// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Basic authentication token and access key management * * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
/* We serialise key instantiation and link */
DEFINE_MUTEX(key_construction_mutex);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING void __key_check(conststruct key *key)
{
printk("__key_check: key %p {%08x} should be {%08x}\n",
key, key->magic, KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC);
BUG();
} #endif
/* * Get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't * already exist.
*/ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
{ struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user; struct rb_node *parent, **p;
try_again:
parent = NULL;
p = &key_user_tree.rb_node;
spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
/* search the tree for a user record with a matching UID */ while (*p) {
parent = *p;
user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node);
if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid))
p = &(*p)->rb_left; elseif (uid_gt(uid, user->uid))
p = &(*p)->rb_right; else goto found;
}
/* if we get here, we failed to find a match in the tree */ if (!candidate) { /* allocate a candidate user record if we don't already have
* one */
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
user = NULL;
candidate = kmalloc(sizeof(struct key_user), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!candidate)) goto out;
/* the allocation may have scheduled, so we need to repeat the * search lest someone else added the record whilst we were
* asleep */ goto try_again;
}
/* if we get here, then the user record still hadn't appeared on the
* second pass - so we use the candidate record */
refcount_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
candidate->uid = uid;
candidate->qnkeys = 0;
candidate->qnbytes = 0;
spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
mutex_init(&candidate->cons_lock);
/* okay - we found a user record for this UID */
found:
refcount_inc(&user->usage);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
kfree(candidate);
out: return user;
}
/* * Dispose of a user structure
*/ void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
{ if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
kfree(user);
}
}
/* * Allocate a serial number for a key. These are assigned randomly to avoid * security issues through covert channel problems.
*/ staticinlinevoid key_alloc_serial(struct key *key)
{ struct rb_node *parent, **p; struct key *xkey;
/* propose a random serial number and look for a hole for it in the
* serial number tree */ do {
get_random_bytes(&key->serial, sizeof(key->serial));
key->serial >>= 1; /* negative numbers are not permitted */
} while (key->serial < 3);
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
attempt_insertion:
parent = NULL;
p = &key_serial_tree.rb_node;
if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
p = &(*p)->rb_left; elseif (key->serial > xkey->serial)
p = &(*p)->rb_right; else goto serial_exists;
}
/* we've found a suitable hole - arrange for this key to occupy it */
rb_link_node(&key->serial_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock); return;
/* we found a key with the proposed serial number - walk the tree from
* that point looking for the next unused serial number */
serial_exists: for (;;) {
key->serial++; if (key->serial < 3) {
key->serial = 3; goto attempt_insertion;
}
parent = rb_next(parent); if (!parent) goto attempt_insertion;
/** * key_alloc - Allocate a key of the specified type. * @type: The type of key to allocate. * @desc: The key description to allow the key to be searched out. * @uid: The owner of the new key. * @gid: The group ID for the new key's group permissions. * @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace. * @perm: The permissions mask of the new key. * @flags: Flags specifying quota properties. * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction for new keyrings. * * Allocate a key of the specified type with the attributes given. The key is * returned in an uninstantiated state and the caller needs to instantiate the * key before returning. * * The restrict_link structure (if not NULL) will be freed when the * keyring is destroyed, so it must be dynamically allocated. * * The user's key count quota is updated to reflect the creation of the key and * the user's key data quota has the default for the key type reserved. The * instantiation function should amend this as necessary. If insufficient * quota is available, -EDQUOT will be returned. * * The LSM security modules can prevent a key being created, in which case * -EACCES will be returned. * * Returns a pointer to the new key if successful and an error code otherwise. * * Note that the caller needs to ensure the key type isn't uninstantiated. * Internally this can be done by locking key_types_sem. Externally, this can * be done by either never unregistering the key type, or making sure * key_alloc() calls don't race with module unloading.
*/ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, constchar *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, conststruct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsignedlong flags, struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{ struct key_user *user = NULL; struct key *key;
size_t desclen, quotalen; int ret; unsignedlong irqflags;
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (!desc || !*desc) goto error;
if (type->vet_description) {
ret = type->vet_description(desc); if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error;
}
}
/** * key_payload_reserve - Adjust data quota reservation for the key's payload * @key: The key to make the reservation for. * @datalen: The amount of data payload the caller now wants. * * Adjust the amount of the owning user's key data quota that a key reserves. * If the amount is increased, then -EDQUOT may be returned if there isn't * enough free quota available. * * If successful, 0 is returned.
*/ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
{ int delta = (int)datalen - key->datalen; int ret = 0;
/* change the recorded data length if that didn't generate an error */ if (ret == 0)
key->datalen = datalen;
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
/* * Change the key state to being instantiated.
*/ staticvoid mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error)
{ /* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus * key_read_state().
*/
smp_store_release(&key->state,
(reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE);
}
/* * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by * key_construction_mutex.
*/ staticint __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
{ int ret, awaken;
key_check(key);
key_check(keyring);
awaken = 0;
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* can't instantiate twice */ if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* instantiate the key */
ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, 0);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */ if (keyring) { if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
__key_link(keyring, key, _edit);
}
/* disable the authorisation key */ if (authkey)
key_invalidate(authkey);
if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX)
key_set_expiry(key, prep->expiry);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */ if (awaken)
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
return ret;
}
/** * key_instantiate_and_link - Instantiate a key and link it into the keyring. * @key: The key to instantiate. * @data: The data to use to instantiate the keyring. * @datalen: The length of @data. * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL). * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation. * * Instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state using the provided data * and, if successful, link it in to the destination keyring if one is * supplied. * * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone * waiting for the key is woken up. If the key was already instantiated, * -EBUSY will be returned.
*/ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, constvoid *data,
size_t datalen, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey)
{ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL; int ret;
if (keyring) {
ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &key->index_key); if (ret < 0) goto error;
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); if (ret < 0) goto error_link_end;
if (keyring->restrict_link && keyring->restrict_link->check) { struct key_restriction *keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
ret = keyres->check(keyring, key->type, &prep.payload,
keyres->key); if (ret < 0) goto error_link_end;
}
}
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
error_link_end: if (keyring)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
error: if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep); return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
/** * key_reject_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring. * @key: The key to instantiate. * @timeout: The timeout on the negative key. * @error: The error to return when the key is hit. * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL). * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation. * * Negatively instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state and, if * successful, set its timeout and stored error and link it in to the * destination keyring if one is supplied. The key and any links to the key * will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires. * * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing * them to return the stored error code (typically ENOKEY) until the negative * key expires. * * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone * waiting for the key is woken up. If the key was already instantiated, * -EBUSY will be returned.
*/ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey)
{ struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL; int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
key_check(key);
key_check(keyring);
awaken = 0;
ret = -EBUSY;
if (keyring) { if (keyring->restrict_link) return -EPERM;
/* can't instantiate twice */ if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, -error);
key_set_expiry(key, ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
ret = 0;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */ if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link(keyring, key, &edit);
/* disable the authorisation key */ if (authkey)
key_invalidate(authkey);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */ if (awaken)
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_reject_and_link);
/** * key_put - Discard a reference to a key. * @key: The key to discard a reference from. * * Discard a reference to a key, and when all the references are gone, we * schedule the cleanup task to come and pull it out of the tree in process * context at some later time.
*/ void key_put(struct key *key)
{ if (key) {
key_check(key);
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&key->usage)) { unsignedlong flags;
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
} /* Mark key as safe for GC after key->user done. */
clear_bit_unlock(KEY_FLAG_USER_ALIVE, &key->flags);
schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
}
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put);
/* * Find a key by its serial number.
*/ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
{ struct rb_node *n; struct key *key;
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
/* search the tree for the specified key */
n = key_serial_tree.rb_node; while (n) {
key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
if (id < key->serial)
n = n->rb_left; elseif (id > key->serial)
n = n->rb_right; else goto found;
}
not_found:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); goto error;
found: /* A key is allowed to be looked up only if someone still owns a * reference to it - otherwise it's awaiting the gc.
*/ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&key->usage)) goto not_found;
/* * Find and lock the specified key type against removal. * * We return with the sem read-locked if successful. If the type wasn't * available -ENOKEY is returned instead.
*/ struct key_type *key_type_lookup(constchar *type)
{ struct key_type *ktype;
down_read(&key_types_sem);
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
list_for_each_entry(ktype, &key_types_list, link) { if (strcmp(ktype->name, type) == 0) goto found_kernel_type;
}
/* * Unlock a key type locked by key_type_lookup().
*/ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
{
up_read(&key_types_sem);
}
/* * Attempt to update an existing key. * * The key is given to us with an incremented refcount that we need to discard * if we get an error.
*/ staticinline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{ struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); int ret;
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE); if (ret < 0) goto error;
ret = -EEXIST; if (!key->type->update) goto error;
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED, 0);
}
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type); if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); goto error;
}
ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &index_key); if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error_free_prep;
}
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit); if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error_link_end;
}
if (restrict_link && restrict_link->check) {
ret = restrict_link->check(keyring, index_key.type,
&prep.payload, restrict_link->key); if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error_link_end;
}
}
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE); if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error_link_end;
}
/* if it's requested and possible to update this type of key, search * for an existing key of the same type and description in the * destination keyring and update that instead if possible
*/ if (allow_update) { if (index_key.type->update) {
key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key); if (key_ref) goto found_matching_key;
}
} else {
key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key); if (key_ref) {
key_ref_put(key_ref);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); goto error_link_end;
}
}
/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */ if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (index_key.type->read)
perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
index_key.type->update)
perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
}
/* allocate a new key */
key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags, NULL); if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); goto error_link_end;
}
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit); if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error_link_end;
}
found_matching_key: /* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
*/
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true); if (ret < 0) {
key_ref_put(key_ref);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); goto error_free_prep;
}
}
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
flags, false);
goto error_free_prep;
}
/** * key_create_or_update - Update or create and instantiate a key. * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the destination keyring with possession flag. * @type: The type of key. * @description: The searchable description for the key. * @payload: The data to use to instantiate or update the key. * @plen: The length of @payload. * @perm: The permissions mask for a new key. * @flags: The quota flags for a new key. * * Search the destination keyring for a key of the same description and if one * is found, update it, otherwise create and instantiate a new one and create a * link to it from that keyring. * * If perm is KEY_PERM_UNDEF then an appropriate key permissions mask will be * concocted. * * Returns a pointer to the new key if successful, -ENODEV if the key type * wasn't available, -ENOTDIR if the keyring wasn't a keyring, -EACCES if the * caller isn't permitted to modify the keyring or the LSM did not permit * creation of the key. * * On success, the possession flag from the keyring ref will be tacked on to * the key ref before it is returned.
*/
key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, constchar *type, constchar *description, constvoid *payload,
size_t plen,
key_perm_t perm, unsignedlong flags)
{ return __key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description, payload,
plen, perm, flags, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
/** * key_create - Create and instantiate a key. * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the destination keyring with possession flag. * @type: The type of key. * @description: The searchable description for the key. * @payload: The data to use to instantiate or update the key. * @plen: The length of @payload. * @perm: The permissions mask for a new key. * @flags: The quota flags for a new key. * * Create and instantiate a new key and link to it from the destination keyring. * * If perm is KEY_PERM_UNDEF then an appropriate key permissions mask will be * concocted. * * Returns a pointer to the new key if successful, -EEXIST if a key with the * same description already exists, -ENODEV if the key type wasn't available, * -ENOTDIR if the keyring wasn't a keyring, -EACCES if the caller isn't * permitted to modify the keyring or the LSM did not permit creation of the * key. * * On success, the possession flag from the keyring ref will be tacked on to * the key ref before it is returned.
*/
key_ref_t key_create(key_ref_t keyring_ref, constchar *type, constchar *description, constvoid *payload,
size_t plen,
key_perm_t perm, unsignedlong flags)
{ return __key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description, payload,
plen, perm, flags, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create);
/** * key_update - Update a key's contents. * @key_ref: The pointer (plus possession flag) to the key. * @payload: The data to be used to update the key. * @plen: The length of @payload. * * Attempt to update the contents of a key with the given payload data. The * caller must be granted Write permission on the key. Negative keys can be * instantiated by this method. * * Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if not permitted and -EOPNOTSUPP if the key * type does not support updating. The key type may return other errors.
*/ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, constvoid *payload, size_t plen)
{ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); int ret;
key_check(key);
/* the key must be writable */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE); if (ret < 0) return ret;
/* attempt to update it if supported */ if (!key->type->update) return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) goto error;
}
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); if (ret == 0) { /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED, 0);
}
up_write(&key->sem);
error: if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep); return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
/** * key_revoke - Revoke a key. * @key: The key to be revoked. * * Mark a key as being revoked and ask the type to free up its resources. The * revocation timeout is set and the key and all its links will be * automatically garbage collected after key_gc_delay amount of time if they * are not manually dealt with first.
*/ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
time64_t time;
key_check(key);
/* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it * - we tell lockdep that we might nest because we might be revoking an * authorisation key whilst holding the sem on a key we've just * instantiated
*/
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1); if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags)) {
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED, 0); if (key->type->revoke)
key->type->revoke(key);
/* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
key->revoked_at = time;
key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
}
}
up_write(&key->sem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_revoke);
/** * key_invalidate - Invalidate a key. * @key: The key to be invalidated. * * Mark a key as being invalidated and have it cleaned up immediately. The key * is ignored by all searches and other operations from this point.
*/ void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
{
kenter("%d", key_serial(key));
key_check(key);
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1); if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INVALIDATED, 0);
key_schedule_gc_links();
}
up_write(&key->sem);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate);
/** * generic_key_instantiate - Simple instantiation of a key from preparsed data * @key: The key to be instantiated * @prep: The preparsed data to load. * * Instantiate a key from preparsed data. We assume we can just copy the data * in directly and clear the old pointers. * * This can be pointed to directly by the key type instantiate op pointer.
*/ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{ int ret;
/** * register_key_type - Register a type of key. * @ktype: The new key type. * * Register a new key type. * * Returns 0 on success or -EEXIST if a type of this name already exists.
*/ int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
{ struct key_type *p; int ret;
/** * unregister_key_type - Unregister a type of key. * @ktype: The key type. * * Unregister a key type and mark all the extant keys of this type as dead. * Those keys of this type are then destroyed to get rid of their payloads and * they and their links will be garbage collected as soon as possible.
*/ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
{
down_write(&key_types_sem);
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
downgrade_write(&key_types_sem);
key_gc_keytype(ktype);
pr_notice("Key type %s unregistered\n", ktype->name);
up_read(&key_types_sem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
/* * Initialise the key management state.
*/ void __init key_init(void)
{ /* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/* add the special key types */
list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
list_add_tail(&key_type_dead.link, &key_types_list);
list_add_tail(&key_type_user.link, &key_types_list);
list_add_tail(&key_type_logon.link, &key_types_list);
/* record the root user tracking */
rb_link_node(&root_key_user.node,
NULL,
&key_user_tree.rb_node);
Die Informationen auf dieser Webseite wurden
nach bestem Wissen sorgfältig zusammengestellt. Es wird jedoch weder Vollständigkeit, noch Richtigkeit,
noch Qualität der bereit gestellten Informationen zugesichert.
Bemerkung:
Die farbliche Syntaxdarstellung und die Messung sind noch experimentell.