.use_master_clock || vcpu->cpu == -1)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu); if (vcpu->cpu != cpu)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu);
vcpu->cpu = cpu;
}
/* * The vCPU can be marked preempted if and only if the VM-Exit was on * an instruction boundary and will not trigger guest emulation of any * kind (see vcpu_run). Vendor specific code controls (conservatively) * when this is true, for example allowing the vCPU to be marked * preempted if and only if the VM-Exit was due to a host interrupt.
*/ if (!vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary) {
vcpu->stat.preemption_other++; return;
}
vcpu->stat.preemption_reported++; if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED)) return;
if (vcpu->arch.st.preempted) return;
/* This happens on process exit */ if (unlikely(current->mm != vcpu->kvm->mm)) return;
void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ int idx;
if (vcpu->preempted) { /* * Assume protected guests are in-kernel. Inefficient yielding * due to false positives is preferable to never yielding due * to false negatives.
*/
vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel = vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected ||
!kvm_x86_call(get_cpl_no_cache)(vcpu);
/* * Take the srcu lock as memslots will be accessed to check the gfn * cache generation against the memslots generation.
*/
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu); if (kvm_xen_msr_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
kvm_xen_runstate_set_preempted(vcpu); else
kvm_steal_time_set_preempted(vcpu);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
}
staticint kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
{ int r;
if (vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected) return -EINVAL;
r = kvm_apic_set_state(vcpu, s); if (r) return r;
update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
return 0;
}
staticint kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* * We can accept userspace's request for interrupt injection * as long as we have a place to store the interrupt number. * The actual injection will happen when the CPU is able to * deliver the interrupt.
*/ if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(vcpu)) returnfalse;
/* Acknowledging ExtINT does not happen if LINT0 is masked. */ return (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(vcpu));
}
staticint kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* * Do not cause an interrupt window exit if an exception * is pending or an event needs reinjection; userspace * might want to inject the interrupt manually using KVM_SET_REGS * or KVM_SET_SREGS. For that to work, we must be at an * instruction boundary and with no events half-injected.
*/ return (kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu) &&
!kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) &&
!kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu));
}
r = -EINVAL; if (!bank_num || bank_num > KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) goto out; if (mcg_cap & ~(kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap | 0xff | 0xff0000)) goto out;
r = 0;
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = mcg_cap; /* Init IA32_MCG_CTL to all 1s */ if (mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P)
vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl = ~(u64)0; /* Init IA32_MCi_CTL to all 1s, IA32_MCi_CTL2 to all 0s */ for (bank = 0; bank < bank_num; bank++) {
vcpu->arch.mce_banks[bank*4] = ~(u64)0; if (mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P)
vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[bank] = 0;
}
kvm_apic_after_set_mcg_cap(vcpu);
kvm_x86_call(setup_mce)(vcpu);
out: return r;
}
/* * Validate this is an UCNA (uncorrectable no action) error by checking the * MCG_STATUS and MCi_STATUS registers: * - none of the bits for Machine Check Exceptions are set * - both the VAL (valid) and UC (uncorrectable) bits are set * MCI_STATUS_PCC - Processor Context Corrupted * MCI_STATUS_S - Signaled as a Machine Check Exception * MCI_STATUS_AR - Software recoverable Action Required
*/ staticbool is_ucna(struct kvm_x86_mce *mce)
{ return !mce->mcg_status &&
!(mce->status & (MCI_STATUS_PCC | MCI_STATUS_S | MCI_STATUS_AR)) &&
(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL) &&
(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
process_smi(vcpu); #endif
/* * KVM's ABI only allows for one exception to be migrated. Luckily, * the only time there can be two queued exceptions is if there's a * non-exiting _injected_ exception, and a pending exiting exception. * In that case, ignore the VM-Exiting exception as it's an extension * of the injected exception.
*/ if (vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending &&
!vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
!vcpu->arch.exception.injected)
ex = &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit; else
ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
/* * In guest mode, payload delivery should be deferred if the exception * will be intercepted by L1, e.g. KVM should not modifying CR2 if L1 * intercepts #PF, ditto for DR6 and #DBs. If the per-VM capability, * KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD, is not set, userspace may or may not * propagate the payload and so it cannot be safely deferred. Deliver * the payload if the capability hasn't been requested.
*/ if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled &&
ex->pending && ex->has_payload)
kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
memset(events, 0, sizeof(*events));
/* * The API doesn't provide the instruction length for software * exceptions, so don't report them. As long as the guest RIP * isn't advanced, we should expect to encounter the exception * again.
*/ if (!kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector)) {
events->exception.injected = ex->injected;
events->exception.pending = ex->pending; /* * For ABI compatibility, deliberately conflate * pending and injected exceptions when * KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD isn't enabled.
*/ if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled)
events->exception.injected |= ex->pending;
}
events->exception.nr = ex->vector;
events->exception.has_error_code = ex->has_error_code;
events->exception.error_code = ex->error_code;
events->exception_has_payload = ex->has_payload;
events->exception_payload = ex->payload;
/* * Flag that userspace is stuffing an exception, the next KVM_RUN will * morph the exception to a VM-Exit if appropriate. Do this only for * pending exceptions, already-injected exceptions are not subject to * intercpetion. Note, userspace that conflates pending and injected * is hosed, and will incorrectly convert an injected exception into a * pending exception, which in turn may cause a spurious VM-Exit.
*/
vcpu->arch.exception_from_userspace = events->exception.pending;
staticint kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u8 *state, unsignedint size)
{ /* * Only copy state for features that are enabled for the guest. The * state itself isn't problematic, but setting bits in the header for * features that are supported in *this* host but not exposed to the * guest can result in KVM_SET_XSAVE failing when live migrating to a * compatible host without the features that are NOT exposed to the * guest. * * FP+SSE can always be saved/restored via KVM_{G,S}ET_XSAVE, even if * XSAVE/XCRO are not exposed to the guest, and even if XSAVE isn't * supported by the host.
*/
u64 supported_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 |
XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu)) return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL : 0;
staticint kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
{ int i, r = 0;
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) return -EINVAL;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) return -EINVAL;
if (guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs > KVM_MAX_XCRS || guest_xcrs->flags) return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs; i++) /* Only support XCR0 currently */ if (guest_xcrs->xcrs[i].xcr == XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK) {
r = __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
guest_xcrs->xcrs[i].value); break;
} if (r)
r = -EINVAL; return r;
}
/* * kvm_set_guest_paused() indicates to the guest kernel that it has been * stopped by the hypervisor. This function will be called from the host only. * EINVAL is returned when the host attempts to set the flag for a guest that * does not support pv clocks.
*/ staticint kvm_set_guest_paused(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ if (!vcpu->arch.pv_time.active) return -EINVAL;
vcpu->arch.pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu); return 0;
}
staticint kvm_arch_tsc_has_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
{ int r;
switch (attr->attr) { case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET:
r = 0; break; default:
r = -ENXIO;
}
switch (attr->attr) { case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET:
r = -EFAULT; if (put_user(vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset, uaddr)) break;
r = 0; break; default:
r = -ENXIO;
}
if (copy_from_user(&attr, argp, sizeof(attr))) return -EFAULT;
if (attr.group != KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL) return -ENXIO;
switch (ioctl) { case KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR:
r = kvm_arch_tsc_has_attr(vcpu, &attr); break; case KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR:
r = kvm_arch_tsc_get_attr(vcpu, &attr); break; case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
r = kvm_arch_tsc_set_attr(vcpu, &attr); break;
}
switch (cap->cap) { #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2: if (cap->args[0]) return -EINVAL;
fallthrough;
case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC: if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm)) return -EINVAL; return kvm_hv_activate_synic(vcpu, cap->cap ==
KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2); case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS:
{ int r;
uint16_t vmcs_version; void __user *user_ptr;
if (!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->enable_evmcs) return -ENOTTY;
r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->enable_evmcs(vcpu, &vmcs_version); if (!r) {
user_ptr = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)cap->args[0]; if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, &vmcs_version, sizeof(vmcs_version)))
r = -EFAULT;
} return r;
} case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH: if (!kvm_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush) return -ENOTTY;
return kvm_x86_call(enable_l2_tlb_flush)(vcpu);
case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID: return kvm_hv_set_enforce_cpuid(vcpu, cap->args[0]); #endif
u.buffer = NULL; switch (ioctl) { case KVM_GET_LAPIC: {
r = -EINVAL; if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) goto out;
u.lapic = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_lapic_state), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM; if (!u.lapic) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_lapic(vcpu, u.lapic); if (r) goto out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, u.lapic, sizeof(struct kvm_lapic_state))) goto out;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_LAPIC: {
r = -EINVAL; if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) goto out;
u.lapic = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.lapic)); if (IS_ERR(u.lapic)) {
r = PTR_ERR(u.lapic); goto out_nofree;
}
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(vcpu, u.lapic); break;
} case KVM_INTERRUPT: { struct kvm_interrupt irq;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&irq, argp, sizeof(irq))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(vcpu, &irq); break;
} case KVM_NMI: {
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(vcpu); break;
} case KVM_SMI: {
r = kvm_inject_smi(vcpu); break;
} case KVM_SET_CPUID: { struct kvm_cpuid __user *cpuid_arg = argp; struct kvm_cpuid cpuid;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(vcpu, &cpuid, cpuid_arg->entries); break;
} case KVM_SET_CPUID2: { struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp; struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(vcpu, &cpuid,
cpuid_arg->entries); break;
} case KVM_GET_CPUID2: { struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp; struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(vcpu, &cpuid,
cpuid_arg->entries); if (r) goto out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(cpuid_arg, &cpuid, sizeof(cpuid))) goto out;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_GET_MSRS: { int idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_get_msr, 1);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx); break;
} case KVM_SET_MSRS: { int idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_set_msr, 0);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx); break;
} case KVM_TPR_ACCESS_REPORTING: { struct kvm_tpr_access_ctl tac;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&tac, argp, sizeof(tac))) goto out;
r = vcpu_ioctl_tpr_access_reporting(vcpu, &tac); if (r) goto out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, &tac, sizeof(tac))) goto out;
r = 0; break;
}; case KVM_SET_VAPIC_ADDR: { struct kvm_vapic_addr va; int idx;
r = -EINVAL; if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) goto out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&va, argp, sizeof(va))) goto out;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(vcpu, va.vapic_addr);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx); break;
} case KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE: {
u64 mcg_cap;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&mcg_cap, argp, sizeof(mcg_cap))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce(vcpu, mcg_cap); break;
} case KVM_X86_SET_MCE: { struct kvm_x86_mce mce;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&mce, argp, sizeof(mce))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(vcpu, &mce); break;
} case KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS: { struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, &events, sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_events))) break;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS: { struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&events, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_events))) break;
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu); break;
} case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS: { struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs); if (r < 0) break;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, &dbgregs, sizeof(struct kvm_debugregs))) break;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_DEBUGREGS: { struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&dbgregs, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_debugregs))) break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs); break;
} case KVM_GET_XSAVE: {
r = -EINVAL; if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size > sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)) break;
u.xsave = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xsave), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM; if (!u.xsave) break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave); if (r < 0) break;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))) break;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_XSAVE: { int size = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size;
u.xsave = memdup_user(argp, size); if (IS_ERR(u.xsave)) {
r = PTR_ERR(u.xsave); goto out_nofree;
}
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave); break;
}
case KVM_GET_XSAVE2: { int size = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size;
u.xsave = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM; if (!u.xsave) break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, u.buffer, size); if (r < 0) break;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, size)) break;
r = 0; break;
}
case KVM_GET_XCRS: {
u.xcrs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM; if (!u.xcrs) break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs); if (r < 0) break;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xcrs, sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs))) break;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_XCRS: {
u.xcrs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.xcrs)); if (IS_ERR(u.xcrs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(u.xcrs); goto out_nofree;
}
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs); break;
} case KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ: {
u32 user_tsc_khz;
r = -EINVAL;
if (vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected) goto out;
user_tsc_khz = (u32)arg;
if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control &&
user_tsc_khz >= kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz) goto out;
if (user_tsc_khz == 0)
user_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
if (!kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, user_tsc_khz))
r = 0;
goto out;
} case KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ: {
r = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz; goto out;
} case KVM_KVMCLOCK_CTRL: {
r = kvm_set_guest_paused(vcpu); goto out;
} case KVM_ENABLE_CAP: { struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&cap, argp, sizeof(cap))) goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(vcpu, &cap); break;
} case KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE: { struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state = argp;
u32 user_data_size;
r = -EINVAL; if (!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state) break;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_data_size) != sizeof(user_kvm_nested_state->size));
r = -EFAULT; if (get_user(user_data_size, &user_kvm_nested_state->size)) break;
r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state(vcpu, user_kvm_nested_state,
user_data_size); if (r < 0) break;
if (r > user_data_size) { if (put_user(r, &user_kvm_nested_state->size))
r = -EFAULT; else
r = -E2BIG; break;
}
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE: { struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state = argp; struct kvm_nested_state kvm_state; int idx;
r = -EINVAL; if (!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->set_state) break;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&kvm_state, user_kvm_nested_state, sizeof(kvm_state))) break;
r = -EINVAL; if (kvm_state.size < sizeof(kvm_state)) break;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->set_state(vcpu, user_kvm_nested_state, &kvm_state);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx); break;
} #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID:
r = kvm_ioctl_get_supported_hv_cpuid(vcpu, argp); break; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN case KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR: { struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr xva;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&xva, argp, sizeof(xva))) goto out;
r = kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(vcpu, &xva); if (!r && copy_to_user(argp, &xva, sizeof(xva)))
r = -EFAULT; break;
} case KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR: { struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr xva;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&xva, argp, sizeof(xva))) goto out;
r = kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(vcpu, &xva); break;
} #endif case KVM_GET_SREGS2: {
r = -EINVAL; if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) goto out;
u.sregs2 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM; if (!u.sregs2) goto out;
__get_sregs2(vcpu, u.sregs2);
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, u.sregs2, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2))) goto out;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_SREGS2: {
r = -EINVAL; if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) goto out;
u.sregs2 = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2)); if (IS_ERR(u.sregs2)) {
r = PTR_ERR(u.sregs2);
u.sregs2 = NULL; goto out;
}
r = __set_sregs2(vcpu, u.sregs2); break;
} case KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR: case KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR: case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr(vcpu, ioctl, argp); break; case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
r = -ENOTTY; if (!kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl) goto out;
r = kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(vcpu, argp); break; default:
r = -EINVAL;
}
out:
kfree(u.buffer);
out_nofree:
vcpu_put(vcpu); return r;
}
/* * Flush all CPUs' dirty log buffers to the dirty_bitmap. Called * before reporting dirty_bitmap to userspace. KVM flushes the buffers * on all VM-Exits, thus we only need to kick running vCPUs to force a * VM-Exit.
*/ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; unsignedlong i;
int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
{ int r;
if (cap->flags) return -EINVAL;
switch (cap->cap) { case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] & ~kvm_caps.supported_quirks) break;
fallthrough; case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS:
kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= cap->args[0] & kvm_caps.supported_quirks;
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP: {
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] > MAX_NR_RESERVED_IOAPIC_PINS) goto split_irqchip_unlock;
r = -EEXIST; if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) goto split_irqchip_unlock; if (kvm->created_vcpus) goto split_irqchip_unlock; /* Pairs with irqchip_in_kernel. */
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.irqchip_mode = KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT;
kvm->arch.nr_reserved_ioapic_pins = cap->args[0];
kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT);
r = 0;
split_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break;
} case KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X2APIC_API_VALID_FLAGS) break;
if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS)
kvm->arch.x2apic_format = true; if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK)
kvm->arch.x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled = true;
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] & ~kvm_get_allowed_disable_exits()) break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (kvm->created_vcpus) goto disable_exits_unlock;
#define SMT_RSB_MSG "This processor is affected by the Cross-Thread Return Predictions vulnerability. " \ "KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS should only be used with SMT disabled or trusted guests."
kvm_disable_exits(kvm, cap->args[0]);
r = 0;
disable_exits_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info = cap->args[0];
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD:
kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled = cap->args[0];
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT:
kvm->arch.triple_fault_event = cap->args[0];
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_VALID_MASK) break;
kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask = cap->args[0];
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_VALID_MODE) break;
if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF) &&
(cap->args[0] & KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT)) break;
if (kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit &&
cap->args[0] & KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT)
kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled = true;
r = 0; break; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: { unsignedlong allowed_attributes = 0;
r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]); if (r) break;
/* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */ if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) &&
!(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY))
kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true; else
r = -EINVAL; break;
} #endif case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM:
r = -EINVAL; if (!kvm_x86_ops.vm_copy_enc_context_from) break;
r = kvm_x86_call(vm_copy_enc_context_from)(kvm, cap->args[0]); break; case KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM:
r = -EINVAL; if (!kvm_x86_ops.vm_move_enc_context_from) break;
r = kvm_x86_call(vm_move_enc_context_from)(kvm, cap->args[0]); break; case KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL: if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK) {
r = -EINVAL; break;
}
kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled = cap->args[0];
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] & ~1) break;
kvm->arch.exit_on_emulation_error = cap->args[0];
r = 0; break; case KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY:
r = -EINVAL; if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK)) break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
kvm->arch.enable_pmu = !(cap->args[0] & KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE);
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
r = -EINVAL; if (cap->args[0] > KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS) break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id > cap->args[0]) {
;
} elseif (kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids == cap->args[0]) {
r = 0;
} elseif (!kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids) {
kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids = cap->args[0];
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT:
r = -EINVAL; if ((u32)cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_VALID_BITS) break; if (!kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit) break; if (!((u32)cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED)) break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
kvm->arch.notify_window = cap->args[0] >> 32;
kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags = (u32)cap->args[0];
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; case KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES:
r = -EINVAL;
/* * Since the risk of disabling NX hugepages is a guest crashing * the system, ensure the userspace process has permission to * reboot the system. * * Note that unlike the reboot() syscall, the process must have * this capability in the root namespace because exposing * /dev/kvm into a container does not limit the scope of the * iTLB multihit bug to that container. In other words, * this must use capable(), not ns_capable().
*/ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) {
r = -EPERM; break;
}
if (cap->args[0]) break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
kvm->arch.disable_nx_huge_pages = true;
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; case KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS: {
u64 bus_cycle_ns = cap->args[0];
u64 unused;
/* * Guard against overflow in tmict_to_ns(). 128 is the highest * divide value that can be programmed in APIC_TDCR.
*/
r = -EINVAL; if (!bus_cycle_ns ||
check_mul_overflow((u64)U32_MAX * 128, bus_cycle_ns, &unused)) break;
r = 0;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
r = -ENXIO; elseif (kvm->created_vcpus)
r = -EINVAL; else
kvm->arch.apic_bus_cycle_ns = bus_cycle_ns;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break;
} default:
r = -EINVAL; break;
} return r;
}
new_filter = kvm_alloc_msr_filter(default_allow); if (!new_filter) return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(filter->ranges); i++) {
r = kvm_add_msr_filter(new_filter, &filter->ranges[i]); if (r) {
kvm_free_msr_filter(new_filter); return r;
}
}
/* * Ignore the return, marking the guest paused only "fails" if the vCPU * isn't using kvmclock; continuing on is correct and desirable.
*/
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
(void)kvm_set_guest_paused(vcpu);
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
int kvm_arch_pm_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, unsignedlong state)
{ switch (state) { case PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE: case PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE: return kvm_arch_suspend_notifier(kvm);
}
if (copy_from_user(&data, argp, sizeof(data))) return -EFAULT;
/* * Only KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME is used, but allow passing the * result of KVM_GET_CLOCK back to KVM_SET_CLOCK.
*/ if (data.flags & ~KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS) return -EINVAL;
/* * This pairs with kvm_guest_time_update(): when masterclock is * in use, we use master_kernel_ns + kvmclock_offset to set * unsigned 'system_time' so if we use get_kvmclock_ns() (which * is slightly ahead) here we risk going negative on unsigned * 'system_time' when 'data.clock' is very small.
*/ if (data.flags & KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME) {
u64 now_real_ns = ktime_get_real_ns();
/* * Avoid stepping the kvmclock backwards.
*/ if (now_real_ns > data.realtime)
data.clock += now_real_ns - data.realtime;
}
int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsignedint ioctl, unsignedlong arg)
{ struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data; void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg; int r = -ENOTTY;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC /* * This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x * that these three variables' stack usage should be * combined, not added together.
*/ union { struct kvm_pit_state ps; struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2; struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
} u; #endif
switch (ioctl) { case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg); break; case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
u64 ident_addr;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EINVAL; if (kvm->created_vcpus) goto set_identity_unlock;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof(ident_addr))) goto set_identity_unlock;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
set_identity_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break;
} case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg); break; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST; if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -EINVAL; if (kvm->created_vcpus) goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = kvm_pic_init(kvm); if (r) goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm); if (r) {
kvm_pic_destroy(kvm); goto create_irqchip_unlock;
}
r = kvm_setup_default_ioapic_and_pic_routing(kvm); if (r) {
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_pic_destroy(kvm); goto create_irqchip_unlock;
} /* Write kvm->irq_routing before enabling irqchip_in_kernel. */
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.irqchip_mode = KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL;
kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT);
create_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break;
} case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY; goto create_pit; case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config))) goto out;
create_pit:
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST; if (kvm->arch.vpit) goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOENT; if (!pic_in_kernel(kvm)) goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags); if (kvm->arch.vpit)
r = 0;
create_pit_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: { /* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */ struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip)); if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip); goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO; if (!irqchip_full(kvm)) goto get_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip); if (r) goto get_irqchip_out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof(*chip))) goto get_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
get_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip); break;
} case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: { /* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */ struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip)); if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip); goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO; if (!irqchip_full(kvm)) goto set_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
set_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip); break;
} case KVM_GET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state))) goto out;
r = -ENXIO; if (!kvm->arch.vpit) goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps); if (r) goto out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state))) goto out;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(u.ps))) goto out;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -ENXIO; if (!kvm->arch.vpit) goto set_pit_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
set_pit_out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break;
} case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
r = -ENXIO; if (!kvm->arch.vpit) goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2); if (r) goto out;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2))) goto out;
r = 0; break;
} case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2))) goto out;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -ENXIO; if (!kvm->arch.vpit) goto set_pit2_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
set_pit2_out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break;
} case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: { struct kvm_reinject_control control;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control))) goto out;
r = -ENXIO; if (!kvm->arch.vpit) goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control); break;
} #endif case KVM_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID:
r = 0;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (kvm->created_vcpus)
r = -EBUSY; elseif (arg > KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS ||
(kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids && arg > kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids))
r = -EINVAL; else
kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id = arg;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); break; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: { struct kvm_xen_hvm_config xhc;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&xhc, argp, sizeof(xhc))) goto out;
r = kvm_xen_hvm_config(kvm, &xhc); break;
} case KVM_XEN_HVM_GET_ATTR: { struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr xha;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&xha, argp, sizeof(xha))) goto out;
r = kvm_xen_hvm_get_attr(kvm, &xha); if (!r && copy_to_user(argp, &xha, sizeof(xha)))
r = -EFAULT; break;
} case KVM_XEN_HVM_SET_ATTR: { struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr xha;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&xha, argp, sizeof(xha))) goto out;
r = kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(kvm, &xha); break;
} case KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND: { struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn uxe;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&uxe, argp, sizeof(uxe))) goto out;
r = kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send(kvm, &uxe); break;
} #endif case KVM_SET_CLOCK:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock(kvm, argp); break; case KVM_GET_CLOCK:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_clock(kvm, argp); break; case KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ: {
u32 user_tsc_khz;
r = -EINVAL;
user_tsc_khz = (u32)arg;
if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control &&
user_tsc_khz >= kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz) goto out;
if (user_tsc_khz == 0)
user_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
WRITE_ONCE(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz, user_tsc_khz);
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); goto out;
} case KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ: {
r = READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz); goto out;
} case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
r = -ENOTTY; if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_ioctl) goto out;
r = kvm_x86_call(mem_enc_ioctl)(kvm, argp); break; case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION: { struct kvm_enc_region region;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(®ion, argp, sizeof(region))) goto out;
r = -ENOTTY; if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_register_region) goto out;
r = kvm_x86_call(mem_enc_register_region)(kvm, ®ion); break;
} case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION: { struct kvm_enc_region region;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(®ion, argp, sizeof(region))) goto out;
r = -ENOTTY; if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_unregister_region) goto out;
r = kvm_x86_call(mem_enc_unregister_region)(kvm, ®ion); break;
} #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD: { struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd hvevfd;
r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&hvevfd, argp, sizeof(hvevfd))) goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_hv_eventfd(kvm, &hvevfd); break;
} #endif case KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(kvm, argp); break; case KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER: { struct kvm_msr_filter __user *user_msr_filter = argp; struct kvm_msr_filter filter;
if (copy_from_user(&filter, user_msr_filter, sizeof(filter))) return -EFAULT;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msr_filter(kvm, &filter); break;
} default:
r = -ENOTTY;
}
out: return r;
}
if (rdmsr_safe(msr_index, &dummy[0], &dummy[1])) return;
/* * Even MSRs that are valid in the host may not be exposed to guests in * some cases.
*/ switch (msr_index) { case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS: if (!kvm_mpx_supported()) return; break; case MSR_TSC_AUX: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID)) return; break; case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG)) return; break; case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL: case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) return; break; case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_cr3_filtering)) return; break; case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE: case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
(!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_single_range_output))) return; break; case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
(msr_index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A >=
intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges) * 2)) return; break; case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 ...
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + KVM_MAX_NR_GP_COUNTERS - 1: if (msr_index - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 >=
kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp) return; break; case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 ...
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + KVM_MAX_NR_GP_COUNTERS - 1: if (msr_index - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 >=
kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp) return; break; case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 ...
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 + KVM_MAX_NR_FIXED_COUNTERS - 1: if (msr_index - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 >=
kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed) return; break; case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL: case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS: case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR: case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_SET: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2)) return; break; case MSR_IA32_XFD: case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD)) return; break; case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL: if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)) return; break; default: break;
}
msrs_to_save[num_msrs_to_save++] = msr_index;
}
staticvoid kvm_init_msr_lists(void)
{ unsigned i;
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(KVM_MAX_NR_FIXED_COUNTERS != 3, "Please update the fixed PMCs in msrs_to_save_pmu[]");
for (i = KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR; i <= KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR; i++)
kvm_probe_feature_msr(i);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx); i++)
kvm_probe_feature_msr(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[i]);
}
staticint vcpu_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len, constvoid *v)
{ int handled = 0; int n;
do {
n = min(len, 8); if (!(lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
!kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev, addr, n, v))
&& kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v)) break;
handled += n;
addr += n;
len -= n;
v += n;
} while (len);
return handled;
}
staticint vcpu_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len, void *v)
{ int handled = 0; int n;
do {
n = min(len, 8); if (!(lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
!kvm_iodevice_read(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev,
addr, n, v))
&& kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v)) break;
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, n, addr, v);
handled += n;
addr += n;
len -= n;
v += n;
} while (len);
return handled;
}
void kvm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
kvm_x86_call(set_segment)(vcpu, var, seg);
}
void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
kvm_x86_call(get_segment)(vcpu, var, seg);
}
/* * FIXME: this should call handle_emulation_failure if X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED * is returned, but our callers are not ready for that and they blindly * call kvm_inject_page_fault. Ensure that they at least do not leak * uninitialized kernel stack memory into cr2 and error code.
*/
memset(exception, 0, sizeof(*exception)); return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access,
exception);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_guest_virt);
/* * currently PKRU is only applied to ept enabled guest so * there is no pkey in EPT page table for L1 guest or EPT * shadow page table for L2 guest.
*/ if (vcpu_match_mmio_gva(vcpu, gva) && (!is_paging(vcpu) ||
!permission_fault(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu,
vcpu->arch.mmio_access, 0, access))) {
*gpa = vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT |
(gva & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
trace_vcpu_match_mmio(gva, *gpa, write, false); return 1;
}
/* * If the exit was due to a NPF we may already have a GPA. * If the GPA is present, use it to avoid the GVA to GPA table walk. * Note, this cannot be used on string operations since string * operation using rep will only have the initial GPA from the NPF * occurred.
*/ if (ctxt->gpa_available && emulator_can_use_gpa(ctxt) &&
(addr & ~PAGE_MASK) == (ctxt->gpa_val & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
gpa = ctxt->gpa_val;
ret = vcpu_is_mmio_gpa(vcpu, addr, gpa, write);
} else {
ret = vcpu_mmio_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, addr, &gpa, exception, write); if (ret < 0) return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
if (!ret && ops->read_write_emulate(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
/* * Is this MMIO handled locally?
*/
handled = ops->read_write_mmio(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val); if (handled == bytes) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
/* * Emulate the atomic as a straight write to avoid #AC if SLD is * enabled in the host and the access splits a cache line.
*/ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
page_line_mask = ~(cache_line_size() - 1); else
page_line_mask = PAGE_MASK;
hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa)); if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva)) goto emul_write;
hva += offset_in_page(gpa);
switch (bytes) { case 1:
r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u8, hva, old, new); break; case 2:
r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u16, hva, old, new); break; case 4:
r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u32, hva, old, new); break; case 8:
r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u64, hva, old, new); break; default:
BUG();
}
if (r < 0) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
/* * Mark the page dirty _before_ checking whether or not the CMPXCHG was * successful, as the old value is written back on failure. Note, for * live migration, this is unnecessarily conservative as CMPXCHG writes * back the original value and the access is atomic, but KVM's ABI is * that all writes are dirty logged, regardless of the value written.
*/
kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
if (r) return X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED;
kvm_page_track_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
emul_write:
pr_warn_once("emulating exchange as write\n");
staticint emulator_pio_in_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size, unsignedshort port, void *data, unsignedint count, bool in)
{ unsigned i; int r;
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pio.count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if (in)
r = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_PIO_BUS, port, size, data); else
r = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_PIO_BUS, port, size, data);
if (r) { if (i == 0) goto userspace_io;
/* * Userspace must have unregistered the device while PIO * was running. Drop writes / read as 0.
*/ if (in)
memset(data, 0, size * (count - i)); break;
}
staticint emulator_pio_in_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int size, unsignedshort port, void *val, unsignedint count)
{ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt); if (vcpu->arch.pio.count) { /* * Complete a previous iteration that required userspace I/O. * Note, @count isn't guaranteed to match pio.count as userspace * can modify ECX before rerunning the vCPU. Ignore any such * shenanigans as KVM doesn't support modifying the rep count, * and the emulator ensures @count doesn't overflow the buffer.
*/
complete_emulator_pio_in(vcpu, val); return 1;
}
switch (cr) { case 0:
value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu); break; case 2:
value = vcpu->arch.cr2; break; case 3:
value = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu); break; case 4:
value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu); break; case 8:
value = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu); break; default:
kvm_err("%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr); return 0;
}
return value;
}
staticint emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val)
{ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt); int res = 0;
switch (cr) { case 0:
res = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr0(vcpu), val)); break; case 2:
vcpu->arch.cr2 = val; break; case 3:
res = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val); break; case 4:
res = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr4(vcpu), val)); break; case 8:
res = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val); break; default:
kvm_err("%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr);
res = -1;
}
staticvoid toggle_interruptibility(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mask)
{
u32 int_shadow = kvm_x86_call(get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu); /* * an sti; sti; sequence only disable interrupts for the first * instruction. So, if the last instruction, be it emulated or * not, left the system with the INT_STI flag enabled, it * means that the last instruction is an sti. We should not * leave the flag on in this case. The same goes for mov ss
*/ if (int_shadow & mask)
mask = 0; if (unlikely(int_shadow || mask)) {
kvm_x86_call(set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, mask); if (!mask)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
}
}
/* * Zero the whole array used to retrieve the exit info, as casting to * u32 for select entries will leave some chunks uninitialized.
*/
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
/* * There's currently space for 13 entries, but 5 are used for the exit * reason and info. Restrict to 4 to reduce the maintenance burden * when expanding kvm_run.emulation_failure in the future.
*/ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ndata > 4))
ndata = 4;
/* Always include the flags as a 'data' entry. */
info_start = 1;
run->emulation_failure.flags = 0;
staticbool kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, int emulation_type)
{ if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF)) returnfalse;
/* * If the failed instruction faulted on an access to page tables that * are used to translate any part of the instruction, KVM can't resolve * the issue by unprotecting the gfn, as zapping the shadow page will * result in the instruction taking a !PRESENT page fault and thus put * the vCPU into an infinite loop of page faults. E.g. KVM will create * a SPTE and write-protect the gfn to resolve the !PRESENT fault, and * then zap the SPTE to unprotect the gfn, and then do it all over * again. Report the error to userspace.
*/ if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP) returnfalse;
/* * If emulation may have been triggered by a write to a shadowed page * table, unprotect the gfn (zap any relevant SPTEs) and re-enter the * guest to let the CPU re-execute the instruction in the hope that the * CPU can cleanly execute the instruction that KVM failed to emulate.
*/
__kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, true);
/* * Retry even if _this_ vCPU didn't unprotect the gfn, as it's possible * all SPTEs were already zapped by a different task. The alternative * is to report the error to userspace and likely terminate the guest, * and the last_retry_{eip,addr} checks will prevent retrying the page * fault indefinitely, i.e. there's nothing to lose by retrying.
*/ returntrue;
}
/* * rflags is the old, "raw" value of the flags. The new value has * not been saved yet. * * This is correct even for TF set by the guest, because "the * processor will not generate this exception after the instruction * that sets the TF flag".
*/ if (unlikely(rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
r = kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(vcpu); return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_skip_emulated_instruction);
staticbool kvm_is_code_breakpoint_inhibited(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ if (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_RF) returntrue;
/* * Intel compatible CPUs inhibit code #DBs when MOV/POP SS blocking is * active, but AMD compatible CPUs do not.
*/ if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu)) returnfalse;
staticbool kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type, int *r)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
/* * Do not check for code breakpoints if hardware has already done the * checks, as inferred from the emulation type. On NO_DECODE and SKIP, * the instruction has passed all exception checks, and all intercepted * exceptions that trigger emulation have lower priority than code * breakpoints, i.e. the fact that the intercepted exception occurred * means any code breakpoints have already been serviced. * * Note, KVM needs to check for code #DBs on EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED as * hardware has checked the RIP of the magic prefix, but not the RIP of * the instruction being emulated. The intent of forced emulation is * to behave as if KVM intercepted the instruction without an exception * and without a prefix.
*/ if (emulation_type & (EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE | EMULTYPE_SKIP |
EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD | EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_PF)) returnfalse;
staticbool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{ switch (ctxt->opcode_len) { case 1: switch (ctxt->b) { case 0xe4: /* IN */ case 0xe5: case 0xec: case 0xed: case 0xe6: /* OUT */ case 0xe7: case 0xee: case 0xef: case 0x6c: /* INS */ case 0x6d: case 0x6e: /* OUTS */ case 0x6f: returntrue;
} break; case 2: switch (ctxt->b) { case 0x33: /* RDPMC */ returntrue;
} break;
}
returnfalse;
}
/* * Decode an instruction for emulation. The caller is responsible for handling * code breakpoints. Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary * (and wrong) when emulating on an intercepted fault-like exception[*], as * code breakpoints have higher priority and thus have already been done by * hardware. * * [*] Except #MC, which is higher priority, but KVM should never emulate in * response to a machine check.
*/ int x86_decode_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type, void *insn, int insn_len)
{ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt; int r;
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
r = x86_decode_insn(ctxt, insn, insn_len, emulation_type);
if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)) {
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
/* * Return immediately if RIP hits a code breakpoint, such #DBs * are fault-like and are higher priority than any faults on * the code fetch itself.
*/ if (kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(vcpu, emulation_type, &r)) return r;
r = x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emulation_type,
insn, insn_len); if (r != EMULATION_OK) { if ((emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD) ||
(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1;
} if (kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,
emulation_type)) return 1;
if (ctxt->have_exception &&
!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP)) { /* * #UD should result in just EMULATION_FAILED, and trap-like * exception should not be encountered during decode.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctxt->exception.vector == UD_VECTOR ||
exception_type(ctxt->exception.vector) == EXCPT_TRAP);
inject_emulated_exception(vcpu); return 1;
} return handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, emulation_type);
}
}
/* * EMULTYPE_SKIP without EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT is intended for * use *only* by vendor callbacks for kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(). * The caller is responsible for updating interruptibility state and * injecting single-step #DBs.
*/ if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) { if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip; else
ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT) {
r = 1; goto writeback;
}
/* * If emulation was caused by a write-protection #PF on a non-page_table * writing instruction, try to unprotect the gfn, i.e. zap shadow pages, * and retry the instruction, as the vCPU is likely no longer using the * gfn as a page table.
*/ if ((emulation_type & EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF) &&
!x86_page_table_writing_insn(ctxt) &&
kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa)) return 1;
/* this is needed for vmware backdoor interface to work since it
changes registers values during IO operation */ if (vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu) {
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = false;
emulator_invalidate_register_cache(ctxt);
}
restart: if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_PF) { /* Save the faulting GPA (cr2) in the address field */
ctxt->exception.address = cr2_or_gpa;
/* With shadow page tables, cr2 contains a GVA or nGPA. */ if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
ctxt->gpa_available = true;
ctxt->gpa_val = cr2_or_gpa;
}
} else { /* Sanitize the address out of an abundance of paranoia. */
ctxt->exception.address = 0;
}
/* * Check L1's instruction intercepts when emulating instructions for * L2, unless KVM is re-emulating a previously decoded instruction, * e.g. to complete userspace I/O, in which case KVM has already * checked the intercepts.
*/
r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt, is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE));
if (r == EMULATION_INTERCEPTED) return 1;
if (r == EMULATION_FAILED) { if (kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,
emulation_type)) return 1;
/* * Note, EXCPT_DB is assumed to be fault-like as the emulator * only supports code breakpoints and general detect #DB, both * of which are fault-like.
*/ if (!ctxt->have_exception ||
exception_type(ctxt->exception.vector) == EXCPT_TRAP) {
kvm_pmu_trigger_event(vcpu, kvm_pmu_eventsel.INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED); if (ctxt->is_branch)
kvm_pmu_trigger_event(vcpu, kvm_pmu_eventsel.BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip); if (r && (ctxt->tf || (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)))
r = kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(vcpu);
kvm_x86_call(update_emulated_instruction)(vcpu);
__kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
}
/* * For STI, interrupts are shadowed; so KVM_REQ_EVENT will * do nothing, and it will be requested again as soon as * the shadow expires. But we still need to check here, * because POPF has no interrupt shadow.
*/ if (unlikely((ctxt->eflags & ~rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
} else
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = true;
return r;
}
int kvm_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type)
{ return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0, emulation_type, NULL, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_instruction);
int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len)
{ return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0, 0, insn, insn_len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer);
int kvm_fast_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size, unsignedshort port, int in)
{ int ret;
if (in)
ret = kvm_fast_pio_in(vcpu, size, port); else
ret = kvm_fast_pio_out(vcpu, size, port); return ret && kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_pio);
staticvoid __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(struct cpufreq_freqs *freq, int cpu)
{ struct kvm *kvm; struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; int send_ipi = 0; unsignedlong i;
/* * We allow guests to temporarily run on slowing clocks, * provided we notify them after, or to run on accelerating * clocks, provided we notify them before. Thus time never * goes backwards. * * However, we have a problem. We can't atomically update * the frequency of a given CPU from this function; it is * merely a notifier, which can be called from any CPU. * Changing the TSC frequency at arbitrary points in time * requires a recomputation of local variables related to * the TSC for each VCPU. We must flag these local variables * to be updated and be sure the update takes place with the * new frequency before any guests proceed. * * Unfortunately, the combination of hotplug CPU and frequency * change creates an intractable locking scenario; the order * of when these callouts happen is undefined with respect to * CPU hotplug, and they can race with each other. As such, * merely setting per_cpu(cpu_tsc_khz) = X during a hotadd is * undefined; you can actually have a CPU frequency change take * place in between the computation of X and the setting of the * variable. To protect against this problem, all updates of * the per_cpu tsc_khz variable are done in an interrupt * protected IPI, and all callers wishing to update the value * must wait for a synchronous IPI to complete (which is trivial * if the caller is on the CPU already). This establishes the * necessary total order on variable updates. * * Note that because a guest time update may take place * anytime after the setting of the VCPU's request bit, the * correct TSC value must be set before the request. However, * to ensure the update actually makes it to any guest which * starts running in hardware virtualization between the set * and the acquisition of the spinlock, we must also ping the * CPU after setting the request bit. *
*/
if (freq->old < freq->new && send_ipi) { /* * We upscale the frequency. Must make the guest * doesn't see old kvmclock values while running with * the new frequency, otherwise we risk the guest sees * time go backwards. * * In case we update the frequency for another cpu * (which might be in guest context) send an interrupt * to kick the cpu out of guest context. Next time * guest context is entered kvmclock will be updated, * so the guest will not see stale values.
*/
smp_call_function_single(cpu, tsc_khz_changed, freq, 1);
}
}
/* * Indirection to move queue_work() out of the tk_core.seq write held * region to prevent possible deadlocks against time accessors which * are invoked with work related locks held.
*/ staticvoid pvclock_irq_work_fn(struct irq_work *w)
{
queue_work(system_long_wq, &pvclock_gtod_work);
}
/* * Disable master clock if host does not trust, or does not use, * TSC based clocksource. Delegate queue_work() to irq_work as * this is invoked with tk_core.seq write held.
*/ if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(gtod->clock.vclock_mode) &&
atomic_read(&kvm_guest_has_master_clock) != 0)
irq_work_queue(&pvclock_irq_work); return 0;
}
staticint kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility(void)
{ int cpu = smp_processor_id(); struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
/* * Compatibility checks are done when loading KVM and when enabling * hardware, e.g. during CPU hotplug, to ensure all online CPUs are * compatible, i.e. KVM should never perform a compatibility check on * an offline CPU.
*/
WARN_ON(!cpu_online(cpu));
if (__cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, c) !=
__cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, &boot_cpu_data)) return -EIO;
/* * KVM explicitly assumes that the guest has an FPU and * FXSAVE/FXRSTOR. For example, the KVM_GET_FPU explicitly casts the * vCPU's FPU state as a fxregs_state struct.
*/ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR)) {
pr_err("inadequate fpu\n"); return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* * KVM assumes that PAT entry '0' encodes WB memtype and simply zeroes * the PAT bits in SPTEs. Bail if PAT[0] is programmed to something * other than WB. Note, EPT doesn't utilize the PAT, but don't bother * with an exception. PAT[0] is set to WB on RESET and also by the * kernel, i.e. failure indicates a kernel bug or broken firmware.
*/ if (rdmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, &host_pat) ||
(host_pat & GENMASK(2, 0)) != 6) {
pr_err("host PAT[0] is not WB\n"); return -EIO;
}
memset(&kvm_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_caps));
x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache(); if (!x86_emulator_cache) {
pr_err("failed to allocate cache for x86 emulator\n"); return -ENOMEM;
}
user_return_msrs = alloc_percpu(struct kvm_user_return_msrs); if (!user_return_msrs) {
pr_err("failed to allocate percpu kvm_user_return_msrs\n");
r = -ENOMEM; goto out_free_x86_emulator_cache;
}
kvm_nr_uret_msrs = 0;
r = kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init(); if (r) goto out_free_percpu;
/* * Point of no return! DO NOT add error paths below this point unless * absolutely necessary, as most operations from this point forward * require unwinding.
*/
kvm_timer_init();
if (pi_inject_timer == -1)
pi_inject_timer = housekeeping_enabled(HK_TYPE_TIMER); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pvclock_gtod_register_notifier(&pvclock_gtod_notifier);
if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV))
set_hv_tscchange_cb(kvm_hyperv_tsc_notifier); #endif
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) && tdp_mmu_enabled)
kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
/* KVM always ignores guest PAT for shadow paging. */ if (!tdp_enabled)
kvm_caps.supported_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) { /* * Make sure the user can only configure tsc_khz values that * fit into a signed integer. * A min value is not calculated because it will always * be 1 on all machines.
*/
u64 max = min(0x7fffffffULL,
__scale_tsc(kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio, tsc_khz));
kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
}
kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
kvm_init_msr_lists(); return 0;
if (clock_type != KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK) return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
/* * When tsc is in permanent catchup mode guests won't be able to use * pvclock_read_retry loop to get consistent view of pvclock
*/ if (vcpu->arch.tsc_always_catchup) return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread(&ts, &cycle)) return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = 0; if (kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, paddr, &clock_pairing, sizeof(struct kvm_clock_pairing)))
ret = -KVM_EFAULT;
return ret;
} #endif
/* * kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op: Kick a vcpu. * * @apicid - apicid of vcpu to be kicked.
*/ staticvoid kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(struct kvm *kvm, int apicid)
{ /* * All other fields are unused for APIC_DM_REMRD, but may be consumed by * common code, e.g. for tracing. Defer initialization to the compiler.
*/ struct kvm_lapic_irq lapic_irq = {
.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_REMRD,
.dest_mode = APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL,
.shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
.dest_id = apicid,
};
if (likely(map) && dest_id <= map->max_apic_id) {
dest_id = array_index_nospec(dest_id, map->max_apic_id + 1); if (map->phys_map[dest_id])
target = map->phys_map[dest_id]->vcpu;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!target || !READ_ONCE(target->ready)) goto no_yield;
/* Ignore requests to yield to self */ if (vcpu == target) goto no_yield;
if (kvm_vcpu_yield_to(target) <= 0) goto no_yield;
vcpu->stat.directed_yield_successful++;
no_yield: return;
}
staticint complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 ret = vcpu->run->hypercall.ret;
if (!is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu))
ret = (u32)ret;
kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl, int (*complete_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *))
{ unsignedlong ret; unsignedlong nr = kvm_rax_read(vcpu); unsignedlong a0 = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu); unsignedlong a1 = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu); unsignedlong a2 = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu); unsignedlong a3 = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu); int op_64_bit = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);
if (!op_64_bit) {
nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a1 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a2 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a3 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
}
if (cpl) {
ret = -KVM_EPERM; goto out;
}
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
switch (nr) { case KVM_HC_VAPIC_POLL_IRQ:
ret = 0; break; case KVM_HC_KICK_CPU: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)) break;
kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(vcpu->kvm, a1);
kvm_sched_yield(vcpu, a1);
ret = 0; break; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 case KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING:
ret = kvm_pv_clock_pairing(vcpu, a0, a1); break; #endif case KVM_HC_SEND_IPI: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI)) break;
ret = kvm_pv_send_ipi(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1, a2, a3, op_64_bit); break; case KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD: if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD)) break;
kvm_sched_yield(vcpu, a0);
ret = 0; break; case KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE: {
u64 gpa = a0, npages = a1, attrs = a2;
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS; if (!user_exit_on_hypercall(vcpu->kvm, KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)) break;
if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(gpa) || !npages ||
gpa_to_gfn(gpa) + npages <= gpa_to_gfn(gpa)) {
ret = -KVM_EINVAL; break;
}
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL;
vcpu->run->hypercall.nr = KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE; /* * In principle this should have been -KVM_ENOSYS, but userspace (QEMU <=9.2) * assumed that vcpu->run->hypercall.ret is never changed by KVM and thus that * it was always zero on KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL. Since KVM is now overwriting * vcpu->run->hypercall.ret, ensuring that it is zero to not break QEMU.
*/
vcpu->run->hypercall.ret = 0;
vcpu->run->hypercall.args[0] = gpa;
vcpu->run->hypercall.args[1] = npages;
vcpu->run->hypercall.args[2] = attrs;
vcpu->run->hypercall.flags = 0; if (op_64_bit)
vcpu->run->hypercall.flags |= KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_LONG_MODE;
/* * If the quirk is disabled, synthesize a #UD and let the guest pick up * the pieces.
*/ if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN)) {
ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
ctxt->have_exception = true; return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
staticvoid kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* * Suppress the error code if the vCPU is in Real Mode, as Real Mode * exceptions don't report error codes. The presence of an error code * is carried with the exception and only stripped when the exception * is injected as intercepted #PF VM-Exits for AMD's Paged Real Mode do * report an error code despite the CPU being in Real Mode.
*/
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code &= is_protmode(vcpu);
/* * Check for any event (interrupt or exception) that is ready to be injected, * and if there is at least one event, inject the event with the highest * priority. This handles both "pending" events, i.e. events that have never * been injected into the guest, and "injected" events, i.e. events that were * injected as part of a previous VM-Enter, but weren't successfully delivered * and need to be re-injected. * * Note, this is not guaranteed to be invoked on a guest instruction boundary, * i.e. doesn't guarantee that there's an event window in the guest. KVM must * be able to inject exceptions in the "middle" of an instruction, and so must * also be able to re-inject NMIs and IRQs in the middle of an instruction. * I.e. for exceptions and re-injected events, NOT invoking this on instruction * boundaries is necessary and correct. * * For simplicity, KVM uses a single path to inject all events (except events * that are injected directly from L1 to L2) and doesn't explicitly track * instruction boundaries for asynchronous events. However, because VM-Exits * that can occur during instruction execution typically result in KVM skipping * the instruction or injecting an exception, e.g. instruction and exception * intercepts, and because pending exceptions have higher priority than pending * interrupts, KVM still honors instruction boundaries in most scenarios. * * But, if a VM-Exit occurs during instruction execution, and KVM does NOT skip * the instruction or inject an exception, then KVM can incorrecty inject a new * asynchronous event if the event became pending after the CPU fetched the * instruction (in the guest). E.g. if a page fault (#PF, #NPF, EPT violation) * occurs and is resolved by KVM, a coincident NMI, SMI, IRQ, etc... can be * injected on the restarted instruction instead of being deferred until the * instruction completes. * * In practice, this virtualization hole is unlikely to be observed by the * guest, and even less likely to cause functional problems. To detect the * hole, the guest would have to trigger an event on a side effect of an early * phase of instruction execution, e.g. on the instruction fetch from memory. * And for it to be a functional problem, the guest would need to depend on the * ordering between that side effect, the instruction completing, _and_ the * delivery of the asynchronous event.
*/ staticint kvm_check_and_inject_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool *req_immediate_exit)
{ bool can_inject; int r;
/* * Process nested events first, as nested VM-Exit supersedes event * re-injection. If there's an event queued for re-injection, it will * be saved into the appropriate vmc{b,s}12 fields on nested VM-Exit.
*/ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
r = kvm_check_nested_events(vcpu); else
r = 0;
/* * Re-inject exceptions and events *especially* if immediate entry+exit * to/from L2 is needed, as any event that has already been injected * into L2 needs to complete its lifecycle before injecting a new event. * * Don't re-inject an NMI or interrupt if there is a pending exception. * This collision arises if an exception occurred while vectoring the * injected event, KVM intercepted said exception, and KVM ultimately * determined the fault belongs to the guest and queues the exception * for injection back into the guest. * * "Injected" interrupts can also collide with pending exceptions if * userspace ignores the "ready for injection" flag and blindly queues * an interrupt. In that case, prioritizing the exception is correct, * as the exception "occurred" before the exit to userspace. Trap-like * exceptions, e.g. most #DBs, have higher priority than interrupts. * And while fault-like exceptions, e.g. #GP and #PF, are the lowest * priority, they're only generated (pended) during instruction * execution, and interrupts are recognized at instruction boundaries. * Thus a pending fault-like exception means the fault occurred on the * *previous* instruction and must be serviced prior to recognizing any * new events in order to fully complete the previous instruction.
*/ if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected)
kvm_inject_exception(vcpu); elseif (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu))
; /* see above */ elseif (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected)
kvm_x86_call(inject_nmi)(vcpu); elseif (vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected)
kvm_x86_call(inject_irq)(vcpu, true);
/* * Exceptions that morph to VM-Exits are handled above, and pending * exceptions on top of injected exceptions that do not VM-Exit should * either morph to #DF or, sadly, override the injected exception.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.injected &&
vcpu->arch.exception.pending);
/* * Bail if immediate entry+exit to/from the guest is needed to complete * nested VM-Enter or event re-injection so that a different pending * event can be serviced (or if KVM needs to exit to userspace). * * Otherwise, continue processing events even if VM-Exit occurred. The * VM-Exit will have cleared exceptions that were meant for L2, but * there may now be events that can be injected into L1.
*/ if (r < 0) goto out;
/* * A pending exception VM-Exit should either result in nested VM-Exit * or force an immediate re-entry and exit to/from L2, and exception * VM-Exits cannot be injected (flag should _never_ be set).
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.injected ||
vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending);
/* * New events, other than exceptions, cannot be injected if KVM needs * to re-inject a previous event. See above comments on re-injecting * for why pending exceptions get priority.
*/
can_inject = !kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) { /* * Fault-class exceptions, except #DBs, set RF=1 in the RFLAGS * value pushed on the stack. Trap-like exception and all #DBs * leave RF as-is (KVM follows Intel's behavior in this regard; * AMD states that code breakpoint #DBs excplitly clear RF=0). * * Note, most versions of Intel's SDM and AMD's APM incorrectly * describe the behavior of General Detect #DBs, which are * fault-like. They do _not_ set RF, a la code breakpoints.
*/ if (exception_type(vcpu->arch.exception.vector) == EXCPT_FAULT)
__kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) |
X86_EFLAGS_RF);
if (vcpu->arch.exception.vector == DB_VECTOR) {
kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.exception); if (vcpu->arch.dr7 & DR7_GD) {
vcpu->arch.dr7 &= ~DR7_GD;
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
}
}
/* Don't inject interrupts if the user asked to avoid doing so */ if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ) return 0;
/* * Finally, inject interrupt events. If an event cannot be injected * due to architectural conditions (e.g. IF=0) a window-open exit * will re-request KVM_REQ_EVENT. Sometimes however an event is pending * and can architecturally be injected, but we cannot do it right now: * an interrupt could have arrived just now and we have to inject it * as a vmexit, or there could already an event in the queue, which is * indicated by can_inject. In that case we request an immediate exit * in order to make progress and get back here for another iteration. * The kvm_x86_ops hooks communicate this by returning -EBUSY.
*/ #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM if (vcpu->arch.smi_pending) {
r = can_inject ? kvm_x86_call(smi_allowed)(vcpu, true) :
-EBUSY; if (r < 0) goto out; if (r) {
vcpu->arch.smi_pending = false;
++vcpu->arch.smi_count;
enter_smm(vcpu);
can_inject = false;
} else
kvm_x86_call(enable_smi_window)(vcpu);
} #endif
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
r = can_inject ? kvm_x86_call(nmi_allowed)(vcpu, true) :
-EBUSY; if (r < 0) goto out; if (r) {
--vcpu->arch.nmi_pending;
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
kvm_x86_call(inject_nmi)(vcpu);
can_inject = false;
WARN_ON(kvm_x86_call(nmi_allowed)(vcpu, true) < 0);
} if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
kvm_x86_call(enable_nmi_window)(vcpu);
}
if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu)) {
r = can_inject ? kvm_x86_call(interrupt_allowed)(vcpu, true) :
-EBUSY; if (r < 0) goto out; if (r) { int irq = kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(vcpu);
if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(irq == -1)) {
kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, irq, false);
kvm_x86_call(inject_irq)(vcpu, false);
WARN_ON(kvm_x86_call(interrupt_allowed)(vcpu, true) < 0);
}
} if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu))
kvm_x86_call(enable_irq_window)(vcpu);
}
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->has_events &&
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->has_events(vcpu, true))
*req_immediate_exit = true;
/* * KVM must never queue a new exception while injecting an event; KVM * is done emulating and should only propagate the to-be-injected event * to the VMCS/VMCB. Queueing a new exception can put the vCPU into an * infinite loop as KVM will bail from VM-Enter to inject the pending * exception and start the cycle all over. * * Exempt triple faults as they have special handling and won't put the * vCPU into an infinite loop. Triple fault can be queued when running * VMX without unrestricted guest, as that requires KVM to emulate Real * Mode events (see kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt()).
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending); return 0;
out: if (r == -EBUSY) {
*req_immediate_exit = true;
r = 0;
} return r;
}
/* * x86 is limited to one NMI pending, but because KVM can't react to * incoming NMIs as quickly as bare metal, e.g. if the vCPU is * scheduled out, KVM needs to play nice with two queued NMIs showing * up at the same time. To handle this scenario, allow two NMIs to be * (temporarily) pending so long as NMIs are not blocked and KVM is not * waiting for a previous NMI injection to complete (which effectively * blocks NMIs). KVM will immediately inject one of the two NMIs, and * will request an NMI window to handle the second NMI.
*/ if (kvm_x86_call(get_nmi_mask)(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.nmi_injected)
limit = 1; else
limit = 2;
/* * Adjust the limit to account for pending virtual NMIs, which aren't * tracked in vcpu->arch.nmi_pending.
*/ if (kvm_x86_call(is_vnmi_pending)(vcpu))
limit--;
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending &&
(kvm_x86_call(set_vnmi_pending)(vcpu)))
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending--;
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
}
/* Return total number of NMIs pending injection to the VM */ int kvm_get_nr_pending_nmis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ return vcpu->arch.nmi_pending +
kvm_x86_call(is_vnmi_pending)(vcpu);
}
/* * When APICv gets disabled, we may still have injected interrupts * pending. At the same time, KVM_REQ_EVENT may not be set as APICv was * still active when the interrupt got accepted. Make sure * kvm_check_and_inject_events() is called to check for that.
*/ if (!apic->apicv_active)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
staticvoid kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) return;
/* * Due to sharing page tables across vCPUs, the xAPIC memslot must be * deleted if any vCPU has xAPIC virtualization and x2APIC enabled, but * and hardware doesn't support x2APIC virtualization. E.g. some AMD * CPUs support AVIC but not x2APIC. KVM still allows enabling AVIC in * this case so that KVM can use the AVIC doorbell to inject interrupts * to running vCPUs, but KVM must not create SPTEs for the APIC base as * the vCPU would incorrectly be able to access the vAPIC page via MMIO * despite being in x2APIC mode. For simplicity, inhibiting the APIC * access page is sticky.
*/ if (apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic) &&
kvm_x86_ops.allow_apicv_in_x2apic_without_x2apic_virtualization)
kvm_inhibit_apic_access_page(vcpu);
if (!(kvm_x86_ops.required_apicv_inhibits & BIT(reason))) return;
old = new = kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons;
set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(&new, reason, set);
if (!!old != !!new) { /* * Kick all vCPUs before setting apicv_inhibit_reasons to avoid * false positives in the sanity check WARN in vcpu_enter_guest(). * This task will wait for all vCPUs to ack the kick IRQ before * updating apicv_inhibit_reasons, and all other vCPUs will * block on acquiring apicv_update_lock so that vCPUs can't * redo vcpu_enter_guest() without seeing the new inhibit state. * * Note, holding apicv_update_lock and taking it in the read * side (handling the request) also prevents other vCPUs from * servicing the request with a stale apicv_inhibit_reasons.
*/
kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE);
kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons = new; if (new) { unsignedlong gfn = gpa_to_gfn(APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE); int idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
staticvoid kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) return;
kvm_x86_call(set_apic_access_page_addr)(vcpu);
}
/* * Called within kvm->srcu read side. * Returns 1 to let vcpu_run() continue the guest execution loop without * exiting to the userspace. Otherwise, the value will be returned to the * userspace.
*/ staticint vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ int r; bool req_int_win =
dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu);
fastpath_t exit_fastpath;
u64 run_flags, debug_ctl;
bool req_immediate_exit = false;
if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) { if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu)) {
r = -EIO; goto out;
}
if (kvm_dirty_ring_check_request(vcpu)) {
r = 0; goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu)) { if (unlikely(!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_nested_state_pages(vcpu))) {
r = 0; goto out;
}
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu))
__kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_update_masterclock(vcpu->kvm); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_gen_kvmclock_update(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu)) {
r = kvm_guest_time_update(vcpu); if (unlikely(r)) goto out;
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_MMU_PGD, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_load_pgd(vcpu);
/* * Note, the order matters here, as flushing "all" TLB entries * also flushes the "current" TLB entries, i.e. servicing the * flush "all" will clear any request to flush "current".
*/ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_all(vcpu);
kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(vcpu);
/* * Fall back to a "full" guest flush if Hyper-V's precise * flushing fails. Note, Hyper-V's flushing is per-vCPU, but * the flushes are considered "remote" and not "local" because * the requests can be initiated from other vCPUs.
*/ #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu) &&
kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb(vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu); #endif
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS;
r = 0; goto out;
} if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) { if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->triple_fault(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
r = 0; goto out;
}
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu)) { /* Page is swapped out. Do synthetic halt */
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = true;
r = 1; goto out;
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu))
record_steal_time(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu))
kvm_pmu_handle_event(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu))
kvm_pmu_deliver_pmi(vcpu); #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
process_smi(vcpu); #endif if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu))
process_nmi(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_IOAPIC_EOI_EXIT, vcpu)) {
BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi > 255); if (test_bit(vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi,
vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_IOAPIC_EOI;
vcpu->run->eoi.vector =
vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi;
r = 0; goto out;
}
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, vcpu))
vcpu_scan_ioapic(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_EOI_EXITMAP, vcpu))
vcpu_load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(vcpu); #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_CRASH, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_CRASH;
vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 0;
r = 0; goto out;
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_RESET, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_RESET;
vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 0;
r = 0; goto out;
} if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_EXIT, vcpu)) { struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
/* * KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER has to be processed after * KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, because Hyper-V SynIC timers * depend on the guest clock being up-to-date
*/ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER, vcpu))
kvm_hv_process_stimers(vcpu); #endif if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu); if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu))
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
/* * Recalc MSR intercepts as userspace may want to intercept * accesses to MSRs that KVM would otherwise pass through to * the guest.
*/ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED, vcpu))
kvm_x86_call(recalc_msr_intercepts)(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_CPU_DIRTY_LOGGING, vcpu))
kvm_x86_call(update_cpu_dirty_logging)(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, vcpu)) {
kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true); if (vcpu->arch.mp_state != KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE) {
r = 1; goto out;
}
}
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu) || req_int_win ||
kvm_xen_has_interrupt(vcpu)) {
++vcpu->stat.req_event;
r = kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu); if (r < 0) {
r = 0; goto out;
} if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
r = 1; goto out;
}
r = kvm_check_and_inject_events(vcpu, &req_immediate_exit); if (r < 0) {
r = 0; goto out;
} if (req_int_win)
kvm_x86_call(enable_irq_window)(vcpu);
if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu)) {
update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(vcpu);
}
}
r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu); if (unlikely(r)) { goto cancel_injection;
}
preempt_disable();
kvm_x86_call(prepare_switch_to_guest)(vcpu);
/* * Disable IRQs before setting IN_GUEST_MODE. Posted interrupt * IPI are then delayed after guest entry, which ensures that they * result in virtual interrupt delivery.
*/
local_irq_disable();
/* Store vcpu->apicv_active before vcpu->mode. */
smp_store_release(&vcpu->mode, IN_GUEST_MODE);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
/* * 1) We should set ->mode before checking ->requests. Please see * the comment in kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(). * * 2) For APICv, we should set ->mode before checking PID.ON. This * pairs with the memory barrier implicit in pi_test_and_set_on * (see vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt). * * 3) This also orders the write to mode from any reads to the page * tables done while the VCPU is running. Please see the comment * in kvm_flush_remote_tlbs.
*/
smp_mb__after_srcu_read_unlock();
/* * Process pending posted interrupts to handle the case where the * notification IRQ arrived in the host, or was never sent (because the * target vCPU wasn't running). Do this regardless of the vCPU's APICv * status, KVM doesn't update assigned devices when APICv is inhibited, * i.e. they can post interrupts even if APICv is temporarily disabled.
*/ if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu))
kvm_x86_call(sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
if (kvm_vcpu_exit_request(vcpu)) {
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
local_irq_enable();
preempt_enable();
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
r = 1; goto cancel_injection;
}
fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
switch_fpu_return();
if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &&
!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH))) {
set_debugreg(DR7_FIXED_1, 7);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3); /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
run_flags |= KVM_RUN_LOAD_GUEST_DR6;
} elseif (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) {
set_debugreg(DR7_FIXED_1, 7);
}
/* * Refresh the host DEBUGCTL snapshot after disabling IRQs, as DEBUGCTL * can be modified in IRQ context, e.g. via SMP function calls. Inform * vendor code if any host-owned bits were changed, e.g. so that the * value loaded into hardware while running the guest can be updated.
*/
debug_ctl = get_debugctlmsr(); if ((debug_ctl ^ vcpu->arch.host_debugctl) & kvm_x86_ops.HOST_OWNED_DEBUGCTL &&
!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
run_flags |= KVM_RUN_LOAD_DEBUGCTL;
vcpu->arch.host_debugctl = debug_ctl;
guest_timing_enter_irqoff();
for (;;) { /* * Assert that vCPU vs. VM APICv state is consistent. An APICv * update must kick and wait for all vCPUs before toggling the * per-VM state, and responding vCPUs must wait for the update * to complete before servicing KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE((kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(vcpu) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) &&
(kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu) != LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED));
exit_fastpath = kvm_x86_call(vcpu_run)(vcpu, run_flags); if (likely(exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST)) break;
if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu))
kvm_x86_call(sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
if (unlikely(kvm_vcpu_exit_request(vcpu))) {
exit_fastpath = EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED; break;
}
run_flags = 0;
/* Note, VM-Exits that go down the "slow" path are accounted below. */
++vcpu->stat.exits;
}
/* * Do this here before restoring debug registers on the host. And * since we do this before handling the vmexit, a DR access vmexit * can (a) read the correct value of the debug registers, (b) set * KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT again.
*/ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH);
kvm_x86_call(sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
}
/* * If the guest has used debug registers, at least dr7 * will be disabled while returning to the host. * If we don't have active breakpoints in the host, we don't * care about the messed up debug address registers. But if * we have some of them active, restore the old state.
*/ if (hw_breakpoint_active())
hw_breakpoint_restore();
/* * Sync xfd before calling handle_exit_irqoff() which may * rely on the fact that guest_fpu::xfd is up-to-date (e.g. * in #NM irqoff handler).
*/ if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state();
kvm_x86_call(handle_exit_irqoff)(vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, 0);
/* * Mark this CPU as needing a branch predictor flush before running * userspace. Must be done before enabling preemption to ensure it gets * set for the CPU that actually ran the guest, and not the CPU that it * may migrate to.
*/ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER))
this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, true);
/* * Consume any pending interrupts, including the possible source of * VM-Exit on SVM and any ticks that occur between VM-Exit and now. * An instruction is required after local_irq_enable() to fully unblock * interrupts on processors that implement an interrupt shadow, the * stat.exits increment will do nicely.
*/
kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
local_irq_enable();
++vcpu->stat.exits;
local_irq_disable();
kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
/* * Wait until after servicing IRQs to account guest time so that any * ticks that occurred while running the guest are properly accounted * to the guest. Waiting until IRQs are enabled degrades the accuracy * of accounting via context tracking, but the loss of accuracy is * acceptable for all known use cases.
*/
guest_timing_exit_irqoff();
local_irq_enable();
preempt_enable();
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
/* * Call this to ensure WC buffers in guest are evicted after each VM * Exit, so that the evicted WC writes can be snooped across all cpus
*/
smp_mb__after_srcu_read_lock();
/* Called within kvm->srcu read side. */ staticinlineint vcpu_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ bool hv_timer;
if (!kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu)) { /* * Switch to the software timer before halt-polling/blocking as * the guest's timer may be a break event for the vCPU, and the * hypervisor timer runs only when the CPU is in guest mode. * Switch before halt-polling so that KVM recognizes an expired * timer before blocking.
*/
hv_timer = kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu); if (hv_timer)
kvm_lapic_switch_to_sw_timer(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu); if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED)
kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu); else
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
if (hv_timer)
kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(vcpu);
/* * If the vCPU is not runnable, a signal or another host event * of some kind is pending; service it without changing the * vCPU's activity state.
*/ if (!kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu)) return 1;
}
/* * Evaluate nested events before exiting the halted state. This allows * the halt state to be recorded properly in the VMCS12's activity * state field (AMD does not have a similar field and a VM-Exit always * causes a spurious wakeup from HLT).
*/ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { int r = kvm_check_nested_events(vcpu);
WARN_ON_ONCE(r == -EBUSY); if (r < 0) return 0;
}
if (kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu) < 0) return 0; switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) { case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED: case KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD:
kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE);
fallthrough; case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false; break; case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED: break; default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1); break;
} return 1;
}
/* Called within kvm->srcu read side. */ staticint vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ int r;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
for (;;) { /* * If another guest vCPU requests a PV TLB flush in the middle * of instruction emulation, the rest of the emulation could * use a stale page translation. Assume that any code after * this point can start executing an instruction.
*/
vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = false; if (kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu)) {
r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
} else {
r = vcpu_block(vcpu);
}
if (r <= 0) break;
kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu); if (kvm_xen_has_pending_events(vcpu))
kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(vcpu);
if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu) &&
kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(vcpu)) {
r = 0;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_IRQ_WINDOW_OPEN;
++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits; break;
}
if (__xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending()) {
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
r = xfer_to_guest_mode_handle_work(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu); if (r) return r;
}
}
return r;
}
staticint __kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int state, int reason)
{ /* * The vCPU has halted, e.g. executed HLT. Update the run state if the * local APIC is in-kernel, the run loop will detect the non-runnable * state and halt the vCPU. Exit to userspace if the local APIC is * managed by userspace, in which case userspace is responsible for * handling wake events.
*/
++vcpu->stat.halt_exits; if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) { if (kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted)
state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, state); return 1;
} else {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = reason; return 0;
}
}
int kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ int ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); /* * TODO: we might be squashing a GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
*/ return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu) && ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_halt);
fastpath_t handle_fastpath_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ int ret;
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
ret = kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
if (!ret) return EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_USERSPACE;
if (kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu)) return EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
/* * Implements the following, as a state machine: * * read: * for each fragment * for each mmio piece in the fragment * write gpa, len * exit * copy data * execute insn * * write: * for each fragment * for each mmio piece in the fragment * write gpa, len * copy data * exit
*/ staticint complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run; struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag; unsigned len;
BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len); if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) { /* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else { /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment >= vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping. */ if (vcpu->mmio_is_write) return 1;
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1; return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
/* Swap (qemu) user FPU context for the guest FPU context. */ staticvoid kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* Exclude PKRU, it's restored separately immediately after VM-Exit. */
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, true);
trace_kvm_fpu(1);
}
/* When vcpu_run ends, restore user space FPU context. */ staticvoid kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, false);
++vcpu->stat.fpu_reload;
trace_kvm_fpu(0);
}
staticint kvm_x86_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* * SIPI_RECEIVED is obsolete; KVM leaves the vCPU in Wait-For-SIPI and * tracks the pending SIPI separately. SIPI_RECEIVED is still accepted * by KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS for backwards compatibility, but should be * converted to INIT_RECEIVED.
*/ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED)) return -EINVAL;
/* * Disallow running the vCPU if userspace forced it into an impossible * MP_STATE, e.g. if the vCPU is in WFS but SIPI is blocked.
*/ if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED &&
!kvm_apic_init_sipi_allowed(vcpu)) return -EINVAL;
return kvm_x86_call(vcpu_pre_run)(vcpu);
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception; struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u64 sync_valid_fields; int r;
r = kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(vcpu->kvm); if (r) return r;
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu); if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)) { if (!vcpu->wants_to_run) {
r = -EINTR; goto out;
}
/* * Don't bother switching APIC timer emulation from the * hypervisor timer to the software timer, the only way for the * APIC timer to be active is if userspace stuffed vCPU state, * i.e. put the vCPU into a nonsensical state. Only an INIT * will transition the vCPU out of UNINITIALIZED (without more * state stuffing from userspace), which will reset the local * APIC and thus cancel the timer or drop the IRQ (if the timer * already expired).
*/
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
if (kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu) < 0) {
r = 0; goto out;
}
r = -EAGAIN; if (signal_pending(current)) {
r = -EINTR;
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
} goto out;
}
sync_valid_fields = kvm_sync_valid_fields(vcpu->kvm); if ((kvm_run->kvm_valid_regs & ~sync_valid_fields) ||
(kvm_run->kvm_dirty_regs & ~sync_valid_fields)) {
r = -EINVAL; goto out;
}
if (kvm_run->kvm_dirty_regs) {
r = sync_regs(vcpu); if (r != 0) goto out;
}
/* re-sync apic's tpr */ if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) { if (kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, kvm_run->cr8) != 0) {
r = -EINVAL; goto out;
}
}
/* * If userspace set a pending exception and L2 is active, convert it to * a pending VM-Exit if L1 wants to intercept the exception.
*/ if (vcpu->arch.exception_from_userspace && is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->is_exception_vmexit(vcpu, ex->vector,
ex->error_code)) {
kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(vcpu, ex->vector,
ex->has_error_code, ex->error_code,
ex->has_payload, ex->payload);
ex->injected = false;
ex->pending = false;
}
vcpu->arch.exception_from_userspace = false;
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io)) { int (*cui)(struct kvm_vcpu *) = vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = NULL;
r = cui(vcpu); if (r <= 0) goto out;
} else {
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pio.count);
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed);
}
if (!vcpu->wants_to_run) {
r = -EINTR; goto out;
}
r = kvm_x86_vcpu_pre_run(vcpu); if (r <= 0) goto out;
r = vcpu_run(vcpu);
out:
kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu); if (kvm_run->kvm_valid_regs && likely(!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected))
store_regs(vcpu);
post_kvm_run_save(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
staticvoid __get_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
{ if (vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu) { /* * We are here if userspace calls get_regs() in the middle of * instruction emulation. Registers state needs to be copied * back from emulation context to vcpu. Userspace shouldn't do * that usually, but some bad designed PV devices (vmware * backdoor interface) need this to work
*/
emulator_writeback_register_cache(vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt);
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
}
regs->rax = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
regs->rbx = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
regs->rcx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
regs->rdx = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
regs->rsi = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
regs->rdi = kvm_rdi_read(vcpu);
regs->rsp = kvm_rsp_read(vcpu);
regs->rbp = kvm_rbp_read(vcpu); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
regs->r8 = kvm_r8_read(vcpu);
regs->r9 = kvm_r9_read(vcpu);
regs->r10 = kvm_r10_read(vcpu);
regs->r11 = kvm_r11_read(vcpu);
regs->r12 = kvm_r12_read(vcpu);
regs->r13 = kvm_r13_read(vcpu);
regs->r14 = kvm_r14_read(vcpu);
regs->r15 = kvm_r15_read(vcpu); #endif
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
vcpu_put(vcpu); return r;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
{ int ret = -EINVAL;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
switch (mp_state->mp_state) { case KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED: case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED: case KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD: case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED: case KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED: if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) goto out; break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE: break;
default: goto out;
}
/* * SIPI_RECEIVED is obsolete and no longer used internally; KVM instead * leaves the vCPU in INIT_RECIEVED (Wait-For-SIPI) and pends the SIPI. * Translate SIPI_RECEIVED as appropriate for backwards compatibility.
*/ if (mp_state->mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED) {
mp_state->mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
set_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
}
int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason, bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt; int ret;
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ret = emulator_task_switch(ctxt, tss_selector, idt_index, reason,
has_error_code, error_code);
/* * Report an error userspace if MMIO is needed, as KVM doesn't support * MMIO during a task switch (or any other complex operation).
*/ if (ret || vcpu->mmio_needed) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = false;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0; return 0;
}
staticbool kvm_is_valid_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
{ if ((sregs->efer & EFER_LME) && (sregs->cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) { /* * When EFER.LME and CR0.PG are set, the processor is in * 64-bit mode (though maybe in a 32-bit code segment). * CR4.PAE and EFER.LMA must be set.
*/ if (!(sregs->cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) || !(sregs->efer & EFER_LMA)) returnfalse; if (!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(vcpu, sregs->cr3)) returnfalse;
} else { /* * Not in 64-bit mode: EFER.LMA is clear and the code * segment cannot be 64-bit.
*/ if (sregs->efer & EFER_LMA || sregs->cs.l) returnfalse;
}
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ) {
set = true; break;
}
}
__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ, set);
up_write(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
{ unsignedlong rflags; int i, r;
if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) return -EINVAL;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (dbg->control & (KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB | KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_BP)) {
r = -EBUSY; if (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu)) goto out; if (dbg->control & KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR); else
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, BP_VECTOR);
}
/* * Read rflags as long as potentially injected trace flags are still * filtered out.
*/
rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control; if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE))
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) { for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; ++i)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = dbg->arch.debugreg[i];
vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 = dbg->arch.debugreg[7];
} else { for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
}
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vcpu->arch.singlestep_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
/* * Trigger an rflags update that will inject or remove the trace * flags.
*/
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
int kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm, unsignedint id)
{ if (kvm_check_tsc_unstable() && kvm->created_vcpus)
pr_warn_once("SMP vm created on host with unstable TSC; " "guest TSC will not be reliable\n");
if (!kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids)
kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS;
if (id >= kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids) return -EINVAL;
return kvm_x86_call(vcpu_precreate)(kvm);
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ struct page *page; int r;
/* * Several of the "set" flows, e.g. ->set_cr0(), read other registers * to handle side effects. RESET emulation hits those flows and relies * on emulated/virtualized registers, including those that are loaded * into hardware, to be zeroed at vCPU creation. Use CRs as a sentinel * to detect improper or missing initialization.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!init_event &&
(old_cr0 || kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) || kvm_read_cr4(vcpu)));
/* * SVM doesn't unconditionally VM-Exit on INIT and SHUTDOWN, thus it's * possible to INIT the vCPU while L2 is active. Force the vCPU back * into L1 as EFER.SVME is cleared on INIT (along with all other EFER * bits), i.e. virtualization is disabled.
*/ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
kvm_leave_nested(vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate && kvm_mpx_supported()) { struct fpstate *fpstate = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate;
/* * All paths that lead to INIT are required to load the guest's * FPU state (because most paths are buried in KVM_RUN).
*/ if (init_event)
kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
/* All GPRs except RDX (handled below) are zeroed on RESET/INIT. */
memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
/* * Fall back to KVM's default Family/Model/Stepping of 0x600 (P6/Athlon) * if no CPUID match is found. Note, it's impossible to get a match at * RESET since KVM emulates RESET before exposing the vCPU to userspace, * i.e. it's impossible for kvm_find_cpuid_entry() to find a valid entry * on RESET. But, go through the motions in case that's ever remedied.
*/
cpuid_0x1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, cpuid_0x1 ? cpuid_0x1->eax : 0x600);
/* * CR0.CD/NW are set on RESET, preserved on INIT. Note, some versions * of Intel's SDM list CD/NW as being set on INIT, but they contradict * (or qualify) that with a footnote stating that CD/NW are preserved.
*/
new_cr0 = X86_CR0_ET; if (init_event)
new_cr0 |= (old_cr0 & (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)); else
new_cr0 |= X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD;
/* * On the standard CR0/CR4/EFER modification paths, there are several * complex conditions determining whether the MMU has to be reset and/or * which PCIDs have to be flushed. However, CR0.WP and the paging-related * bits in CR4 and EFER are irrelevant if CR0.PG was '0'; and a reset+flush * is needed anyway if CR0.PG was '1' (which can only happen for INIT, as * CR0 will be '0' prior to RESET). So we only need to check CR0.PG here.
*/ if (old_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) {
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
}
/* * Intel's SDM states that all TLB entries are flushed on INIT. AMD's * APM states the TLBs are untouched by INIT, but it also states that * the TLBs are flushed on "External initialization of the processor." * Flush the guest TLB regardless of vendor, there is no meaningful * benefit in relying on the guest to flush the TLB immediately after * INIT. A spurious TLB flush is benign and likely negligible from a * performance perspective.
*/ if (init_event)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_reset);
/* * Sometimes, even reliable TSCs go backwards. This happens on * platforms that reset TSC during suspend or hibernate actions, but * maintain synchronization. We must compensate. Fortunately, we can * detect that condition here, which happens early in CPU bringup, * before any KVM threads can be running. Unfortunately, we can't * bring the TSCs fully up to date with real time, as we aren't yet far * enough into CPU bringup that we know how much real time has actually * elapsed; our helper function, ktime_get_boottime_ns() will be using boot * variables that haven't been updated yet. * * So we simply find the maximum observed TSC above, then record the * adjustment to TSC in each VCPU. When the VCPU later gets loaded, * the adjustment will be applied. Note that we accumulate * adjustments, in case multiple suspend cycles happen before some VCPU * gets a chance to run again. In the event that no KVM threads get a * chance to run, we will miss the entire elapsed period, as we'll have * reset last_host_tsc, so VCPUs will not have the TSC adjusted and may * loose cycle time. This isn't too big a deal, since the loss will be * uniform across all VCPUs (not to mention the scenario is extremely * unlikely). It is possible that a second hibernate recovery happens * much faster than a first, causing the observed TSC here to be * smaller; this would require additional padding adjustment, which is * why we set last_host_tsc to the local tsc observed here. * * N.B. - this code below runs only on platforms with reliable TSC, * as that is the only way backwards_tsc is set above. Also note * that this runs for ALL vcpus, which is not a bug; all VCPUs should * have the same delta_cyc adjustment applied if backwards_tsc * is detected. Note further, this adjustment is only done once, * as we reset last_host_tsc on all VCPUs to stop this from being * called multiple times (one for each physical CPU bringup). * * Platforms with unreliable TSCs don't have to deal with this, they * will be compensated by the logic in vcpu_load, which sets the TSC to * catchup mode. This will catchup all VCPUs to real time, but cannot * guarantee that they stay in perfect synchronization.
*/ if (backwards_tsc) {
u64 delta_cyc = max_tsc - local_tsc;
list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
kvm->arch.backwards_tsc_observed = true;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment += delta_cyc;
vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc = local_tsc;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
/* * We have to disable TSC offset matching.. if you were * booting a VM while issuing an S4 host suspend.... * you may have some problem. Solving this issue is * left as an exercise to the reader.
*/
kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec = 0;
kvm->arch.last_tsc_write = 0;
}
int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsignedlong type)
{ int ret; unsignedlong flags;
if (!kvm_is_vm_type_supported(type)) return -EINVAL;
kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM); /* Decided by the vendor code for other VM types. */
kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed =
type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM;
kvm->arch.disabled_quirks = kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks & kvm_caps.supported_quirks;
ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm); if (ret) goto out;
ret = kvm_mmu_init_vm(kvm); if (ret) goto out_cleanup_page_track;
ret = kvm_x86_call(vm_init)(kvm); if (ret) goto out_uninit_mmu;
if (ignore_msrs && !report_ignored_msrs) {
pr_warn_once("Running KVM with ignore_msrs=1 and report_ignored_msrs=0 is not a\n" "a supported configuration. Lying to the guest about the existence of MSRs\n" "may cause the guest operating system to hang or produce errors. If a guest\n" "does not run without ignore_msrs=1, please report it to kvm@vger.kernel.org.\n");
}
/** * __x86_set_memory_region: Setup KVM internal memory slot * * @kvm: the kvm pointer to the VM. * @id: the slot ID to setup. * @gpa: the GPA to install the slot (unused when @size == 0). * @size: the size of the slot. Set to zero to uninstall a slot. * * This function helps to setup a KVM internal memory slot. Specify * @size > 0 to install a new slot, while @size == 0 to uninstall a * slot. The return code can be one of the following: * * HVA: on success (uninstall will return a bogus HVA) * -errno: on error * * The caller should always use IS_ERR() to check the return value * before use. Note, the KVM internal memory slots are guaranteed to * remain valid and unchanged until the VM is destroyed, i.e., the * GPA->HVA translation will not change. However, the HVA is a user * address, i.e. its accessibility is not guaranteed, and must be * accessed via __copy_{to,from}_user().
*/ void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa,
u32 size)
{ int i, r; unsignedlong hva, old_npages; struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm); struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
if (WARN_ON(id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)) return ERR_PTR_USR(-EINVAL);
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, id); if (size) { if (slot && slot->npages) return ERR_PTR_USR(-EEXIST);
/* * MAP_SHARED to prevent internal slot pages from being moved * by fork()/COW.
*/
hva = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(hva)) return (void __user *)hva;
} else { if (!slot || !slot->npages) return NULL;
old_npages = slot->npages;
hva = slot->userspace_addr;
}
for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++) { struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 m;
m.slot = id | (i << 16);
m.flags = 0;
m.guest_phys_addr = gpa;
m.userspace_addr = hva;
m.memory_size = size;
r = kvm_set_internal_memslot(kvm, &m); if (r < 0) return ERR_PTR_USR(r);
}
if (!size)
vm_munmap(hva, old_npages * PAGE_SIZE);
void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{ /* * Stop all background workers and kthreads before destroying vCPUs, as * iterating over vCPUs in a different task while vCPUs are being freed * is unsafe, i.e. will lead to use-after-free. The PIT also needs to * be stopped before IRQ routing is freed.
*/
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work);
staticint kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{ unsignedlong npages = slot->npages; int i, r;
/* * Clear out the previous array pointers for the KVM_MR_MOVE case. The * old arrays will be freed by kvm_set_memory_region() if installing * the new memslot is successful.
*/
memset(&slot->arch, 0, sizeof(slot->arch));
if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
r = memslot_rmap_alloc(slot, npages); if (r) return r;
}
for (i = 1; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) { struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo; unsignedlong ugfn; int lpages; int level = i + 1;
linfo = __vcalloc(lpages, sizeof(*linfo), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!linfo) goto out_free;
slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = linfo;
if (slot->base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
linfo[0].disallow_lpage = 1; if ((slot->base_gfn + npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
linfo[lpages - 1].disallow_lpage = 1;
ugfn = slot->userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; /* * If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each * other, disable large page support for this slot.
*/ if ((slot->base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1)) { unsignedlong j;
/* * memslots->generation has been incremented. * mmio generation may have reached its maximum value.
*/
kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(kvm, gen);
/* Force re-initialization of steal_time cache */
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, conststruct kvm_memory_slot *old, struct kvm_memory_slot *new, enum kvm_mr_change change)
{ /* * KVM doesn't support moving memslots when there are external page * trackers attached to the VM, i.e. if KVMGT is in use.
*/ if (change == KVM_MR_MOVE && kvm_page_track_has_external_user(kvm)) return -EINVAL;
if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE) { if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages - 1) > kvm_mmu_max_gfn()) return -EINVAL;
if (kvm_is_gfn_alias(kvm, new->base_gfn + new->npages - 1)) return -EINVAL;
/* * Update CPU dirty logging if dirty logging is being toggled. This * applies to all operations.
*/ if ((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES)
kvm_mmu_update_cpu_dirty_logging(kvm, log_dirty_pages);
/* * Nothing more to do for RO slots (which can't be dirtied and can't be * made writable) or CREATE/MOVE/DELETE of a slot. * * For a memslot with dirty logging disabled: * CREATE: No dirty mappings will already exist. * MOVE/DELETE: The old mappings will already have been cleaned up by * kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot() * * For a memslot with dirty logging enabled: * CREATE: No shadow pages exist, thus nothing to write-protect * and no dirty bits to clear. * MOVE/DELETE: The old mappings will already have been cleaned up by * kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot().
*/ if ((change != KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY) || (new_flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY)) return;
/* * READONLY and non-flags changes were filtered out above, and the only * other flag is LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, i.e. something is wrong if dirty * logging isn't being toggled on or off.
*/ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))) return;
if (!log_dirty_pages) { /* * Recover huge page mappings in the slot now that dirty logging * is disabled, i.e. now that KVM does not have to track guest * writes at 4KiB granularity. * * Dirty logging might be disabled by userspace if an ongoing VM * live migration is cancelled and the VM must continue running * on the source.
*/
kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages(kvm, new);
} else { /* * Initially-all-set does not require write protecting any page, * because they're all assumed to be dirty.
*/ if (kvm_dirty_log_manual_protect_and_init_set(kvm)) return;
if (READ_ONCE(eager_page_split))
kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, new, PG_LEVEL_4K);
/* * Unconditionally flush the TLBs after enabling dirty logging. * A flush is almost always going to be necessary (see below), * and unconditionally flushing allows the helpers to omit * the subtly complex checks when removing write access. * * Do the flush outside of mmu_lock to reduce the amount of * time mmu_lock is held. Flushing after dropping mmu_lock is * safe as KVM only needs to guarantee the slot is fully * write-protected before returning to userspace, i.e. before * userspace can consume the dirty status. * * Flushing outside of mmu_lock requires KVM to be careful when * making decisions based on writable status of an SPTE, e.g. a * !writable SPTE doesn't guarantee a CPU can't perform writes. * * Specifically, KVM also write-protects guest page tables to * monitor changes when using shadow paging, and must guarantee * no CPUs can write to those page before mmu_lock is dropped. * Because CPUs may have stale TLB entries at this point, a * !writable SPTE doesn't guarantee CPUs can't perform writes. * * KVM also allows making SPTES writable outside of mmu_lock, * e.g. to allow dirty logging without taking mmu_lock. * * To handle these scenarios, KVM uses a separate software-only * bit (MMU-writable) to track if a SPTE is !writable due to * a guest page table being write-protected (KVM clears the * MMU-writable flag when write-protecting for shadow paging). * * The use of MMU-writable is also the primary motivation for * the unconditional flush. Because KVM must guarantee that a * CPU doesn't contain stale, writable TLB entries for a * !MMU-writable SPTE, KVM must flush if it encounters any * MMU-writable SPTE regardless of whether the actual hardware * writable bit was set. I.e. KVM is almost guaranteed to need * to flush, while unconditionally flushing allows the "remove * write access" helpers to ignore MMU-writable entirely. * * See is_writable_pte() for more details (the case involving * access-tracked SPTEs is particularly relevant).
*/
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, new);
}
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ return kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu) == IN_GUEST_MODE;
}
int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ return kvm_x86_call(interrupt_allowed)(vcpu, false);
}
unsignedlong kvm_get_linear_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{ /* Can't read the RIP when guest state is protected, just return 0 */ if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] != gfn)) return;
while (true) {
vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] = ~0; do {
j = kvm_async_pf_next_probe(j); if (vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[j] == ~0) return;
k = kvm_async_pf_hash_fn(vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[j]); /* * k lies cyclically in ]i,j] * | i.k.j | * |....j i.k.| or |.k..j i...|
*/
} while ((i <= j) ? (i < k && k <= j) : (i < k || k <= j));
vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] = vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[j];
i = j;
}
}
if (!vcpu->arch.apf.send_always &&
(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected || !kvm_x86_call(get_cpl)(vcpu))) returnfalse;
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { /* * L1 needs to opt into the special #PF vmexits that are * used to deliver async page faults.
*/ return vcpu->arch.apf.delivery_as_pf_vmexit;
} else { /* * Play it safe in case the guest temporarily disables paging. * The real mode IDT in particular is unlikely to have a #PF * exception setup.
*/ return is_paging(vcpu);
}
}
if (kvm_can_deliver_async_pf(vcpu) &&
!apf_put_user_notpresent(vcpu)) {
fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
fault.error_code_valid = true;
fault.error_code = 0;
fault.nested_page_fault = false;
fault.address = work->arch.token;
fault.async_page_fault = true;
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &fault); returntrue;
} else { /* * It is not possible to deliver a paravirtualized asynchronous * page fault, but putting the guest in an artificial halt state * can be beneficial nevertheless: if an interrupt arrives, we * can deliver it timely and perhaps the guest will schedule * another process. When the instruction that triggered a page * fault is retried, hopefully the page will be ready in the host.
*/
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu); returnfalse;
}
}
staticvoid kvm_noncoherent_dma_assignment_start_or_stop(struct kvm *kvm)
{ /* * Non-coherent DMA assignment and de-assignment may affect whether or * not KVM honors guest PAT, and thus may cause changes in EPT SPTEs * due to toggling the "ignore PAT" bit. Zap all SPTEs when the first * (or last) non-coherent device is (un)registered to so that new SPTEs * with the correct "ignore guest PAT" setting are created. * * If KVM always honors guest PAT, however, there is nothing to do.
*/ if (kvm_check_has_quirk(kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT))
kvm_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(0), gpa_to_gfn(~0ULL));
}
int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value)
{ /* * test that setting IA32_SPEC_CTRL to given value * is allowed by the host processor
*/
u64 saved_value; unsignedlong flags; int ret = 0;
local_irq_save(flags);
if (rdmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &saved_value))
ret = 1; elseif (wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, value))
ret = 1; else
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, saved_value);
if (!(error_code & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK) ||
mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, access, &fault) != INVALID_GPA) { /* * If vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa succeeded, the page * tables probably do not match the TLB. Just proceed * with the error code that the processor gave.
*/
fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
fault.error_code_valid = true;
fault.error_code = error_code;
fault.nested_page_fault = false;
fault.address = gva;
fault.async_page_fault = false;
}
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error);
/* * Handles kvm_read/write_guest_virt*() result and either injects #PF or returns * KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR for cases not currently handled by KVM. Return value * indicates whether exit to userspace is needed.
*/ int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r, struct x86_exception *e)
{ if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) { if (KVM_BUG_ON(!e, vcpu->kvm)) return -EIO;
/* * In case kvm_read/write_guest_virt*() failed with X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED * while handling a VMX instruction KVM could've handled the request * correctly by exiting to userspace and performing I/O but there * doesn't seem to be a real use-case behind such requests, just return * KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR for now.
*/
kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_NON_GLOBAL: /* * Currently, KVM doesn't mark global entries in the shadow * page tables, so a non-global flush just degenerates to a * global flush. If needed, we could optimize this later by * keeping track of global entries in shadow page tables.
*/
fallthrough; case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_INCL_GLOBAL:
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len); if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) { /* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else { /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment >= vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
// VMG change, at this point, we're always done // RIP has already been advanced return 1;
}
// More MMIO is needed
run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write; if (run->mmio.is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
bytes -= handled;
gpa += handled;
data += handled;
/*TODO: Check if need to increment number of frags */
frag = vcpu->mmio_fragments;
vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 1;
frag->len = bytes;
frag->gpa = gpa;
frag->data = data;
bytes -= handled;
gpa += handled;
data += handled;
/*TODO: Check if need to increment number of frags */
frag = vcpu->mmio_fragments;
vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 1;
frag->len = bytes;
frag->gpa = gpa;
frag->data = data;
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