theory Dining_Cryptographers imports"HOL-Probability.Information" begin
lemma image_ex1_eq: "inj_on f A ==> (b ∈ f ` A) ⟷ (∃!x ∈ A. b = f x)" by (unfold inj_on_def) blast
lemma Ex1_eq: "∃!x. P x ==> P x ==> P y ==> x = y" by auto
subsection‹Define the state space›
text‹ We introduce the state space on which the algorithm operates. This contains: \begin{description} \item[n] The number of cryptographers on the table. \item[payer] Either one of the cryptographers or the NSA. \item[coin] The result of the coin flipping for each cryptographer. \item[inversion] The public result for each cryptographer, e.g. the sum of the coin flipping for the cryptographer, its right neighbour and the information if he paid or not. \end{description} The observables are the \emph{inversions} ›
locale dining_cryptographers_space = fixes n :: nat assumes n_gt_3: "n ≥ 3" begin
definition"dining_cryptographers = ({None} ∪ Some ` {0..× {xs :: bool list. length xs = n}" definition"payer dc = fst dc" definition coin :: "(nat option × bool list) ==> nat ==> bool"where "coin dc c = snd dc ! (c mod n)" definition"inversion dc = map (λc. (payer dc = Some c) ≠ (coin dc c ≠ coin dc (c + 1))) [0..
definition"result dc = foldl (λ a b. a ≠ b) False (inversion dc)"
lemma coin_n[simp]: "coin dc n = coin dc 0" unfolding coin_def by simp
theorem correctness: assumes"dc ∈ dining_cryptographers" shows"result dc ⟷ (payer dc ≠ None)" proof - let ?XOR = "λf l. foldl (≠) False (map f [0..
have foldl_coin: "¬ ?XOR (λc. coin dc c ≠ coin dc (c + 1)) n" proof -
define n' where"n' = n"🍋‹Need to hide n, as it is hidden in coin› have"?XOR (λc. coin dc c ≠ coin dc (c + 1)) n' = (coin dc 0 ≠ coin dc n')" by (induct n') auto thus ?thesis using‹n' ≡ n›by simp qed
from assms have"payer dc = None ∨ (∃k unfolding dining_cryptographers_def payer_def by auto thus ?thesis proof (rule disjE) assume"payer dc = None" thus ?thesis unfolding result_def inversion_def using foldl_coin by simp next assume"∃k thenobtain k where"k < n"and"payer dc = Some k"by auto
define l where"l = n"🍋‹Need to hide n, as it is hidden in coin, payer etc.› have"?XOR (λc. (payer dc = Some c) ≠ (coin dc c ≠ coin dc (c + 1))) l = ((k < l) ≠ ?XOR (λc. (coin dc c ≠ coin dc (c + 1))) l)" using‹payer dc = Some k›by (induct l) auto thus ?thesis unfolding result_def inversion_def l_def using‹payer dc = Some k› foldl_coin ‹k 🚫›by simp qed qed
text‹ We now restrict the state space for the dining cryptographers to the cases when one of the cryptographer pays. ›
lemma dc_crypto: "dc_crypto = Some ` {0..× {xs :: bool list. length xs = n}" unfolding dc_crypto_def dining_cryptographers_def by auto
lemma image_payer_dc_crypto: "payer ` dc_crypto = Some ` {0.. proof - have *: "{xs. length xs = n} ≠ {}" by (auto intro!: exI[of _ "replicate n undefined"]) show ?thesis unfolding payer_def [abs_def] dc_crypto fst_image_times if_not_P[OF *] .. qed
lemma card_payer_and_inversion: assumes"xs ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto"and"i < n" shows"card {dc ∈ dc_crypto. payer dc = Some i ∧ inversion dc = xs} = 2"
(is"card ?S = 2") proof - obtain ys j where xs_inv: "inversion (Some j, ys) = xs"and "j < n"and"(Some j, ys) ∈ dc_crypto" using assms(1) by (auto simp: dc_crypto)
hence"length ys = n"by (simp add: dc_crypto) have [simp]: "length xs = n"using xs_inv[symmetric] by (simp add: inversion_def)
have inj_inv: "inj_on (λx. inversion (Some i, x)) {ys. ys ! 0 = b ∧ length ys = length xs}" for b proof (rule inj_onI) fix x y assume"x ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ∧ length ys = length xs}" and"y ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ∧ length ys = length xs}" and inv: "inversion (Some i, x) = inversion (Some i, y)" hence [simp]: "x ! 0 = y ! 0""length y = n""length x = n" using‹length xs = n›by simp_all have *: "∧j. j < n ==> (x ! j = x ! (Suc j mod n)) = (y ! j = y ! (Suc j mod n))" using inv unfolding inversion_def map_eq_conv payer_def coin_def by fastforce show"x = y" proof (rule nth_equalityI, simp) fix j assume"j < length x"hence"j < n"using‹length xs = n›by simp thus"x ! j = y ! j" proof (induct j) case (Suc j) hence"j < n"by simp with Suc show ?caseusing *[OF ‹j 🚫›] by (cases "y ! j") simp_all qed simp qed qed
txt‹ We now construct the possible inversions for 🍋‹xs›when the payer is 🍋‹i›. ›
define zs where"zs = map (λp. if p ∈ {min i j<..max i j} then ¬ ys ! p else ys ! p) [0.. hence [simp]: "length zs = n"by simp hence [simp]: "0 < length zs"using n_gt_3 by simp
have"∧l. l < max i j ==> Suc l mod n = Suc l" using‹i 🚫›‹j 🚫›by auto have"((i = l) = (zs ! l = zs ! (Suc l mod n))) = ((j = l) = (ys ! l = ys ! (Suc l mod n)))" if"l < n"for l proof - from that consider "l < min i j" | "l = min i j" | "min i j < l""l < max i j"
| "l = max i j" | "max i j < l" by linarith thus ?thesis proof cases case 1 hence"l ≠ i"and"l ≠ j"and"zs ! l = ys ! l"and "zs ! (Suc l mod n) = ys ! (Suc l mod n)"using‹i 🚫›‹j 🚫›unfolding zs_def by auto thus ?thesis by simp next case 2 show ?thesis proof (cases rule: linorder_cases) assume"i < j" hence"l = i"and"Suc l < n"and"i ≠ j"and"Suc l ≤ max i j"using‹l = min i j›using‹j ??›by auto hence"zs ! l = ys ! l"and"zs ! (Suc l mod n) = (¬ ys ! (Suc l mod n))" using‹l = min i j›[symmetric] by (simp_all add: zs_def) thus ?thesis using‹l = i›‹i ≠ j›by simp next assume"j < i" hence"l = j"and"Suc l < n"and"i ≠ j"and"Suc l ≤ max i j"using‹l = min i j›using‹i ??›by auto hence"zs ! l = ys ! l"and"zs ! (Suc l mod n) = (¬ ys ! (Suc l mod n))" using‹l = min i j›[symmetric] by (simp_all add: zs_def) thus ?thesis using‹l = j›‹i ≠ j›by simp next assume"i = j" hence"i = j"and"max i j = l"and"min i j = l"and"zs = ys" using‹l = min i j›by (simp_all add: zs_def ‹length ys = n›[symmetric] map_nth) thus ?thesis by simp qed next case 3 hence"i ≠ l"and"j ≠ l"and"zs ! l = (¬ ys ! l)" "zs ! (Suc l mod n) = (¬ ys ! (Suc l mod n))" using‹i 🚫›‹j 🚫›by (auto simp: zs_def) thus ?thesis by simp next case 4 show ?thesis proof (cases rule: linorder_cases) assume"i < j" hence"l = j"and"i ≠ j"using‹l = max i j›using‹j 🚫›by auto have"zs ! (Suc l mod n) = ys ! (Suc l mod n)" using‹j 🚫›‹i 🚫›‹l = j›by (cases "Suc l = n") (auto simp add: zs_def) moreoverhave"zs ! l = (¬ ys ! l)" using‹j 🚫›‹i 🚫›by (auto simp add: ‹l = j› zs_def) ultimatelyshow ?thesis using‹l = j›‹i ≠ j›by simp next assume"j < i" hence"l = i"and"i ≠ j"using‹l = max i j›by auto have"zs ! (Suc l mod n) = ys ! (Suc l mod n)" using‹i 🚫›‹j 🚫›‹l = i›by (cases "Suc l = n") (auto simp add: zs_def) moreoverhave"zs ! l = (¬ ys ! l)" using‹i 🚫›‹j 🚫›by (auto simp add: ‹l = i› zs_def) ultimatelyshow ?thesis using‹l = i›‹i ≠ j›by auto next assume"i = j" hence"i = j"and"max i j = l"and"min i j = l"and"zs = ys" using‹l = max i j›by (simp_all add: zs_def ‹length ys = n›[symmetric] map_nth) thus ?thesis by simp qed next case 5 hence"j ≠ l"and"i ≠ l"by simp_all have"zs ! (Suc l mod n) = ys ! (Suc l mod n)" using‹l 🚫›‹max i j 🚫›by (cases "Suc l = n") (auto simp add: zs_def) moreoverhave"zs ! l = ys ! l" using‹l 🚫›‹max i j 🚫›by (auto simp add: zs_def) ultimatelyshow ?thesis using‹j ≠ l›‹i ≠ l›by auto qed qed hence zs: "inversion (Some i, zs) = xs" by (simp add: xs_inv[symmetric] inversion_def coin_def payer_def) moreover from zs have Not_zs: "inversion (Some i, (map Not zs)) = xs" by (simp add: xs_inv[symmetric] inversion_def coin_def payer_def) ultimately have"{dc ∈ dc_crypto. payer dc = Some i ∧ inversion dc = xs} = {(Some i, zs), (Some i, map Not zs)}" using‹i 🚫› [[ hypsubst_thin = true ]] proof (safe, simp_all add:dc_crypto payer_def) fix b assume [simp]: "length b = n" and *: "inversion (Some i, b) = xs"and"b ≠ zs" show"b = map Not zs" proof (cases "b ! 0 = zs ! 0") case True hence zs: "zs ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs} ∧ xs = inversion (Some i, zs)" using zs by simp have b: "b ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs} ∧ xs = inversion (Some i, b)" using * by simp hence"b ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs}" .. with *[symmetric] have"xs ∈ (λx. inversion (Some i, x)) ` {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs}" by (rule image_eqI) from this[unfolded image_ex1_eq[OF inj_inv]] b zs have"b = zs"by (rule Ex1_eq) thus ?thesis using‹b ≠ zs›by simp next case False hence zs: "map Not zs ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs} ∧ xs = inversion (Some i, map Not zs)" using Not_zs by (simp add: nth_map[OF ‹0 🚫 zs›]) have b: "b ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs} ∧ xs = inversion (Some i, b)" using * by simp hence"b ∈ {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs}" .. with *[symmetric] have"xs ∈ (λx. inversion (Some i, x)) ` {ys. ys ! 0 = b ! 0 ∧ length ys = length xs}" by (rule image_eqI) from this[unfolded image_ex1_eq[OF inj_inv]] b zs show"b = map Not zs"by (rule Ex1_eq) qed qed moreover have"zs ≠ map Not zs" using‹0 🚫 zs›by (cases zs) simp_all ultimatelyshow ?thesis by simp qed
lemma finite_dc_crypto: "finite dc_crypto" using finite_lists_length_eq[where A="UNIV :: bool set"] unfolding dc_crypto by simp
lemma card_inversion: assumes"xs ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto" shows"card {dc ∈ dc_crypto. inversion dc = xs} = 2 * n" proof - let ?set = "λi. {dc ∈ dc_crypto. payer dc = Some i ∧ inversion dc = xs}" let ?sets = "{?set i | i. i < n}"
have [simp]: "length xs = n"using assms by (auto simp: dc_crypto inversion_def [abs_def])
have"{dc ∈ dc_crypto. inversion dc = xs} = (∪i < n. ?set i)" unfolding dc_crypto payer_def by auto alsohave"… = (∪?sets)"by auto finallyhave eq_Union: "{dc ∈ dc_crypto. inversion dc = xs} = (∪?sets)"by simp
have card_double: "2 * card ?sets = card (∪?sets)" proof (rule card_partition) show"finite ?sets"by simp have"finite (?set i)"for i using finite_dc_crypto by auto thus"finite (∪?sets)"by auto next fix c assume"c ∈ ?sets" thus"card c = 2"using card_payer_and_inversion[OF assms] by auto next fix x y assume"x ∈ ?sets"and"y ∈ ?sets""x ≠ y" thenobtain i j where xy: "x = ?set i""y = ?set j"by auto hence"i ≠ j"using‹x ≠ y›by auto thus"x ∩ y = {}"using xy by auto qed
have sets: "?sets = ?set ` {..< n}" unfolding image_def by auto have"?set i ≠ ?set j"if asm: "i ≠ j""i < n""j < n"for i j proof - have False if iasm: "?set i = {}" proof - have"card (?set i) = 2" using card_payer_and_inversion[OF assms ‹i 🚫›] by auto thus ?thesis using iasm by auto qed thenobtain c where ci: "c ∈ ?set i"by blast hence cj: "c ∉ ?set j"using asm by auto have False if"?set i = ?set j" using that ci cj by auto thus ?thesis by auto qed hence"inj_on ?set {..< n}"unfolding inj_on_def by auto from card_image[OF this] have"card (?set ` {..< n}) = n"by auto hence"card ?sets = n"using sets by auto thus ?thesis using eq_Union card_double by auto qed
lemma card_dc_crypto: "card dc_crypto = n * 2^n" unfolding dc_crypto using card_lists_length_eq[of "UNIV :: bool set"] by (simp add: card_cartesian_product card_image)
lemma card_image_inversion: "card (inversion ` dc_crypto) = 2^(n - 1)" proof - let ?P = "{inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto |x. x ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto}" have"∪?P = dc_crypto"by auto
have inv_SOME: "inversion (SOME x. inversion x = inversion (a, b) ∧ x ∈ dc_crypto) = inversion (a, b)" if"(a, b) ∈ dc_crypto"for a b by (rule someI2) (auto simp: that)
have SOME_inv_dc: "(SOME x. inversion x = inversion (a, b) ∧ x ∈ dc_crypto) ∈ dc_crypto" if"(a, b) ∈ dc_crypto"for a b by (rule someI2) (auto simp: that)
have"bij_betw (λs. inversion (SOME x. x ∈ s ∧ x ∈ dc_crypto)) {inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto |x. x ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto} (inversion ` dc_crypto)" unfolding bij_betw_def by (auto intro!: inj_onI image_eqI simp: inv_SOME SOME_inv_dc) hence card_eq: "card {inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto |x. x ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto} = card (inversion ` dc_crypto)" by (rule bij_betw_same_card)
have"?P = (λx. inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto) ` (inversion ` dc_crypto)" by auto thus"finite ?P"using finite_dc_crypto by auto next fix c assume"c ∈ {inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto |x. x ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto}" thenobtain x where"c = inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto"and x: "x ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto"by auto hence"c = {dc ∈ dc_crypto. inversion dc = x}"by auto thus"card c = 2 * n"using card_inversion[OF x] by simp next fix x y assume"x ∈ ?P""y ∈ ?P"and"x ≠ y" thenobtain i j where
x: "x = inversion -` {i} ∩ dc_crypto"and i: "i ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto"and
y: "y = inversion -` {j} ∩ dc_crypto"and j: "j ∈ inversion ` dc_crypto"by auto show"x ∩ y = {}"using x y ‹x ≠ y›by auto qed hence"2 * card (inversion ` dc_crypto) = 2 ^ n"unfolding‹∪?P = dc_crypto› card_dc_crypto using n_gt_3 by auto thus ?thesis by (cases n) auto qed
end
sublocale dining_cryptographers_space ⊆ prob_space "uniform_count_measure dc_crypto" by (rule prob_space_uniform_count_measure[OF finite_dc_crypto])
(insert n_gt_3, auto simp: dc_crypto intro: exI[of _ "replicate n True"])
sublocale dining_cryptographers_space ⊆ information_space "uniform_count_measure dc_crypto" 2 by standard auto
notation (in dining_cryptographers_space)
mutual_information_Pow (‹I'( _ ; _ ')›)
notation (in dining_cryptographers_space)
entropy_Pow (‹H'( _ ')›)
notation (in dining_cryptographers_space)
conditional_entropy_Pow (‹H'( _ | _ ')›)
theorem (in dining_cryptographers_space) "I( inversion ; payer ) = 0" proof (rule mutual_information_eq_0_simple) have n: "0 < n"using n_gt_3 by auto have card_image_inversion: "real (card (inversion ` dc_crypto)) = 2^n / 2" unfolding card_image_inversion using‹0 🚫›by (cases n) auto
show inversion: "simple_distributed (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) inversion (λx. 2 / 2^n)" proof (rule simple_distributedI) show"simple_function (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) inversion" using finite_dc_crypto by (auto simp: simple_function_def space_uniform_count_measure sets_uniform_count_measure) fix x assume"x ∈ inversion ` space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto)" moreoverhave"inversion -` {x} ∩ dc_crypto = {dc ∈ dc_crypto. inversion dc = x}"by auto ultimatelyshow"2 / 2^n = prob (inversion -` {x} ∩ space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto))" using‹0 🚫› by (simp add: card_inversion card_dc_crypto finite_dc_crypto
subset_eq space_uniform_count_measure measure_uniform_count_measure) qed simp
show"simple_distributed (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) payer (λx. 1 / real n)" proof (rule simple_distributedI) show"simple_function (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) payer" using finite_dc_crypto by (auto simp: simple_function_def space_uniform_count_measure sets_uniform_count_measure) fix z assume"z ∈ payer ` space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto)" thenhave"payer -` {z} ∩ dc_crypto = {z} × {xs. length xs = n}" by (auto simp: dc_crypto payer_def space_uniform_count_measure cong del: image_cong_simp) hence"card (payer -` {z} ∩ dc_crypto) = 2^n" using card_lists_length_eq[where A="UNIV::bool set"] by (simp add: card_cartesian_product_singleton) thenshow"1 / real n = prob (payer -` {z} ∩ space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto))" using finite_dc_crypto by (subst measure_uniform_count_measure) (auto simp add: card_dc_crypto space_uniform_count_measure) qed simp
show"simple_distributed (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) (λx. (inversion x, payer x)) (λx. 2 / (real n *2^n))" proof (rule simple_distributedI) show"simple_function (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) (λx. (inversion x, payer x))" using finite_dc_crypto by (auto simp: simple_function_def space_uniform_count_measure sets_uniform_count_measure) fix x assume"x ∈ (λx. (inversion x, payer x)) ` space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto)" thenobtain i xs where x: "x = (inversion (Some i, xs), payer (Some i, xs))" and"i < n""length xs = n" by (simp add: image_iff space_uniform_count_measure dc_crypto Bex_def) blast thenhave xs: "inversion (Some i, xs) ∈ inversion`dc_crypto"and i: "Some i ∈ Some ` {0.. and x: "x = (inversion (Some i, xs), Some i)"by (simp_all add: payer_def dc_crypto) moreover define ys where"ys = inversion (Some i, xs)" ultimatelyhave ys: "ys ∈ inversion`dc_crypto" and"Some i ∈ Some ` {0.."x = (ys, Some i)"by simp_all thenhave"(λx. (inversion x, payer x)) -` {x} ∩ space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto) = {dc ∈ dc_crypto. payer dc = Some (the (Some i)) ∧ inversion dc = ys}" by (auto simp add: payer_def space_uniform_count_measure) thenshow"2 / (real n * 2 ^ n) = prob ((λx. (inversion x, payer x)) -` {x} ∩ space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto))" using‹i 🚫› ys by (simp add: measure_uniform_count_measure card_payer_and_inversion finite_dc_crypto subset_eq card_dc_crypto) qed simp
show"∀x∈space (uniform_count_measure dc_crypto). 2 / (real n * 2 ^ n) = 2 / 2 ^ n * (1 / real n) " by simp qed
end
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