/** * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted * * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl. * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can * expect the speed in Mbps.
*/
u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed)
{ /* convert a BIT() value into an array index */
u32 index = fls(link_speed) - 1;
if (adv_link_support) return ice_get_link_speed(index); elseif (index < ARRAY_SIZE(ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed)) /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds
*/ return ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[index];
return VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
}
/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the * PF. * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot(). * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF. * * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This * requires calling ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() as well as calling * ice_mbx_reset_vf_info() for each VF tracking structure. * * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm. * * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a tracking structure * for the VF must be passed to the state handler. The boolean output * report_malvf from ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the * caller whether it must report this VF as malicious or not. * * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message * to the system administrator. * * 6. The PF is responsible for maintaining the struct ice_mbx_vf_info * structure for each VF. The PF should clear the VF tracking structure if the * VF is reset. When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we will then * assume that the new VF is not malicious and may report it again if we * detect it again. * * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled.
*/ #define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M) /* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm
*/ #define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF
/* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture.
*/
memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
/* Reset message counts for all VFs to zero */
list_for_each_entry(vf_info, &snap->mbx_vf, list_entry)
vf_info->msg_count = 0;
}
/** * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot * @hw: pointer to the HW struct * @new_state: new algorithm state * * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking * for malicious VFs.
*/ staticvoid
ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state)
{ struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
u32 num_iterations;
snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf;
/* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask * on the incremented iteration count.
*/
num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations);
/* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal: * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end * of the static snapshot. * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item.
*/ if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head ||
(snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT &&
++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx))
*new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
}
/** * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot * @hw: pointer to the HW struct * @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for a VF * @new_state: new algorithm state * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious * * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds * the permissible number of messages to send.
*/ staticint
ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, bool *is_malvf)
{ /* increment the message count for this VF */
vf_info->msg_count++;
if (vf_info->msg_count >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
*is_malvf = true;
/* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */
ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state);
return 0;
}
/** * ice_mbx_vf_dec_trig_e830 - Decrements the VF mailbox queue counter * @hw: pointer to the HW struct * @event: pointer to the control queue receive event * * This function triggers to decrement the counter * MBX_VF_IN_FLIGHT_MSGS_AT_PF_CNT when the driver replenishes * the buffers at the PF mailbox queue.
*/ void ice_mbx_vf_dec_trig_e830(conststruct ice_hw *hw, conststruct ice_rq_event_info *event)
{
u16 vfid = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
wr32(hw, E830_MBX_VF_DEC_TRIG(vfid), 1);
}
/** * ice_mbx_vf_clear_cnt_e830 - Clear the VF mailbox queue count * @hw: pointer to the HW struct * @vf_id: VF ID in the PF space * * This function clears the counter MBX_VF_IN_FLIGHT_MSGS_AT_PF_CNT, and should * be called when a VF is created and on VF reset.
*/ void ice_mbx_vf_clear_cnt_e830(conststruct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id)
{
u32 reg = rd32(hw, E830_MBX_VF_IN_FLIGHT_MSGS_AT_PF_CNT(vf_id));
wr32(hw, E830_MBX_VF_DEC_TRIG(vf_id), reg);
}
/** * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm * @hw: pointer to the HW struct * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data * @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for the VF in question * @report_malvf: boolean output to indicate whether VF should be reported * * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state * transitions of the algorithm: * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters * traverse or detect states. * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate * through the snapshot without any action on VF. * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF.
*/ int
ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, bool *report_malvf)
{ struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; bool is_malvf = false; int status = 0;
if (!report_malvf || !mbx_data || !vf_info) return -EINVAL;
*report_malvf = false;
/* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF * is not malicious until detected.
*/ /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold.
*/ if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) return -EINVAL;
/* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the * mailbox serviced in current interrupt.
*/ if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD ||
mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx) return -EINVAL;
switch (snap_buf->state) { case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT: /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */
ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap);
/* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the * Mailbox for current interrupt.
*/
snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq;
snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc;
snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx;
/* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot.
*/
snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean +
mbx_data->num_pending_arq);
snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1);
snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail;
/* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem * is the difference between the head and tail of the * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs.
*/ if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >=
mbx_data->async_watermark_val) {
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state, &is_malvf);
} else {
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
} break;
case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE:
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); break;
case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT:
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state, &is_malvf); break;
default:
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
status = -EIO;
}
snap_buf->state = new_state;
/* Only report VFs as malicious the first time we detect it */ if (is_malvf && !vf_info->malicious) {
vf_info->malicious = 1;
*report_malvf = true;
}
return status;
}
/** * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF mailbox info * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking structure for a VF * * In case of a VF reset, this function shall be called to clear the VF's * current mailbox tracking state.
*/ void ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info)
{
vf_info->malicious = 0;
vf_info->msg_count = 0;
}
/** * ice_mbx_init_vf_info - Initialize a new VF mailbox tracking info * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF * * Initialize a VF mailbox tracking info structure and insert it into the * snapshot list. * * If you remove the VF, you must also delete the associated VF info structure * from the linked list.
*/ void ice_mbx_init_vf_info(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info)
{ struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
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