Quelle  Public.thy

(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/Public.thy
  Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
  Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge
 
 Theory of Public Keys (common to all public-key protocols)
 
 Private and public keys; initial states of agents
*)

theory Public
imports Event
begin

lemma invKey_K: "K ∈ symKeys ==> invKey K = K"
by (simp add: symKeys_def)

subsection‹Asymmetric Keys›

datatype keymode = Signature | Encryption

consts
  publicKey :: "[keymode,agent] ==> key"

abbreviation
  pubEK :: "agent ==> key" where
  "pubEK == publicKey Encryption"

abbreviation
  pubSK :: "agent ==> key" where
  "pubSK == publicKey Signature"

abbreviation
  privateKey :: "[keymode, agent] ==> key" where
  "privateKey b A == invKey (publicKey b A)"

abbreviation
  (*BEWARE!! priEK, priSK DON'T WORK with inj, range, image, etc.*)
  priEK :: "agent ==> key" where
  "priEK A == privateKey Encryption A"

abbreviation
  priSK :: "agent ==> key" where
  "priSK A == privateKey Signature A"


text‹These abbreviations give backward compatibility. They represent the
 simple situation where the signature and encryption keys are the same.›

abbreviation (input)
  pubK :: "agent ==> key" where
  "pubK A == pubEK A"

abbreviation (input)
  priK :: "agent ==> key" where
  "priK A == invKey (pubEK A)"


text‹By freeness of agents, no two agents have the same key. Since
  🍋‹True≠False›,
specification (publicKey)
  injective_publicKey:
    "publicKey b A = publicKey c A' ==> b=c ∧ A=A'"
   apply (rule exI [of _ 
       "λb A. 2 * case_agent 0 (λn. n + 2) 1 A + case_keymode 0 1 b"])
   apply (auto simp add: inj_on_def split: agent.split keymode.split)
   apply presburger
   apply presburger
   done                       


axiomatization where
  (*No private key equals any public key (essential to ensure that private
    keys are private!) *)
  privateKey_neq_publicKey [iff]: "privateKey b A ≠ publicKey c A'"

lemmas publicKey_neq_privateKey = privateKey_neq_publicKey [THEN not_sym]
declare publicKey_neq_privateKey [iff]


subsection‹Basic properties of 🍋‹pubK› and 🍋‹priK›\›

lemma publicKey_inject [iff]: "(publicKey b A = publicKey c A') = (b=c ∧ A=A')"
by (blast dest!: injective_publicKey) 

lemma not_symKeys_pubK [iff]: "publicKey b A ∉ symKeys"
by (simp add: symKeys_def)

lemma not_symKeys_priK [iff]: "privateKey b A ∉ symKeys"
by (simp add: symKeys_def)

lemma symKey_neq_priEK: "K ∈ symKeys ==> K ≠ priEK A"
by auto

lemma symKeys_neq_imp_neq: "(K ∈ symKeys) ≠ (K' ∈ symKeys) ==> K ≠ K'"
by blast

lemma symKeys_invKey_iff [iff]: "(invKey K ∈ symKeys) = (K ∈ symKeys)"
  unfolding symKeys_def by auto

lemma analz_symKeys_Decrypt:
     "[Crypt K X ∈ analz H; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∈ analz H]
      ==> X ∈ analz H"
by (auto simp add: symKeys_def)



subsection‹"Image" equations that hold for injective functions›

lemma invKey_image_eq [simp]: "(invKey x ∈ invKey`A) = (x ∈ A)"
by auto

(*holds because invKey is injective*)
lemma publicKey_image_eq [simp]:
     "(publicKey b x ∈ publicKey c ` AA) = (b=c ∧ x ∈ AA)"
by auto

lemma privateKey_notin_image_publicKey [simp]: "privateKey b x ∉ publicKey c ` AA"
by auto

lemma privateKey_image_eq [simp]:
     "(privateKey b A ∈ invKey ` publicKey c ` AS) = (b=c ∧ A∈AS)"
by auto

lemma publicKey_notin_image_privateKey [simp]: "publicKey b A ∉ invKey ` publicKey c ` AS"
by auto


subsection‹Symmetric Keys›

text‹For some protocols, it is convenient to equip agents with symmetric as
 well as asymmetric keys. The theory ‹Shared› a
are symmetric.›

consts
  shrK    :: "agent => key"    🍋 ‹long-term shared keys›

specification (shrK)
  inj_shrK: "inj shrK"
  🍋 ‹No two agents have the same long-term key›
   apply (rule exI [of _ "case_agent 0 (λn. n + 2) 1"]) 
   apply (simp add: inj_on_def split: agent.split) 
   done

axiomatization where
  sym_shrK [iff]: "shrK X ∈ symKeys" 🍋 ‹All shared keys are symmetric›

text‹Injectiveness: Agents' long-term keys are distinct.›
lemmas shrK_injective = inj_shrK [THEN inj_eq]
declare shrK_injective [iff]

lemma invKey_shrK [simp]: "invKey (shrK A) = shrK A"
by (simp add: invKey_K) 

lemma analz_shrK_Decrypt:
     "[Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz H; Key(shrK A) ∈ analz H] ==> X ∈ analz H"
by auto

lemma analz_Decrypt':
     "[Crypt K X ∈ analz H; K ∈ symKeys; Key K ∈ analz H] ==> X ∈ analz H"
by (auto simp add: invKey_K)

lemma priK_neq_shrK [iff]: "shrK A ≠ privateKey b C"
by (simp add: symKeys_neq_imp_neq)

lemmas shrK_neq_priK = priK_neq_shrK [THEN not_sym]
declare shrK_neq_priK [simp]

lemma pubK_neq_shrK [iff]: "shrK A ≠ publicKey b C"
by (simp add: symKeys_neq_imp_neq)

lemmas shrK_neq_pubK = pubK_neq_shrK [THEN not_sym]
declare shrK_neq_pubK [simp]

lemma priEK_noteq_shrK [simp]: "priEK A ≠ shrK B" 
by auto

lemma publicKey_notin_image_shrK [simp]: "publicKey b x ∉ shrK ` AA"
by auto

lemma privateKey_notin_image_shrK [simp]: "privateKey b x ∉ shrK ` AA"
by auto

lemma shrK_notin_image_publicKey [simp]: "shrK x ∉ publicKey b ` AA"
by auto

lemma shrK_notin_image_privateKey [simp]: "shrK x ∉ invKey ` publicKey b ` AA" 
by auto

lemma shrK_image_eq [simp]: "(shrK x ∈ shrK ` AA) = (x ∈ AA)"
by auto

text‹For some reason, moving this up can make some proofs loop!›
declare invKey_K [simp]


subsection‹Initial States of Agents›

text‹Note: for all practical purposes, all that matters is the initial
 knowledge of the Spy. All other agents are automata, merely following the
 protocol.›

overloading
  initState ≡ initState
begin

primrec initState where
        (*Agents know their private key and all public keys*)
  initState_Server:
    "initState Server =
       {Key (priEK Server), Key (priSK Server)} ∪
       (Key ` range pubEK) ∪ (Key ` range pubSK) ∪ (Key ` range shrK)"

| initState_Friend:
    "initState (Friend i) =
       {Key (priEK(Friend i)), Key (priSK(Friend i)), Key (shrK(Friend i))} ∪
       (Key ` range pubEK) ∪ (Key ` range pubSK)"

| initState_Spy:
    "initState Spy =
       (Key ` invKey ` pubEK ` bad) ∪ (Key ` invKey ` pubSK ` bad) ∪
       (Key ` shrK ` bad) ∪
       (Key ` range pubEK) ∪ (Key ` range pubSK)"

end


text‹These lemmas allow reasoning about 🍋‹used evs› rather than
   🍋‹knows Spy evs›, which is useful when there are private Notes. 
   Because they depend upon the definition of 🍋‹initState›, they cannot
   be moved up.›

lemma used_parts_subset_parts [rule_format]:
     "∀X ∈ used evs. parts {X} ⊆ used evs"
apply (induct evs) 
 prefer 2
 apply (simp add: used_Cons split: event.split)
 apply (metis Un_iff empty_subsetI insert_subset le_supI1 le_supI2 parts_subset_iff)
txt‹Base case›
apply (auto dest!: parts_cut simp add: used_Nil) 
done

lemma MPair_used_D: "{X,Y} ∈ used H ==> X ∈ used H ∧ Y ∈ used H"
by (drule used_parts_subset_parts, simp, blast)

text‹There was a similar theorem in Event.thy, so perhaps this one can
  be moved up if proved directly by induction.›
lemma MPair_used [elim!]:
     "[{X,Y} ∈ used H;
         [X ∈ used H; Y ∈ used H] ==> P]
      ==> P"
by (blast dest: MPair_used_D) 


text‹Rewrites should not refer to 🍋‹initState(Friend i)› because
  that expression is not in normal form.›

lemma keysFor_parts_initState [simp]: "keysFor (parts (initState C)) = {}"
unfolding keysFor_def
apply (induct_tac "C")
apply (auto intro: range_eqI)
done

lemma Crypt_notin_initState: "Crypt K X ∉ parts (initState B)"
by (induct B, auto)

lemma Crypt_notin_used_empty [simp]: "Crypt K X ∉ used []"
by (simp add: Crypt_notin_initState used_Nil)

(*** Basic properties of shrK ***)

(*Agents see their own shared keys!*)
lemma shrK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ initState A"
by (induct_tac "A", auto)

lemma shrK_in_knows [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ knows A evs"
by (simp add: initState_subset_knows [THEN subsetD])

lemma shrK_in_used [iff]: "Key (shrK A) ∈ used evs"
by (rule initState_into_used, blast)


(** Fresh keys never clash with long-term shared keys **)

(*Used in parts_induct_tac and analz_Fake_tac to distinguish session keys
  from long-term shared keys*)
lemma Key_not_used [simp]: "Key K ∉ used evs ==> K ∉ range shrK"
by blast

lemma shrK_neq: "Key K ∉ used evs ==> shrK B ≠ K"
by blast

lemmas neq_shrK = shrK_neq [THEN not_sym]
declare neq_shrK [simp]


subsection‹Function 🍋‹spies›\›

lemma not_SignatureE [elim!]: "b ≠ Signature ==> b = Encryption"
  by (cases b, auto) 

text‹Agents see their own private keys!›
lemma priK_in_initState [iff]: "Key (privateKey b A) ∈ initState A"
  by (cases A, auto)

text‹Agents see all public keys!›
lemma publicKey_in_initState [iff]: "Key (publicKey b A) ∈ initState B"
  by (cases B, auto) 

text‹All public keys are visible›
lemma spies_pubK [iff]: "Key (publicKey b A) ∈ spies evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (auto simp add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done

lemmas analz_spies_pubK = spies_pubK [THEN analz.Inj]
declare analz_spies_pubK [iff]

text‹Spy sees private keys of bad agents!›
lemma Spy_spies_bad_privateKey [intro!]:
     "A ∈ bad ==> Key (privateKey b A) ∈ spies evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (auto simp add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done

text‹Spy sees long-term shared keys of bad agents!›
lemma Spy_spies_bad_shrK [intro!]:
     "A ∈ bad ==> Key (shrK A) ∈ spies evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (simp_all add: imageI knows_Cons split: event.split)
done

lemma publicKey_into_used [iff] :"Key (publicKey b A) ∈ used evs"
apply (rule initState_into_used)
apply (rule publicKey_in_initState [THEN parts.Inj])
done

lemma privateKey_into_used [iff]: "Key (privateKey b A) ∈ used evs"
apply(rule initState_into_used)
apply(rule priK_in_initState [THEN parts.Inj])
done

(*For case analysis on whether or not an agent is compromised*)
lemma Crypt_Spy_analz_bad:
     "[Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs); A ∈ bad]
      ==> X ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)"
by force


subsection‹Fresh Nonces›

lemma Nonce_notin_initState [iff]: "Nonce N ∉ parts (initState B)"
by (induct_tac "B", auto)

lemma Nonce_notin_used_empty [simp]: "Nonce N ∉ used []"
by (simp add: used_Nil)


subsection‹Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems›

text‹In any trace, there is an upper bound N on the greatest nonce in use›
lemma Nonce_supply_lemma: "∃N. ∀n. N≤n ⟶ Nonce n ∉ used evs"
apply (induct_tac "evs")
apply (rule_tac x = 0 in exI)
apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: used_Cons split: event.split)
apply safe
apply (rule msg_Nonce_supply [THEN exE], blast elim!: add_leE)+
done

lemma Nonce_supply1: "∃N. Nonce N ∉ used evs"
by (rule Nonce_supply_lemma [THEN exE], blast)

lemma Nonce_supply: "Nonce (SOME N. Nonce N ∉ used evs) ∉ used evs"
apply (rule Nonce_supply_lemma [THEN exE])
apply (rule someI, fast)
done

subsection‹Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About 🍋‹analz› and Image›

lemma insert_Key_singleton: "insert (Key K) H = Key ` {K} ∪ H"
by blast

lemma insert_Key_image: "insert (Key K) (Key`KK ∪ C) = Key ` (insert K KK) ∪ C"
by blast


lemma Crypt_imp_keysFor :"[Crypt K X ∈ H; K ∈ symKeys] ==> K ∈ keysFor H"
by (drule Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor, simp)

text‹Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if of the
 Session Key Compromise Theorem›
lemma analz_image_freshK_lemma:
     "(Key K ∈ analz (Key`nE ∪ H)) ⟶ (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H) ==>
         (Key K ∈ analz (Key`nE ∪ H)) = (K ∈ nE | Key K ∈ analz H)"
by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])

lemmas analz_image_freshK_simps =
       simp_thms mem_simps 🍋 ‹these two allow its use with ‹only:›\        disj_comms 
       image_insert [THEN sym] image_Un [THEN sym] empty_subsetI insert_subset
       analz_insert_eq Un_upper2 [THEN analz_mono, THEN subsetD]
       insert_Key_singleton 
       Key_not_used insert_Key_image Un_assoc [THEN sym]

ML ‹
 structure Public =
 struct
 
 val analz_image_freshK_ss =
  simpset_of
  (🍋 |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms image_insert image_Un}
    |> Simplifier.del_simps @{thms imp_disjL}    (*reduces blow-up*)
    |> Simplifier.add_simps @{thms analz_image_freshK_simps})

(*Tactic for possibility theorems*)
fun possibility_tac ctxt =
    REPEAT (*omit used_Says so that Nonces start from different traces!*)
    (ALLGOALS (simp_tac (ctxt |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver |> Simplifier.del_simp @{thm used_Says}))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (eq_assume_tac ORELSE' 
                   resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI, @{thm Nonce_supply}]))

(*For harder protocols (such as Recur) where we have to set up some
  nonces and keys initially*)
fun basic_possibility_tac ctxt =
    REPEAT 
    (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (ctxt |> Simplifier.set_unsafe_solver safe_solver))
     THEN
     REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt [refl, conjI]))

end
›

method_setup analz_freshK = ‹
  Scan.succeed (fn ctxt =>
  (SIMPLE_METHOD
  (EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms allI ballI impI}),
  REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac ctxt @{thms analz_image_freshK_lemma}),
  ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (put_simpset Public.analz_image_freshK_ss ctxt))])))›
    "for proving the Session Key Compromise theorem"


subsection‹Specialized Methods for Possibility Theorems›

method_setup possibility = ‹
  Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD o Public.possibility_tac)›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

method_setup basic_possibility = ‹
  Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD o Public.basic_possibility_tac)›
    "for proving possibility theorems"

end