/* * Identifier for the LSM static calls. * HOOK is an LSM hook as defined in linux/lsm_hookdefs.h * IDX is the index of the static call. 0 <= NUM < MAX_LSM_COUNT
*/ #define LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, IDX) lsm_static_call_##HOOK##_##IDX
/* * Call the macro M for each LSM hook MAX_LSM_COUNT times.
*/ #define LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(M, ...) \ do { \
UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__) \
} while (0)
#define LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(M, ...) UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__)
/* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing * purposes.
*/ constchar *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
[LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents",
[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
[LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
};
/* * Initialise a table of static calls for each LSM hook. * DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL invocation above generates a key (STATIC_CALL_KEY) * and a trampoline (STATIC_CALL_TRAMP) which are used to call * __static_call_update when updating the static call. * * The static calls table is used by early LSMs, some architectures can fault on * unaligned accesses and the fault handling code may not be ready by then. * Thus, the static calls table should be aligned to avoid any unhandled faults * in early init.
*/ struct lsm_static_calls_table
static_calls_table __ro_after_init __aligned(sizeof(u64)) = { #define INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME) \
(struct lsm_static_call) { \
.key = &STATIC_CALL_KEY(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM)), \
.trampoline = LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM), \
.active = &SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM), \
}, #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
.NAME = { \
LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME) \
}, #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> #undef LSM_HOOK #undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL
};
static __initdata bool debug; #define init_debug(...) \ do { \ if (debug) \
pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
staticbool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{ if (!lsm->enabled) returnfalse;
return *lsm->enabled;
}
/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ staticint lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; staticint lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; staticvoid __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
{ /* * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
*/ if (!lsm->enabled) { if (enabled)
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; else
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
} elseif (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { if (!enabled)
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
} elseif (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { if (enabled)
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
} else {
*lsm->enabled = enabled;
}
}
/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ staticbool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{ struct lsm_info **check;
for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) if (*check == lsm) returntrue;
returnfalse;
}
/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ staticint last_lsm __initdata; staticvoid __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, constchar *from)
{ /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) return;
if (WARN(last_lsm == MAX_LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM static calls!?\n", from)) return;
/* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ if (!lsm->enabled)
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ staticbool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{ /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ if (!is_enabled(lsm)) returnfalse;
/* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); returnfalse;
}
returntrue;
}
staticvoid __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
{ int offset;
staticvoid __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
{ if (!needed) return;
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ib, &blob_sizes.lbs_ib); /* * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to * what the modules might need.
*/ if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_perf_event, &blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_tun_dev, &blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count,
&blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev);
}
/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ staticvoid __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{ int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
/* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
/* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ if (enabled) { if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
exclusive = lsm;
init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
}
lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
}
}
/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ staticvoid __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{ if (is_enabled(lsm)) { int ret;
init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
ret = lsm->init();
WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
}
}
/* * Current index to use while initializing the lsm id list.
*/
u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init; conststruct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[MAX_LSM_COUNT];
/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ staticvoid __init ordered_lsm_parse(constchar *order, constchar *origin)
{ struct lsm_info *lsm; char *sep, *name, *next;
/* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first");
}
/* Process "security=", if given. */ if (chosen_major_lsm) { struct lsm_info *major;
/* * To match the original "security=" behavior, this * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
*/ for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
major++) { if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
set_enabled(major, false);
init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n",
chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
}
}
}
sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
next = sep; /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { bool found = false;
for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
found = true;
}
}
if (!found)
init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n",
origin, name);
}
/* Process "security=", if given. */ if (chosen_major_lsm) { for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) continue; if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
}
}
/* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
}
/* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) continue;
set_enabled(lsm, false);
init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n",
origin, lsm->name);
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_COUNT; i++) { /* Update the first static call that is not used yet */ if (!scall->hl) {
__static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline,
hl->hook.lsm_func_addr);
scall->hl = hl;
static_branch_enable(scall->active); return;
}
scall++;
}
panic("%s - Ran out of static slots.\n", __func__);
}
if (chosen_lsm_order) { if (chosen_major_lsm) {
pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n",
chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order);
chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
}
ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
} else
ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
prepare_lsm(*lsm);
int __init early_security_init(void)
{ struct lsm_info *lsm;
for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (!lsm->enabled)
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
prepare_lsm(lsm);
initialize_lsm(lsm);
}
return 0;
}
/** * security_init - initializes the security framework * * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
*/ int __init security_init(void)
{ struct lsm_info *lsm;
/* * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is * available
*/ for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name,
is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); if (lsm->enabled)
lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names);
}
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();
return 0;
}
/* Save user chosen LSM */ staticint __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
{
chosen_major_lsm = str; return 1;
}
__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) returnfalse;
last = strrchr(list, ','); if (last) /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */
last++; else
last = list; return !strcmp(last, lsm);
}
if (*result == NULL) {
*result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); if (*result == NULL) return -ENOMEM;
} else { /* Check if it is the last registered name */ if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) return 0;
cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); if (cp == NULL) return -ENOMEM;
kfree(*result);
*result = cp;
} return 0;
}
/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. * @hooks: the hooks to add * @count: the number of hooks to add * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module * * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
*/ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, conststruct lsm_id *lsmid)
{ int i;
/* * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization * is serialized. Landlock is one such case. * Look at the previous entry, if there is one, for duplication.
*/ if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid) { if (lsm_active_cnt >= MAX_LSM_COUNT)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
lsm_static_call_init(&hooks[i]);
}
/* * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back * and fix this up afterwards.
*/ if (slab_is_available()) { if (lsm_append(lsmid->name, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{ return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
nb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{ return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
nb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
/** * lsm_blob_alloc - allocate a composite blob * @dest: the destination for the blob * @size: the size of the blob * @gfp: allocation type * * Allocate a blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_blob_alloc(void **dest, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
{ if (size == 0) {
*dest = NULL; return 0;
}
/** * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob * @cred: the cred that needs a blob * @gfp: allocation type * * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{ return lsm_blob_alloc(&cred->security, blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
}
/** * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob * @cred: the cred that needs a blob * * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
*/ staticvoid __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
{ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc)
panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
/** * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob * @file: the file that needs a blob * * Allocate the file blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
{ if (!lsm_file_cache) {
file->f_security = NULL; return 0;
}
/** * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob * @inode: the inode that needs a blob * @gfp: allocation flags * * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp)
{ if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
inode->i_security = NULL; return 0;
}
/** * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob * * Allocate the task blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{ return lsm_blob_alloc(&task->security, blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
}
/** * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob * * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
{ return lsm_blob_alloc(&kip->security, blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS /** * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob * @key: the key that needs a blob * * Allocate the key blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
{ return lsm_blob_alloc(&key->security, blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
} #endif/* CONFIG_KEYS */
/** * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob * * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
{ return lsm_blob_alloc(&mp->security, blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
/** * lsm_bdev_alloc - allocate a composite block_device blob * @bdev: the block_device that needs a blob * * Allocate the block_device blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev)
{ if (blob_sizes.lbs_bdev == 0) {
bdev->bd_security = NULL; return 0;
}
bdev->bd_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, GFP_KERNEL); if (!bdev->bd_security) return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
/** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob * * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
*/ staticvoid __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
{ int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
if (rc)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
/** * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob * * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ staticint lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{ return lsm_blob_alloc(&sb->s_security, blob_sizes.lbs_superblock,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
/** * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled * @uctx_len: available uctx size (input), used uctx size (output) * @val: the new LSM context value * @val_len: the size of the new LSM context value * @id: LSM id * @flags: LSM defined flags * * Fill all of the fields in a userspace lsm_ctx structure. If @uctx is NULL * simply calculate the required size to output via @utc_len and return * success. * * Returns 0 on success, -E2BIG if userspace buffer is not large enough, * -EFAULT on a copyout error, -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
*/ int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len, void *val, size_t val_len,
u64 id, u64 flags)
{ struct lsm_ctx *nctx = NULL;
size_t nctx_len; int rc = 0;
/* * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and * can be accessed with: * * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) * * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each * LSM hook.
*/ #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ staticconstint __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> #undef LSM_HOOK
/* * Hook list operation macros. * * call_void_hook: * This is a hook that does not return a value. * * call_int_hook: * This is a hook that returns a value.
*/ #define __CALL_STATIC_VOID(NUM, HOOK, ...) \ do { \ if (static_branch_unlikely(&SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, NUM))) { \
static_call(LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, NUM))(__VA_ARGS__); \
} \
} while (0);
#define call_void_hook(HOOK, ...) \ do { \
LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(__CALL_STATIC_VOID, HOOK, __VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
#define __CALL_STATIC_INT(NUM, R, HOOK, LABEL, ...) \ do { \ if (static_branch_unlikely(&SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, NUM))) { \
R = static_call(LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, NUM))(__VA_ARGS__); \ if (R != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(HOOK)) \ goto LABEL; \
} \
} while (0);
#define lsm_for_each_hook(scall, NAME) \ for (scall = static_calls_table.NAME; \
scall - static_calls_table.NAME < MAX_LSM_COUNT; scall++) \ if (static_key_enabled(&scall->active->key))
/* Security operations */
/** * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process * * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. * * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(conststruct cred *mgr)
{ return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, mgr);
}
/** * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed * @from: sending process * @to: receiving process * * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_binder_transaction(conststruct cred *from, conststruct cred *to)
{ return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, from, to);
}
/** * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed * @from: sending process * @to: receiving process * * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_binder_transfer_binder(conststruct cred *from, conststruct cred *to)
{ return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, from, to);
}
/** * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed * @from: sending process * @to: receiving process * @file: file being transferred * * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_binder_transfer_file(conststruct cred *from, conststruct cred *to, conststruct file *file)
{ return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, from, to, file);
}
/** * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed * @child: target process * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags * * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the * execve. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsignedint mode)
{ return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, child, mode);
}
/** * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed * @parent: tracing process * * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the * @parent process for tracing. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{ return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
}
/** * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process * @target: target process * @effective: effective capability set * @inheritable: inheritable capability set * @permitted: permitted capability set * * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target * process. * * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
*/ int security_capget(conststruct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{ return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
/** * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process * @new: new credentials for the target process * @old: current credentials of the target process * @effective: effective capability set * @inheritable: inheritable capability set * @permitted: permitted capability set * * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the * current process. * * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
*/ int security_capset(struct cred *new, conststruct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{ return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable,
permitted);
}
/** * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability * @cred: credentials to examine * @ns: user namespace * @cap: capability requested * @opts: capability check options * * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. * * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted.
*/ int security_capable(conststruct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsignedint opts)
{ return call_int_hook(capable, cred, ns, cap, opts);
}
/** * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs * @cmds: commands * @type: type * @id: id * @sb: filesystem * * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, conststruct super_block *sb)
{ return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb);
}
/** * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry * @dentry: dentry * * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
{ return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry);
}
/** * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type * * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of * the @type values. * * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_syslog(int type)
{ return call_int_hook(syslog, type);
}
/** * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed * @ts: new time * @tz: timezone * * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_settime64(conststruct timespec64 *ts, conststruct timezone *tz)
{ return call_int_hook(settime, ts, tz);
}
/** * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed * @mm: mm struct * @pages: number of pages * * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the * caller.
*/ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{ struct lsm_static_call *scall; int cap_sys_admin = 1; int rc;
/* * The module will respond with 0 if it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() * call should be made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules * agree that it should be set it will. If any module thinks it should * not be set it won't.
*/
lsm_for_each_hook(scall, vm_enough_memory) {
rc = scall->hl->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); if (rc < 0) {
cap_sys_admin = 0; break;
}
} return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
/** * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() * @bprm: binary program information * * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm * contains the linux_binprm structure. * * If execveat(2) is called with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, bprm->is_check is * set. The result must be the same as without this flag even if the execution * will never really happen and @bprm will always be dropped. * * This hook must not change current->cred, only @bprm->cred. * * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
*/ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{ return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, bprm);
}
/** * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file * @bprm: binary program information * @file: associated file * * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm * structure. * * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
*/ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, conststruct file *file)
{ return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, bprm, file);
}
/** * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search * @bprm: binary program information * * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
*/ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{ return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm);
}
/** * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() * @bprm: binary program information * * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds().
*/ void security_bprm_committing_creds(conststruct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
}
/** * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() * @bprm: binary program information * * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called * immediately after commit_creds().
*/ void security_bprm_committed_creds(conststruct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
}
/** * security_fs_context_submount() - Initialise fc->security * @fc: new filesystem context * @reference: dentry reference for submount/remount * * Fill out the ->security field for a new fs_context. * * Return: Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure.
*/ int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference)
{ return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, fc, reference);
}
/** * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob * @fc: destination filesystem context * @src_fc: source filesystem context * * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. * * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
*/ int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
{ return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, fc, src_fc);
}
/** * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context * @fc: filesystem context * @param: filesystem parameter * * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. * * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative * error code is returned.
*/ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{ struct lsm_static_call *scall; int trc; int rc = -ENOPARAM;
/** * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob * @sb: filesystem superblock * * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. * * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful.
*/ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{ int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
if (unlikely(rc)) return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb); if (unlikely(rc))
security_sb_free(sb); return rc;
}
/** * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects * @sb: filesystem superblock * * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the * super_block structure being released.
*/ void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb)
{
call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb);
}
/** * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob * @sb: filesystem superblock * * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block * structure to be modified.
*/ void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
kfree(sb->s_security);
sb->s_security = NULL;
}
/** * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options * * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops.
*/ void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
{ if (!*mnt_opts) return;
call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
*mnt_opts = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
/** * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options * @options: mount options * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options * * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
*/ int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, options, mnt_opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
/** * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed * @sb: filesystem superblock * @mnt_opts: new mount options * * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. * * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible.
*/ int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, sb, mnt_opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
/** * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount * @sb: filesystem superblock * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options * * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are * being made to those options. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, mnt_opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
/** * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed * @sb: filesystem superblock * * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_sb_kern_mount(conststruct super_block *sb)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb);
}
/** * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock * @m: output file * @sb: filesystem superblock * * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
*/ int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb);
}
/** * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed * @dentry: superblock handle * * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry);
}
/** * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem * @dev_name: filesystem backing device * @path: mount point * @type: filesystem type * @flags: mount flags * @data: filesystem specific data * * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being * mounted. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_sb_mount(constchar *dev_name, conststruct path *path, constchar *type, unsignedlong flags, void *data)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
/** * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem * @mnt: mounted filesystem * @flags: unmount flags * * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags);
}
/** * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs * @old_path: new location for current rootfs * @new_path: location of the new rootfs * * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_sb_pivotroot(conststruct path *old_path, conststruct path *new_path)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path);
}
/** * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem * @sb: filesystem superblock * @mnt_opts: binary mount options * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) * * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
*/ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, unsignedlong kern_flags, unsignedlong *set_kern_flags)
{ struct lsm_static_call *scall; int rc = mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts);
/** * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options * @oldsb: source superblock * @newsb: destination superblock * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) * * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
*/ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(conststruct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb, unsignedlong kern_flags, unsignedlong *set_kern_flags)
{ return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb,
kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
/** * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount * @from_path: source mount point * @to_path: destination mount point * * Check permission before a mount is moved. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_move_mount(conststruct path *from_path, conststruct path *to_path)
{ return call_int_hook(move_mount, from_path, to_path);
}
/** * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed * @path: file path * @mask: event mask * @obj_type: file path type * * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_notify(conststruct path *path, u64 mask, unsignedint obj_type)
{ return call_int_hook(path_notify, path, mask, obj_type);
}
/** * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob * @inode: the inode * @gfp: allocation flags * * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is * allocated. * * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
*/ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp)
{ int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode, gfp);
if (unlikely(rc)) return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode); if (unlikely(rc))
security_inode_free(inode); return rc;
}
staticvoid inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{ /* The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob */
call_void_hook(inode_free_security_rcu, head);
kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
}
/** * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob * @inode: the inode * * Release any LSM resources associated with @inode, although due to the * inode's RCU protections it is possible that the resources will not be * fully released until after the current RCU grace period has elapsed. * * It is important for LSMs to note that despite being present in a call to * security_inode_free(), @inode may still be referenced in a VFS path walk * and calls to security_inode_permission() may be made during, or after, * a call to security_inode_free(). For this reason the inode->i_security * field is released via a call_rcu() callback and any LSMs which need to * retain inode state for use in security_inode_permission() should only * release that state in the inode_free_security_rcu() LSM hook callback.
*/ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); if (!inode->i_security) return;
call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, inode_free_by_rcu);
}
/** * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization * @dentry: the dentry to initialize * @mode: mode used to determine resource type * @name: name of the last path component * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr * @lsmctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context * * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
*/ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, conststruct qstr *name, constchar **xattr_name, struct lsm_context *lsmctx)
{ return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, dentry, mode, name,
xattr_name, lsmctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
/** * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization * @dentry: the dentry to initialize * @mode: mode used to determine resource type * @name: name of the last path component * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations * @new: creds to modify * * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds * of the caller. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
*/ int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, conststruct cred *old, struct cred *new)
{ return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode,
name, old, new);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
/** * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context * @inode: the inode * @dir: parent directory * @qstr: last component of the pathname * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs * @fs_data: filesystem specific data * * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... * hooks called by the VFS. * * The hook function is expected to populate the xattrs array, by calling * lsm_get_xattr_slot() to retrieve the slots reserved by the security module * with the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. For each * slot, the hook function should set ->name to the attribute name suffix * (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by the caller) and set it * to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the length of the value. If * the security module does not use security attributes or does not wish to put * a security attribute on this particular inode, then it should return * -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. * * Return: Returns 0 if the LSM successfully initialized all of the inode * security attributes that are required, negative values otherwise.
*/ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, conststruct qstr *qstr, const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
{ struct lsm_static_call *scall; struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL; int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0;
if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count) return 0;
if (initxattrs) { /* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1, sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); if (!new_xattrs) return -ENOMEM;
}
lsm_for_each_hook(scall, inode_init_security) {
ret = scall->hl->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
&xattr_count); if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) goto out; /* * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke * the remaining LSMs.
*/
}
/* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */ if (!xattr_count) goto out;
/** * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode * @inode: the inode * @name: the anonymous inode class * @context_inode: an optional related inode * * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. * * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors.
*/ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, conststruct qstr *name, conststruct inode *context_inode)
{ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
context_inode);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH /** * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: new file * @mode: new file mode * @dev: device number * * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_mknod(conststruct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode, unsignedint dev)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
/** * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security after reg file creation * @idmap: idmap of the mount * @dentry: new file * * Update inode security field after a regular file has been created.
*/ void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return;
call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
}
/** * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: new directory * @mode: new directory mode * * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_mkdir(conststruct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
/** * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: directory to remove * * Check the permission to remove a directory. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_rmdir(conststruct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry);
}
/** * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: file * * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_unlink(conststruct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
/** * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: symbolic link * @old_name: file pathname * * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_symlink(conststruct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, constchar *old_name)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
}
/** * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed * @old_dentry: existing file * @new_dir: new parent directory * @new_dentry: new link * * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, conststruct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
}
/** * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file * @old_dentry: the old file * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file * @new_dentry: the new file * @flags: flags * * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_rename(conststruct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, conststruct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, unsignedint flags)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) &&
IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) return 0;
/** * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed * @path: file * * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, * using the security_file_truncate() hook. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_truncate(conststruct path *path)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path);
}
/** * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed * @path: file * @mode: new mode * * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_chmod(conststruct path *path, umode_t mode)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode);
}
/** * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed * @path: file * @uid: file owner * @gid: file group * * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_chown(conststruct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid);
}
/** * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed * @path: directory * * Check for permission to change root directory. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_path_chroot(conststruct path *path)
{ return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
} #endif/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
/** * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed * @dir: the parent directory * @dentry: the file being created * @mode: requested file mode * * Check permission to create a regular file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
/** * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile * @idmap: idmap of the mount * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile * * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
*/ void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return;
call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
}
/** * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed * @old_dentry: existing file * @dir: new parent directory * @new_dentry: new link * * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
}
/** * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: file * * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry);
}
/** * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: symbolic link * @old_name: existing filename * * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, constchar *old_name)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
}
/** * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: new directory * @mode: new directory mode * * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with inode structure @dir. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
/** * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: directory to be removed * * Check the permission to remove a directory. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
--> --------------------
--> maximum size reached
--> --------------------
Messung V0.5
¤ Dauer der Verarbeitung: 0.28 Sekunden
(vorverarbeitet)
¤
Die Informationen auf dieser Webseite wurden
nach bestem Wissen sorgfältig zusammengestellt. Es wird jedoch weder Vollständigkeit, noch Richtigkeit,
noch Qualität der bereit gestellten Informationen zugesichert.
Bemerkung:
Die farbliche Syntaxdarstellung und die Messung sind noch experimentell.
