|
|
|
|
Quelle crypto.rs
Sprache: unbekannt
|
|
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
// except according to those terms.
use std::{
cell::RefCell,
cmp::{max, min},
collections::HashMap,
mem,
ops::{Index, IndexMut, Range},
rc::Rc,
time::Instant,
};
use neqo_common::{hex, hex_snip_middle, qdebug, qinfo, qtrace, Encoder, Role};
use neqo_crypto::{
hkdf, hp::HpKey, Aead, Agent, AntiReplay, Cipher, Epoch, Error as CryptoError, HandshakeSt ate,
PrivateKey, PublicKey, Record, RecordList, ResumptionToken, SymKey, ZeroRttChecker,
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE,
TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA, TLS_EPOCH_HANDSHAKE, TLS_EPOCH_INITIAL, TLS_EPOCH_ZERO_RTT,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP256R1, TLS_GRP_EC_SECP384R1, TLS_GRP_EC_SECP521R1, TLS_GRP_EC_X25519,
TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519, TLS_VERSION_1_3,
};
use crate::{
cid::ConnectionIdRef,
packet::{PacketBuilder, PacketNumber},
recovery::RecoveryToken,
recv_stream::RxStreamOrderer,
send_stream::TxBuffer,
stats::FrameStats,
tparams::{TpZeroRttChecker, TransportParameters, TransportParametersHandler},
tracking::PacketNumberSpace,
version::Version,
Error, Res,
};
const MAX_AUTH_TAG: usize = 32;
/// The number of invocations remaining on a write cipher before we try
/// to update keys. This has to be much smaller than the number returned
/// by `CryptoDxState::limit` or updates will happen too often. As we don't
/// need to ask permission to update, this can be quite small.
pub const UPDATE_WRITE_KEYS_AT: PacketNumber = 100;
// This is a testing kludge that allows for overwriting the number of
// invocations of the next cipher to operate. With this, it is possible
// to test what happens when the number of invocations reaches 0, or
// when it hits `UPDATE_WRITE_KEYS_AT` and an automatic update should occur.
// This is a little crude, but it saves a lot of plumbing.
#[cfg(test)]
thread_local!(pub static OVERWRITE_INVOCATIONS: RefCell<Option<PacketNumber>> = RefCell::default());
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Crypto {
version: Version,
protocols: Vec<String>,
pub(crate) tls: Agent,
pub(crate) streams: CryptoStreams,
pub(crate) states: CryptoStates,
}
type TpHandler = Rc<RefCell<TransportParametersHandler>>;
impl Crypto {
pub fn new(
version: Version,
mut agent: Agent,
protocols: Vec<String>,
tphandler: TpHandler,
) -> Res<Self> {
agent.set_version_range(TLS_VERSION_1_3, TLS_VERSION_1_3)?;
agent.set_ciphers(&[
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
])?;
match &mut agent {
Agent::Server(c) => {
// Clients do not send mlkem768x25519 shares by default, but servers should accept
// them.
c.set_groups(&[
TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519,
TLS_GRP_EC_X25519,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP256R1,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP384R1,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP521R1,
])?;
}
Agent::Client(c) => {
c.set_groups(&[
TLS_GRP_EC_X25519,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP256R1,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP384R1,
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP521R1,
])?;
// Configure clients to send both X25519 and P256 to reduce
// the rate of HRRs.
c.send_additional_key_shares(1)?;
// Always enable 0-RTT on the client, but the server needs
// more configuration passed to server_enable_0rtt.
c.enable_0rtt()?;
}
}
agent.set_alpn(&protocols)?;
agent.disable_end_of_early_data()?;
let extension = match version {
Version::Version2 | Version::Version1 => 0x39,
Version::Draft29 | Version::Draft30 | Version::Draft31 | Version::Draft32 => 0xffa5,
};
agent.extension_handler(extension, tphandler)?;
Ok(Self {
version,
protocols,
tls: agent,
streams: CryptoStreams::default(),
states: CryptoStates::default(),
})
}
/// Get the name of the server. (Only works for the client currently).
pub fn server_name(&self) -> Option<&str> {
if let Agent::Client(c) = &self.tls {
Some(c.server_name())
} else {
None
}
}
/// Get the set of enabled protocols.
pub fn protocols(&self) -> &[String] {
&self.protocols
}
pub fn server_enable_0rtt(
&mut self,
tphandler: TpHandler,
anti_replay: &AntiReplay,
zero_rtt_checker: impl ZeroRttChecker + 'static,
) -> Res<()> {
if let Agent::Server(s) = &mut self.tls {
Ok(s.enable_0rtt(
anti_replay,
0xffff_ffff,
TpZeroRttChecker::wrap(tphandler, zero_rtt_checker),
)?)
} else {
panic!("not a server");
}
}
pub fn server_enable_ech(
&mut self,
config: u8,
public_name: &str,
sk: &PrivateKey,
pk: &PublicKey,
) -> Res<()> {
if let Agent::Server(s) = &mut self.tls {
s.enable_ech(config, public_name, sk, pk)?;
Ok(())
} else {
panic!("not a client");
}
}
pub fn client_enable_ech(&mut self, ech_config_list: impl AsRef<[u8]>) -> Res<()> {
if let Agent::Client(c) = &mut self.tls {
c.enable_ech(ech_config_list)?;
Ok(())
} else {
panic!("not a client");
}
}
/// Get the active ECH configuration, which is empty if ECH is disabled.
pub fn ech_config(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.tls.ech_config()
}
pub fn handshake(
&mut self,
now: Instant,
space: PacketNumberSpace,
data: Option<&[u8]>,
) -> Res<&HandshakeState> {
let input = data.map(|d| {
qtrace!("Handshake record received {:0x?} ", d);
let epoch = match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => TLS_EPOCH_INITIAL,
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => TLS_EPOCH_HANDSHAKE,
// Our epoch progresses forward, but the TLS epoch is fixed to 3.
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA,
};
Record {
ct: TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE,
epoch,
data: d.to_vec(),
}
});
match self.tls.handshake_raw(now, input) {
Ok(output) => {
self.buffer_records(output)?;
Ok(self.tls.state())
}
Err(CryptoError::EchRetry(v)) => Err(Error::EchRetry(v)),
Err(e) => {
qinfo!("Handshake failed {:?}", e);
Err(self
.tls
.alert()
.map_or(Error::CryptoError(e), |a| Error::CryptoAlert(*a)))
}
}
}
/// Enable 0-RTT and return `true` if it is enabled successfully.
pub fn enable_0rtt(&mut self, version: Version, role: Role) -> Res<bool> {
let info = self.tls.preinfo()?;
// `info.early_data()` returns false for a server,
// so use `early_data_cipher()` to tell if 0-RTT is enabled.
let cipher = info.early_data_cipher();
if cipher.is_none() {
return Ok(false);
}
let (dir, secret) = match role {
Role::Client => (
CryptoDxDirection::Write,
self.tls.write_secret(TLS_EPOCH_ZERO_RTT),
),
Role::Server => (
CryptoDxDirection::Read,
self.tls.read_secret(TLS_EPOCH_ZERO_RTT),
),
};
let secret = secret.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?;
self.states
.set_0rtt_keys(version, dir, &secret, cipher.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?)?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Lock in a compatible upgrade.
pub fn confirm_version(&mut self, confirmed: Version) {
_ = self.states.confirm_version(self.version, confirmed);
self.version = confirmed;
}
/// Returns true if new handshake keys were installed.
pub fn install_keys(&mut self, role: Role) -> Res<bool> {
if self.tls.state().is_final() {
Ok(false)
} else {
let installed_hs = self.install_handshake_keys()?;
if role == Role::Server {
self.maybe_install_application_write_key(self.version)?;
}
Ok(installed_hs)
}
}
fn install_handshake_keys(&mut self) -> Res<bool> {
qtrace!([self], "Attempt to install handshake keys");
let Some(write_secret) = self.tls.write_secret(TLS_EPOCH_HANDSHAKE) else {
// No keys is fine.
return Ok(false);
};
let read_secret = self
.tls
.read_secret(TLS_EPOCH_HANDSHAKE)
.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?;
let cipher = match self.tls.info() {
None => self.tls.preinfo()?.cipher_suite(),
Some(info) => Some(info.cipher_suite()),
}
.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?;
self.states
.set_handshake_keys(self.version, &write_secret, &read_secret, cipher)?;
qdebug!([self], "Handshake keys installed");
Ok(true)
}
fn maybe_install_application_write_key(&mut self, version: Version) -> Res<()> {
qtrace!([self], "Attempt to install application write key");
if let Some(secret) = self.tls.write_secret(TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA) {
self.states.set_application_write_key(version, &secret)?;
qdebug!([self], "Application write key installed");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn install_application_keys(&mut self, version: Version, expire_0rtt: Instant) -> Res<()> {
self.maybe_install_application_write_key(version)?;
// The write key might have been installed earlier, but it should
// always be installed now.
debug_assert!(self.states.app_write.is_some());
let read_secret = self
.tls
.read_secret(TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA)
.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?;
self.states
.set_application_read_key(version, &read_secret, expire_0rtt)?;
qdebug!([self], "application read keys installed");
Ok(())
}
/// Buffer crypto records for sending.
pub fn buffer_records(&mut self, records: RecordList) -> Res<()> {
for r in records {
if r.ct != TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE {
return Err(Error::ProtocolViolation);
}
qtrace!([self], "Adding CRYPTO data {:?}", r);
self.streams
.send(PacketNumberSpace::from(r.epoch), &r.data)?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn write_frame(
&mut self,
space: PacketNumberSpace,
builder: &mut PacketBuilder,
tokens: &mut Vec<RecoveryToken>,
stats: &mut FrameStats,
) {
self.streams.write_frame(space, builder, tokens, stats);
}
pub fn acked(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) {
qdebug!(
"Acked crypto frame space={} offset={} length={}",
token.space,
token.offset,
token.length
);
self.streams.acked(token);
}
pub fn lost(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) {
qinfo!(
"Lost crypto frame space={} offset={} length={}",
token.space,
token.offset,
token.length
);
self.streams.lost(token);
}
/// Mark any outstanding frames in the indicated space as "lost" so
/// that they can be sent again.
pub fn resend_unacked(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) {
self.streams.resend_unacked(space);
}
/// Discard state for a packet number space and return true
/// if something was discarded.
pub fn discard(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool {
self.streams.discard(space);
self.states.discard(space)
}
pub fn create_resumption_token(
&mut self,
new_token: Option<&[u8]>,
tps: &TransportParameters,
version: Version,
rtt: u64,
) -> Option<ResumptionToken> {
if let Agent::Client(ref mut c) = self.tls {
c.resumption_token().as_ref().map(|t| {
qtrace!("TLS token {}", hex(t.as_ref()));
let mut enc = Encoder::default();
enc.encode_uint(4, version.wire_version());
enc.encode_varint(rtt);
enc.encode_vvec_with(|enc_inner| {
tps.encode(enc_inner);
});
enc.encode_vvec(new_token.unwrap_or(&[]));
enc.encode(t.as_ref());
qdebug!("resumption token {}", hex_snip_middle(enc.as_ref()));
ResumptionToken::new(enc.into(), t.expiration_time())
})
} else {
unreachable!("It is a server.");
}
}
pub fn has_resumption_token(&self) -> bool {
if let Agent::Client(c) = &self.tls {
c.has_resumption_token()
} else {
unreachable!("It is a server.");
}
}
}
impl ::std::fmt::Display for Crypto {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Crypto")
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum CryptoDxDirection {
Read,
Write,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CryptoDxState {
/// The QUIC version.
version: Version,
/// Whether packets protected with this state will be read or written.
direction: CryptoDxDirection,
/// The epoch of this crypto state. This initially tracks TLS epochs
/// via DTLS: 0 = initial, 1 = 0-RTT, 2 = handshake, 3 = application.
/// But we don't need to keep that, and QUIC isn't limited in how
/// many times keys can be updated, so we don't use `u16` for this.
epoch: usize,
aead: Aead,
hpkey: HpKey,
/// This tracks the range of packet numbers that have been seen. This allows
/// for verifying that packet numbers before a key update are strictly lower
/// than packet numbers after a key update.
used_pn: Range<PacketNumber>,
/// This is the minimum packet number that is allowed.
min_pn: PacketNumber,
/// The total number of operations that are remaining before the keys
/// become exhausted and can't be used any more.
invocations: PacketNumber,
/// The basis of the invocation limits in `invocations`.
largest_packet_len: usize,
}
const INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN: usize = 1 << 11; // 2048
impl CryptoDxState {
pub fn new(
version: Version,
direction: CryptoDxDirection,
epoch: Epoch,
secret: &SymKey,
cipher: Cipher,
) -> Res<Self> {
qdebug!(
"Making {:?} {} CryptoDxState, v={:?} cipher={}",
direction,
epoch,
version,
cipher,
);
let hplabel = String::from(version.label_prefix()) + "hp";
Ok(Self {
version,
direction,
epoch: usize::from(epoch),
aead: Aead::new(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, secret, version.label_prefix())?,
hpkey: HpKey::extract(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, secret, &hplabel)?,
used_pn: 0..0,
min_pn: 0,
invocations: Self::limit(direction, cipher),
largest_packet_len: INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN,
})
}
pub fn new_initial(
version: Version,
direction: CryptoDxDirection,
label: &str,
dcid: &[u8],
) -> Res<Self> {
qtrace!("new_initial {:?} {}", version, ConnectionIdRef::from(dcid));
let salt = version.initial_salt();
let cipher = TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
let initial_secret = hkdf::extract(
TLS_VERSION_1_3,
cipher,
Some(&hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, salt)?),
&hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, dcid)?,
)?;
let secret = hkdf::expand_label(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, &initial_secret, &[], label)?;
Self::new(version, direction, TLS_EPOCH_INITIAL, &secret, cipher)
}
/// Determine the confidentiality and integrity limits for the cipher.
fn limit(direction: CryptoDxDirection, cipher: Cipher) -> PacketNumber {
match direction {
// This uses the smaller limits for 2^16 byte packets
// as we don't control incoming packet size.
CryptoDxDirection::Read => match cipher {
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 => 1 << 52,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 => PacketNumber::MAX,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 => 1 << 36,
_ => unreachable!(),
},
// This uses the larger limits for 2^11 byte packets.
CryptoDxDirection::Write => match cipher {
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 => 1 << 28,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 => PacketNumber::MAX,
_ => unreachable!(),
},
}
}
fn invoked(&mut self) -> Res<()> {
#[cfg(test)]
OVERWRITE_INVOCATIONS.with(|v| {
if let Some(i) = v.borrow_mut().take() {
neqo_common::qwarn!("Setting {:?} invocations to {}", self.direction, i);
self.invocations = i;
}
});
self.invocations = self
.invocations
.checked_sub(1)
.ok_or(Error::KeysExhausted)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Determine whether we should initiate a key update.
pub fn should_update(&self) -> bool {
// There is no point in updating read keys as the limit is global.
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, CryptoDxDirection::Write);
self.invocations <= UPDATE_WRITE_KEYS_AT
}
pub fn next(&self, next_secret: &SymKey, cipher: Cipher) -> Res<Self> {
let pn = self.next_pn();
// We count invocations of each write key just for that key, but all
// attempts to invocations to read count toward a single limit.
// This doesn't count use of Handshake keys.
let invocations = if self.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read {
self.invocations
} else {
Self::limit(CryptoDxDirection::Write, cipher)
};
Ok(Self {
version: self.version,
direction: self.direction,
epoch: self.epoch + 1,
aead: Aead::new(
TLS_VERSION_1_3,
cipher,
next_secret,
self.version.label_prefix(),
)?,
hpkey: self.hpkey.clone(),
used_pn: pn..pn,
min_pn: pn,
invocations,
largest_packet_len: INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN,
})
}
#[must_use]
pub const fn version(&self) -> Version {
self.version
}
#[must_use]
pub const fn key_phase(&self) -> bool {
// Epoch 3 => 0, 4 => 1, 5 => 0, 6 => 1, ...
self.epoch & 1 != 1
}
/// This is a continuation of a previous, so adjust the range accordingly.
/// Fail if the two ranges overlap. Do nothing if the directions don't match.
pub fn continuation(&mut self, prev: &Self) -> Res<()> {
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, prev.direction);
let next = prev.next_pn();
self.min_pn = next;
if self.used_pn.is_empty() {
self.used_pn = next..next;
Ok(())
} else if prev.used_pn.end > self.used_pn.start {
qdebug!(
[self],
"Found packet with too new packet number {} > {}, compared to {}",
self.used_pn.start,
prev.used_pn.end,
prev,
);
Err(Error::PacketNumberOverlap)
} else {
self.used_pn.start = next;
Ok(())
}
}
/// Mark a packet number as used. If this is too low, reject it.
/// Note that this won't catch a value that is too high if packets protected with
/// old keys are received after a key update. That needs to be caught elsewhere.
pub fn used(&mut self, pn: PacketNumber) -> Res<()> {
if pn < self.min_pn {
qdebug!(
[self],
"Found packet with too old packet number: {} < {}",
pn,
self.min_pn
);
return Err(Error::PacketNumberOverlap);
}
if self.used_pn.start == self.used_pn.end {
self.used_pn.start = pn;
}
self.used_pn.end = max(pn + 1, self.used_pn.end);
Ok(())
}
#[must_use]
pub fn needs_update(&self) -> bool {
// Only initiate a key update if we have processed exactly one packet
// and we are in an epoch greater than 3.
self.used_pn.start + 1 == self.used_pn.end
&& self.epoch > usize::from(TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn can_update(&self, largest_acknowledged: Option<PacketNumber>) -> bool {
largest_acknowledged.map_or_else(
|| self.epoch == usize::from(TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA),
|la| self.used_pn.contains(&la),
)
}
pub fn compute_mask(&self, sample: &[u8]) -> Res<[u8; HpKey::SAMPLE_SIZE]> {
let mask = self.hpkey.mask(sample)?;
qtrace!([self], "HP sample={} mask={}", hex(sample), hex(mask));
Ok(mask)
}
#[must_use]
pub const fn next_pn(&self) -> PacketNumber {
self.used_pn.end
}
pub fn encrypt(&mut self, pn: PacketNumber, hdr: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> {
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, CryptoDxDirection::Write);
qtrace!(
[self],
"encrypt pn={} hdr={} body={}",
pn,
hex(hdr),
hex(body)
);
// The numbers in `Self::limit` assume a maximum packet size of `LIMIT`.
// Adjust them as we encounter larger packets.
debug_assert!(body.len() < 65536);
if body.len() > self.largest_packet_len {
let new_bits = usize::leading_zeros(self.largest_packet_len - 1)
- usize::leading_zeros(body.len() - 1);
self.invocations >>= new_bits;
self.largest_packet_len = body.len();
}
self.invoked()?;
let size = body.len() + MAX_AUTH_TAG;
let mut out = vec![0; size];
let res = self.aead.encrypt(pn, hdr, body, &mut out)?;
qtrace!([self], "encrypt ct={}", hex(res));
debug_assert_eq!(pn, self.next_pn());
self.used(pn)?;
Ok(res.to_vec())
}
#[must_use]
pub const fn expansion(&self) -> usize {
self.aead.expansion()
}
pub fn decrypt(&mut self, pn: PacketNumber, hdr: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> {
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, CryptoDxDirection::Read);
qtrace!(
[self],
"decrypt pn={} hdr={} body={}",
pn,
hex(hdr),
hex(body)
);
self.invoked()?;
let mut out = vec![0; body.len()];
let res = self.aead.decrypt(pn, hdr, body, &mut out)?;
self.used(pn)?;
Ok(res.to_vec())
}
#[cfg(all(test, not(feature = "disable-encryption")))]
pub(crate) fn test_default() -> Self {
// This matches the value in packet.rs
const CLIENT_CID: &[u8] = &[0x83, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x51, 0x57, 0x08];
Self::new_initial(
Version::default(),
CryptoDxDirection::Write,
"server in",
CLIENT_CID,
)
.unwrap()
}
/// Get the amount of extra padding packets protected with this profile need.
/// This is the difference between the size of the header protection sample
/// and the AEAD expansion.
pub const fn extra_padding(&self) -> usize {
HpKey::SAMPLE_SIZE.saturating_sub(self.aead.expansion())
}
}
impl std::fmt::Display for CryptoDxState {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "epoch {} {:?}", self.epoch, self.direction)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CryptoState {
tx: CryptoDxState,
rx: CryptoDxState,
}
impl Index<CryptoDxDirection> for CryptoState {
type Output = CryptoDxState;
fn index(&self, dir: CryptoDxDirection) -> &Self::Output {
match dir {
CryptoDxDirection::Read => &self.rx,
CryptoDxDirection::Write => &self.tx,
}
}
}
impl IndexMut<CryptoDxDirection> for CryptoState {
fn index_mut(&mut self, dir: CryptoDxDirection) -> &mut Self::Output {
match dir {
CryptoDxDirection::Read => &mut self.rx,
CryptoDxDirection::Write => &mut self.tx,
}
}
}
/// `CryptoDxAppData` wraps the state necessary for one direction of application data keys.
/// This includes the secret needed to generate the next set of keys.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CryptoDxAppData {
dx: CryptoDxState,
cipher: Cipher,
// Not the secret used to create `self.dx`, but the one needed for the next iteration.
next_secret: SymKey,
}
impl CryptoDxAppData {
pub fn new(
version: Version,
dir: CryptoDxDirection,
secret: &SymKey,
cipher: Cipher,
) -> Res<Self> {
Ok(Self {
dx: CryptoDxState::new(version, dir, TLS_EPOCH_APPLICATION_DATA, secret, cipher)?,
cipher,
next_secret: Self::update_secret(cipher, secret)?,
})
}
fn update_secret(cipher: Cipher, secret: &SymKey) -> Res<SymKey> {
let next = hkdf::expand_label(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, secret, &[], "quic ku")?;
Ok(next)
}
pub fn next(&self) -> Res<Self> {
if self.dx.epoch == usize::MAX {
// Guard against too many key updates.
return Err(Error::KeysExhausted);
}
let next_secret = Self::update_secret(self.cipher, &self.next_secret)?;
Ok(Self {
dx: self.dx.next(&self.next_secret, self.cipher)?,
cipher: self.cipher,
next_secret,
})
}
pub const fn epoch(&self) -> usize {
self.dx.epoch
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub enum CryptoSpace {
Initial,
ZeroRtt,
Handshake,
ApplicationData,
}
/// All of the keying material needed for a connection.
///
/// Note that the methods on this struct take a version but those are only ever
/// used for Initial keys; a version has been selected at the time we need to
/// get other keys, so those have fixed versions.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct CryptoStates {
initials: HashMap<Version, CryptoState>,
handshake: Option<CryptoState>,
zero_rtt: Option<CryptoDxState>, // One direction only!
cipher: Cipher,
app_write: Option<CryptoDxAppData>,
app_read: Option<CryptoDxAppData>,
app_read_next: Option<CryptoDxAppData>,
// If this is set, then we have noticed a genuine update.
// Once this time passes, we should switch in new keys.
read_update_time: Option<Instant>,
}
impl CryptoStates {
/// Select a `CryptoDxState` and `CryptoSpace` for the given `PacketNumberSpace`.
/// This selects 0-RTT keys for `PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData` if 1-RTT keys are
/// not yet available.
pub fn select_tx_mut(
&mut self,
version: Version,
space: PacketNumberSpace,
) -> Option<(CryptoSpace, &mut CryptoDxState)> {
match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => self
.tx_mut(version, CryptoSpace::Initial)
.map(|dx| (CryptoSpace::Initial, dx)),
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => self
.tx_mut(version, CryptoSpace::Handshake)
.map(|dx| (CryptoSpace::Handshake, dx)),
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => {
if let Some(app) = self.app_write.as_mut() {
Some((CryptoSpace::ApplicationData, &mut app.dx))
} else {
self.zero_rtt.as_mut().map(|dx| (CryptoSpace::ZeroRtt, dx))
}
}
}
}
pub fn tx_mut<'a>(
&'a mut self,
version: Version,
cspace: CryptoSpace,
) -> Option<&'a mut CryptoDxState> {
let tx = |k: Option<&'a mut CryptoState>| k.map(|dx| &mut dx.tx);
match cspace {
CryptoSpace::Initial => tx(self.initials.get_mut(&version)),
CryptoSpace::ZeroRtt => self
.zero_rtt
.as_mut()
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Write),
CryptoSpace::Handshake => tx(self.handshake.as_mut()),
CryptoSpace::ApplicationData => self.app_write.as_mut().map(|app| &mut app.dx),
}
}
pub fn tx<'a>(&'a self, version: Version, cspace: CryptoSpace) -> Option<&'a CryptoDxState> {
let tx = |k: Option<&'a CryptoState>| k.map(|dx| &dx.tx);
match cspace {
CryptoSpace::Initial => tx(self.initials.get(&version)),
CryptoSpace::ZeroRtt => self
.zero_rtt
.as_ref()
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Write),
CryptoSpace::Handshake => tx(self.handshake.as_ref()),
CryptoSpace::ApplicationData => self.app_write.as_ref().map(|app| &app.dx),
}
}
pub fn select_tx(
&self,
version: Version,
space: PacketNumberSpace,
) -> Option<(CryptoSpace, &CryptoDxState)> {
match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => self
.tx(version, CryptoSpace::Initial)
.map(|dx| (CryptoSpace::Initial, dx)),
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => self
.tx(version, CryptoSpace::Handshake)
.map(|dx| (CryptoSpace::Handshake, dx)),
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => self.app_write.as_ref().map_or_else(
|| self.zero_rtt.as_ref().map(|dx| (CryptoSpace::ZeroRtt, dx)),
|app| Some((CryptoSpace::ApplicationData, &app.dx)),
),
}
}
pub fn rx_hp(&mut self, version: Version, cspace: CryptoSpace) -> Option<&mut CryptoDxState> {
if cspace == CryptoSpace::ApplicationData {
self.app_read.as_mut().map(|ar| &mut ar.dx)
} else {
self.rx(version, cspace, false)
}
}
pub fn rx<'a>(
&'a mut self,
version: Version,
cspace: CryptoSpace,
key_phase: bool,
) -> Option<&'a mut CryptoDxState> {
let rx = |x: Option<&'a mut CryptoState>| x.map(|dx| &mut dx.rx);
match cspace {
CryptoSpace::Initial => rx(self.initials.get_mut(&version)),
CryptoSpace::ZeroRtt => self
.zero_rtt
.as_mut()
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read),
CryptoSpace::Handshake => rx(self.handshake.as_mut()),
CryptoSpace::ApplicationData => {
let f = |a: Option<&'a mut CryptoDxAppData>| {
a.filter(|ar| ar.dx.key_phase() == key_phase)
};
// XOR to reduce the leakage about which key is chosen.
f(self.app_read.as_mut())
.xor(f(self.app_read_next.as_mut()))
.map(|ar| &mut ar.dx)
}
}
}
/// Whether keys for processing packets in the indicated space are pending.
/// This allows the caller to determine whether to save a packet for later
/// when keys are not available.
/// NOTE: 0-RTT keys are not considered here. The expectation is that a
/// server will have to save 0-RTT packets in a different place. Though it
/// is possible to attribute 0-RTT packets to an existing connection if there
/// is a multi-packet Initial, that is an unusual circumstance, so we
/// don't do caching for that in those places that call this function.
pub fn rx_pending(&self, space: CryptoSpace) -> bool {
match space {
CryptoSpace::Initial | CryptoSpace::ZeroRtt => false,
CryptoSpace::Handshake => self.handshake.is_none() && !self.initials.is_empty(),
CryptoSpace::ApplicationData => self.app_read.is_none(),
}
}
/// Create the initial crypto state.
/// Note that the version here can change and that's OK.
pub fn init<'v, V>(&mut self, versions: V, role: Role, dcid: &[u8]) -> Res<()>
where
V: IntoIterator<Item = &'v Version>,
{
const CLIENT_INITIAL_LABEL: &str = "client in";
const SERVER_INITIAL_LABEL: &str = "server in";
let (write, read) = match role {
Role::Client => (CLIENT_INITIAL_LABEL, SERVER_INITIAL_LABEL),
Role::Server => (SERVER_INITIAL_LABEL, CLIENT_INITIAL_LABEL),
};
for v in versions {
qdebug!(
[self],
"Creating initial cipher state v={:?}, role={:?} dcid={}",
v,
role,
hex(dcid)
);
let mut initial = CryptoState {
tx: CryptoDxState::new_initial(*v, CryptoDxDirection::Write, write, dcid)?,
rx: CryptoDxState::new_initial(*v, CryptoDxDirection::Read, read, dcid)?,
};
if let Some(prev) = self.initials.get(v) {
qinfo!(
[self],
"Continue packet numbers for initial after retry (write is {:?})",
prev.rx.used_pn,
);
initial.tx.continuation(&prev.tx)?;
}
self.initials.insert(*v, initial);
}
Ok(())
}
/// At a server, we can be more targeted in initializing.
/// Initialize on demand: either to decrypt Initial packets that we receive
/// or after a version has been selected.
/// This is maybe slightly inefficient in the first case, because we might
/// not need the send keys if the packet is subsequently discarded, but
/// the overall effort is small enough to write off.
pub fn init_server(&mut self, version: Version, dcid: &[u8]) -> Res<()> {
if !self.initials.contains_key(&version) {
self.init(&[version], Role::Server, dcid)?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn confirm_version(&mut self, orig: Version, confirmed: Version) -> Res<()> {
if orig != confirmed {
// This part where the old data is removed and then re-added is to
// appease the borrow checker.
// Note that on the server, we might not have initials for |orig| if it
// was configured for |orig| and only |confirmed| Initial packets arrived.
if let Some(prev) = self.initials.remove(&orig) {
let next = self
.initials
.get_mut(&confirmed)
.ok_or(Error::VersionNegotiation)?;
next.tx.continuation(&prev.tx)?;
self.initials.insert(orig, prev);
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn set_0rtt_keys(
&mut self,
version: Version,
dir: CryptoDxDirection,
secret: &SymKey,
cipher: Cipher,
) -> Res<()> {
qtrace!([self], "install 0-RTT keys");
self.zero_rtt = Some(CryptoDxState::new(
version,
dir,
TLS_EPOCH_ZERO_RTT,
secret,
cipher,
)?);
Ok(())
}
/// Discard keys and return true if that happened.
pub fn discard(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool {
match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => {
let empty = self.initials.is_empty();
self.initials.clear();
!empty
}
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => self.handshake.take().is_some(),
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => panic!("Can't drop application data keys"),
}
}
pub fn discard_0rtt_keys(&mut self) {
qtrace!([self], "discard 0-RTT keys");
assert!(
self.app_read.is_none(),
"Can't discard 0-RTT after setting application keys"
);
self.zero_rtt = None;
}
pub fn set_handshake_keys(
&mut self,
version: Version,
write_secret: &SymKey,
read_secret: &SymKey,
cipher: Cipher,
) -> Res<()> {
self.cipher = cipher;
self.handshake = Some(CryptoState {
tx: CryptoDxState::new(
version,
CryptoDxDirection::Write,
TLS_EPOCH_HANDSHAKE,
write_secret,
cipher,
)?,
rx: CryptoDxState::new(
version,
CryptoDxDirection::Read,
TLS_EPOCH_HANDSHAKE,
read_secret,
cipher,
)?,
});
Ok(())
}
pub fn set_application_write_key(&mut self, version: Version, secret: &SymKey) -> Res<()> {
debug_assert!(self.app_write.is_none());
debug_assert_ne!(self.cipher, 0);
let mut app = CryptoDxAppData::new(version, CryptoDxDirection::Write, secret, self.cipher)?;
if let Some(z) = &self.zero_rtt {
if z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Write {
app.dx.continuation(z)?;
}
}
self.zero_rtt = None;
self.app_write = Some(app);
Ok(())
}
pub fn set_application_read_key(
&mut self,
version: Version,
secret: &SymKey,
expire_0rtt: Instant,
) -> Res<()> {
debug_assert!(self.app_write.is_some(), "should have write keys installed");
debug_assert!(self.app_read.is_none());
let mut app = CryptoDxAppData::new(version, CryptoDxDirection::Read, secret, self.cipher)?;
if let Some(z) = &self.zero_rtt {
if z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read {
app.dx.continuation(z)?;
}
self.read_update_time = Some(expire_0rtt);
}
self.app_read_next = Some(app.next()?);
self.app_read = Some(app);
Ok(())
}
/// Update the write keys.
pub fn initiate_key_update(&mut self, largest_acknowledged: Option<PacketNumber>) -> Res<()> {
// Only update if we are able to. We can only do this if we have
// received an acknowledgement for a packet in the current phase.
// Also, skip this if we are waiting for read keys on the existing
// key update to be rolled over.
let write = &self.app_write.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.dx;
if write.can_update(largest_acknowledged) && self.read_update_time.is_none() {
// This call additionally checks that we don't advance to the next
// epoch while a key update is in progress.
if self.maybe_update_write()? {
Ok(())
} else {
qdebug!([self], "Write keys already updated");
Err(Error::KeyUpdateBlocked)
}
} else {
qdebug!([self], "Waiting for ACK or blocked on read key timer");
Err(Error::KeyUpdateBlocked)
}
}
/// Try to update, and return true if it happened.
fn maybe_update_write(&mut self) -> Res<bool> {
// Update write keys. But only do so if the write keys are not already
// ahead of the read keys. If we initiated the key update, the write keys
// will already be ahead.
debug_assert!(self.read_update_time.is_none());
let write = &self.app_write.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?;
let read = &self.app_read.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?;
if write.epoch() == read.epoch() {
qdebug!([self], "Update write keys to epoch={}", write.epoch() + 1);
self.app_write = Some(write.next()?);
Ok(true)
} else {
Ok(false)
}
}
/// Check whether write keys are close to running out of invocations.
/// If that is close, update them if possible. Failing to update at
/// this stage is cause for a fatal error.
pub fn auto_update(&mut self) -> Res<()> {
if let Some(app_write) = self.app_write.as_ref() {
if app_write.dx.should_update() {
qinfo!([self], "Initiating automatic key update");
if !self.maybe_update_write()? {
return Err(Error::KeysExhausted);
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn has_0rtt_read(&self) -> bool {
self.zero_rtt
.as_ref()
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read)
.is_some()
}
/// Prepare to update read keys. This doesn't happen immediately as
/// we want to ensure that we can continue to receive any delayed
/// packets that use the old keys. So we just set a timer.
pub fn key_update_received(&mut self, expiration: Instant) -> Res<()> {
qtrace!([self], "Key update received");
// If we received a key update, then we assume that the peer has
// acknowledged a packet we sent in this epoch. It's OK to do that
// because they aren't allowed to update without first having received
// something from us. If the ACK isn't in the packet that triggered this
// key update, it must be in some other packet they have sent.
_ = self.maybe_update_write()?;
// We shouldn't have 0-RTT keys at this point, but if we do, dump them.
debug_assert_eq!(self.read_update_time.is_some(), self.has_0rtt_read());
if self.has_0rtt_read() {
self.zero_rtt = None;
}
self.read_update_time = Some(expiration);
Ok(())
}
#[must_use]
pub const fn update_time(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
self.read_update_time
}
/// Check if time has passed for updating key update parameters.
/// If it has, then swap keys over and allow more key updates to be initiated.
/// This is also used to discard 0-RTT read keys at the server in the same way.
pub fn check_key_update(&mut self, now: Instant) -> Res<()> {
if let Some(expiry) = self.read_update_time {
// If enough time has passed, then install new keys and clear the timer.
if now >= expiry {
if self.has_0rtt_read() {
qtrace!([self], "Discarding 0-RTT keys");
self.zero_rtt = None;
} else {
qtrace!([self], "Rotating read keys");
mem::swap(&mut self.app_read, &mut self.app_read_next);
self.app_read_next =
Some(self.app_read.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.next()?);
}
self.read_update_time = None;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Get the current/highest epoch. This returns (write, read) epochs.
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_epochs(&self) -> (Option<usize>, Option<usize>) {
let to_epoch = |app: &Option<CryptoDxAppData>| app.as_ref().map(|a| a.dx.epoch);
(to_epoch(&self.app_write), to_epoch(&self.app_read))
}
/// While we are awaiting the completion of a key update, we might receive
/// valid packets that are protected with old keys. We need to ensure that
/// these don't carry packet numbers higher than those in packets protected
/// with the newer keys. To ensure that, this is called after every decryption.
pub fn check_pn_overlap(&mut self) -> Res<()> {
// We only need to do the check while we are waiting for read keys to be updated.
if self.read_update_time.is_some() {
qtrace!([self], "Checking for PN overlap");
let next_dx = &mut self.app_read_next.as_mut().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.dx;
next_dx.continuation(&self.app_read.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.dx)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Make some state for removing protection in tests.
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_default() -> Self {
let read = |epoch| {
let mut dx = CryptoDxState::test_default();
dx.direction = CryptoDxDirection::Read;
dx.epoch = epoch;
dx
};
let app_read = |epoch| CryptoDxAppData {
dx: read(epoch),
cipher: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
next_secret: hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, &[0xaa; 32]).unwrap(),
};
let mut initials = HashMap::new();
initials.insert(
Version::Version1,
CryptoState {
tx: CryptoDxState::test_default(),
rx: read(0),
},
);
Self {
initials,
handshake: None,
zero_rtt: None,
cipher: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
// This isn't used, but the epoch is read to check for a key update.
app_write: Some(app_read(3)),
app_read: Some(app_read(3)),
app_read_next: Some(app_read(4)),
read_update_time: None,
}
}
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "disable-encryption"), test))]
pub(crate) fn test_chacha() -> Self {
const SECRET: &[u8] = &[
0x9a, 0xc3, 0x12, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xbe, 0x69, 0x42, 0x27, 0x48, 0xad,
0x00, 0xa1, 0x54, 0x43, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0x60, 0x60, 0xf6, 0x88, 0xf3,
0x0f, 0x21, 0x63, 0x2b,
];
let secret = hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, SECRET).unwrap();
let app_read = |epoch| CryptoDxAppData {
dx: CryptoDxState {
version: Version::Version1,
direction: CryptoDxDirection::Read,
epoch,
aead: Aead::new(
TLS_VERSION_1_3,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
&secret,
"quic ", // This is a v1 test so hard-code the label.
)
.unwrap(),
hpkey: HpKey::extract(
TLS_VERSION_1_3,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
&secret,
"quic hp",
)
.unwrap(),
used_pn: 0..645_971_972,
min_pn: 0,
invocations: 10,
largest_packet_len: INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN,
},
cipher: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
next_secret: secret.clone(),
};
Self {
initials: HashMap::new(),
handshake: None,
zero_rtt: None,
cipher: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
app_write: Some(app_read(3)),
app_read: Some(app_read(3)),
app_read_next: Some(app_read(4)),
read_update_time: None,
}
}
}
impl std::fmt::Display for CryptoStates {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::std::fmt::Formatter) -> ::std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "CryptoStates")
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct CryptoStream {
tx: TxBuffer,
rx: RxStreamOrderer,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum CryptoStreams {
Initial {
initial: CryptoStream,
handshake: CryptoStream,
application: CryptoStream,
},
Handshake {
handshake: CryptoStream,
application: CryptoStream,
},
ApplicationData {
application: CryptoStream,
},
}
impl CryptoStreams {
/// Keep around 64k if a server wants to push excess data at us.
const BUFFER_LIMIT: u64 = 65536;
pub fn discard(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) {
match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => {
if let Self::Initial {
handshake,
application,
..
} = self
{
*self = Self::Handshake {
handshake: mem::take(handshake),
application: mem::take(application),
};
}
}
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => {
if let Self::Handshake { application, .. } = self {
*self = Self::ApplicationData {
application: mem::take(application),
};
} else if matches!(self, Self::Initial { .. }) {
panic!("Discarding handshake before initial discarded");
}
}
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => {
panic!("Discarding application data crypto streams")
}
}
}
pub fn send(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace, data: &[u8]) -> Res<()> {
self.get_mut(space)
.ok_or(Error::ProtocolViolation)?
.tx
.send(data);
Ok(())
}
pub fn inbound_frame(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace, offset: u64, data: &[u8]) -> Res<()> {
let rx = &mut self.get_mut(space).ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.rx;
rx.inbound_frame(offset, data);
if rx.received() - rx.retired() <= Self::BUFFER_LIMIT {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::CryptoBufferExceeded)
}
}
pub fn data_ready(&self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool {
self.get(space).is_some_and(|cs| cs.rx.data_ready())
}
pub fn read_to_end(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Res<usize> {
Ok(self
.get_mut(space)
.ok_or(Error::ProtocolViolation)?
.rx
.read_to_end(buf))
}
pub fn acked(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) {
self.get_mut(token.space)
.unwrap()
.tx
.mark_as_acked(token.offset, token.length);
}
pub fn lost(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) {
// See BZ 1624800, ignore lost packets in spaces we've dropped keys
if let Some(cs) = self.get_mut(token.space) {
cs.tx.mark_as_lost(token.offset, token.length);
}
}
/// Resend any Initial or Handshake CRYPTO frames that might be outstanding.
/// This can help speed up handshake times.
pub fn resend_unacked(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) {
if space != PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData {
if let Some(cs) = self.get_mut(space) {
cs.tx.unmark_sent();
}
}
}
const fn get(&self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> Option<&CryptoStream> {
let (initial, hs, app) = match self {
Self::Initial {
initial,
handshake,
application,
} => (Some(initial), Some(handshake), Some(application)),
Self::Handshake {
handshake,
application,
} => (None, Some(handshake), Some(application)),
Self::ApplicationData { application } => (None, None, Some(application)),
};
match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => initial,
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => hs,
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => app,
}
}
fn get_mut(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> Option<&mut CryptoStream> {
let (initial, hs, app) = match self {
Self::Initial {
initial,
handshake,
application,
} => (Some(initial), Some(handshake), Some(application)),
Self::Handshake {
handshake,
application,
} => (None, Some(handshake), Some(application)),
Self::ApplicationData { application } => (None, None, Some(application)),
};
match space {
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => initial,
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => hs,
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => app,
}
}
pub fn write_frame(
&mut self,
space: PacketNumberSpace,
builder: &mut PacketBuilder,
tokens: &mut Vec<RecoveryToken>,
stats: &mut FrameStats,
) {
let cs = self.get_mut(space).unwrap();
if let Some((offset, data)) = cs.tx.next_bytes() {
let mut header_len = 1 + Encoder::varint_len(offset) + 1;
// Don't bother if there isn't room for the header and some data.
if builder.remaining() < header_len + 1 {
return;
}
// Calculate length of data based on the minimum of:
// - available data
// - remaining space, less the header, which counts only one byte for the length at
// first to avoid underestimating length
let length = min(data.len(), builder.remaining() - header_len);
header_len += Encoder::varint_len(u64::try_from(length).unwrap()) - 1;
let length = min(data.len(), builder.remaining() - header_len);
builder.encode_varint(crate::frame::FRAME_TYPE_CRYPTO);
builder.encode_varint(offset);
builder.encode_vvec(&data[..length]);
cs.tx.mark_as_sent(offset, length);
qdebug!("CRYPTO for {} offset={}, len={}", space, offset, length);
tokens.push(RecoveryToken::Crypto(CryptoRecoveryToken {
space,
offset,
length,
}));
stats.crypto += 1;
}
}
}
impl Default for CryptoStreams {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Initial {
initial: CryptoStream::default(),
handshake: CryptoStream::default(),
application: CryptoStream::default(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CryptoRecoveryToken {
space: PacketNumberSpace,
offset: u64,
length: usize,
}
[ Verzeichnis aufwärts0.15unsichere Verbindung
Übersetzung europäischer Sprachen durch Browser
]
|
2026-04-04
|
|
|
|
|
