Quelle Guard_OtwayRees.thy Sprache: unbekannt

(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/Guard/Guard_OtwayRees.thy
    Author:     Frederic Blanqui, University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
    Copyright   2002  University of Cambridge
*)

section\<open>Otway-Rees Protocol\<close>

theory Guard_OtwayRees imports Guard_Shared begin

subsection\<open>messages used in the protocol\<close>

abbreviation
  nil :: "msg" where
  "nil == Number 0"

abbreviation
  or1 :: "agent => agent => nat => event" where
  "or1 A B NA ==
    Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Ciph A \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>"

abbreviation
  or1' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => msg => event" where
  "or1' A' A B NA X == Says A' B \Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X\"

abbreviation
  or2 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event" where
  "or2 A B NA NB X ==
    Says B Server \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
                    Ciph B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>"

abbreviation
  or2' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => nat => event" where
  "or2' B' A B NA NB ==
    Says B' Server \Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
                     Ciph A \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>,
                     Ciph B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>"

abbreviation
  or3 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event" where
  "or3 A B NA NB K ==
    Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Ciph A \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Key K\<rbrace>,
                    Ciph B \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace>"

abbreviation
  or3':: "agent => msg => agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event" where
  "or3' S Y A B NA NB K ==
    Says S B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Y, Ciph B \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace>"

abbreviation
  or4 :: "agent => agent => nat => msg => event" where
  "or4 A B NA X == Says B A \Nonce NA, X, nil\"

abbreviation
  or4' :: "agent => agent => nat => key => event" where
  "or4' B' A NA K == Says B' A \Nonce NA, Ciph A \Nonce NA, Key K\, nil\"

subsection\<open>definition of the protocol\<close>

inductive_set or :: "event list set"
where

  Nil: "[] \ or"

| Fake: "\evs \ or; X \ synth (analz (spies evs))\ \ Says Spy B X # evs \ or"

| OR1: "\evs1 \ or; Nonce NA \ used evs1\ \ or1 A B NA # evs1 \ or"

| OR2: "\evs2 \ or; or1' A' A B NA X \ set evs2; Nonce NB \ used evs2\
  \<Longrightarrow> or2 A B NA NB X # evs2 \<in> or"

| OR3: "\evs3 \ or; or2' B' A B NA NB \ set evs3; Key K \ used evs3\
  \<Longrightarrow> or3 A B NA NB K # evs3 \<in> or"

| OR4: "\evs4 \ or; or2 A B NA NB X \ set evs4; or3' S Y A B NA NB K \ set evs4\
  \<Longrightarrow> or4 A B NA X # evs4 \<in> or"

subsection\<open>declarations for tactics\<close>

declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
declare Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]
declare initState.simps [simp del]

subsection\<open>general properties of or\<close>

lemma or_has_no_Gets: "evs \ or \ \A X. Gets A X \ set evs"
by (erule or.induct, auto)

lemma or_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct or"
by (auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: or_has_no_Gets)

lemma or_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step or"
  unfolding one_step_def by (clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs \ or" for ev evs, auto)

lemma or_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs \ or \
ev \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow> (\<exists>A B X. ev=Says A B X)"
by (erule or.induct, auto)

lemma or_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says or"
by (auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: or_has_only_Says')

subsection\<open>or is regular\<close>

lemma or1'_parts_spies [dest]: "or1' A' A B NA X \ set evs
\<Longrightarrow> X \<in> parts (spies evs)"
by blast

lemma or2_parts_spies [dest]: "or2 A B NA NB X \ set evs
\<Longrightarrow> X \<in> parts (spies evs)"
by blast

lemma or3_parts_spies [dest]: "Says S B \NA, Y, Ciph B \NB, K\\ \ set evs
\<Longrightarrow> K \<in> parts (spies evs)"
by blast

lemma or_is_regular [iff]: "regular or"
apply (simp only: regular_def, clarify)
apply (erule or.induct, simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps)
by (auto dest: parts_sub)

subsection\<open>guardedness of KAB\<close>

lemma Guard_KAB [rule_format]: "\evs \ or; A \ bad; B \ bad\ \
or3 A B NA NB K \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow> GuardK K {shrK A,shrK B} (spies evs)"
apply (erule or.induct)
(* Nil *)
apply simp_all
(* Fake *)
apply (clarify, erule in_synth_GuardK, erule GuardK_analz, simp)
(* OR1 *)
apply blast
(* OR2 *)
apply safe
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies, blast)
(* OR3 *)
apply blast
apply (drule_tac A=Server in Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)
apply (drule_tac A=Server in Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)
(* OR4 *)
by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies in_GuardK_kparts)

subsection\<open>guardedness of NB\<close>

lemma Guard_NB [rule_format]: "\evs \ or; B \ bad\ \
or2 A B NA NB X \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow> Guard NB {shrK B} (spies evs)"
apply (erule or.induct)
(* Nil *)
apply simp_all
(* Fake *)
apply safe
apply (erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)
(* OR1 *)
apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
(* OR2 *)
apply blast
apply (drule_tac n=NA in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (blast intro!: No_Nonce dest: used_parts)
apply (drule_tac n=NA in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (blast intro!: No_Nonce dest: used_parts)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
apply (case_tac "Ba=B", clarsimp)
apply (drule_tac n=NB and A=B in Nonce_neq, simp+)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (drule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
(* OR3 *)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (frule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
apply (case_tac "Aa=B", clarsimp)
apply (case_tac "NAa=NB", clarsimp)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (drule_tac Y="\Nonce NB, Agent Aa, Agent Ba\"
                 and K="shrK Aa" in in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
apply (simp add: No_Nonce)
apply (case_tac "Ba=B", clarsimp)
apply (case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)
apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
apply (drule_tac Y="\Nonce NAa, Nonce NB, Agent Aa, Agent Ba\"
                 and K="shrK Ba" in in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
apply (simp add: No_Nonce)
(* OR4 *)
by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)+

end

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Quelle Guard_OtwayRees.thy Sprache: unbekannt

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