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(* Title: HOL/Auth/Guard/Guard_Public.thy
Author: Frederic Blanqui, University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
Copyright 2002 University of Cambridge
Lemmas on guarded messages for public protocols.
*)
theory Guard_Public imports Guard "../Public" Extensions begin
subsection\<open>Extensions to Theory \<open>Public\<close>\<close>
declare initState.simps [simp del]
subsubsection\<open>signature\<close>
definition sign :: "agent => msg => msg" where
"sign A X == \Agent A, X, Crypt (priK A) (Hash X)\"
lemma sign_inj [iff]: "(sign A X = sign A' X') = (A=A' & X=X')"
by (auto simp: sign_def)
subsubsection\<open>agent associated to a key\<close>
definition agt :: "key => agent" where
"agt K == SOME A. K = priK A | K = pubK A"
lemma agt_priK [simp]: "agt (priK A) = A"
by (simp add: agt_def)
lemma agt_pubK [simp]: "agt (pubK A) = A"
by (simp add: agt_def)
subsubsection\<open>basic facts about \<^term>\<open>initState\<close>\<close>
lemma no_Crypt_in_parts_init [simp]: "Crypt K X \ parts (initState A)"
by (cases A, auto simp: initState.simps)
lemma no_Crypt_in_analz_init [simp]: "Crypt K X \ analz (initState A)"
by auto
lemma no_priK_in_analz_init [simp]: "A \ bad
\<Longrightarrow> Key (priK A) \<notin> analz (initState Spy)"
by (auto simp: initState.simps)
lemma priK_notin_initState_Friend [simp]: "A \ Friend C
\<Longrightarrow> Key (priK A) \<notin> parts (initState (Friend C))"
by (auto simp: initState.simps)
lemma keyset_init [iff]: "keyset (initState A)"
by (cases A, auto simp: keyset_def initState.simps)
subsubsection\<open>sets of private keys\<close>
definition priK_set :: "key set => bool" where
"priK_set Ks \ \K. K \ Ks \ (\A. K = priK A)"
lemma in_priK_set: "[| priK_set Ks; K \ Ks |] ==> \A. K = priK A"
by (simp add: priK_set_def)
lemma priK_set1 [iff]: "priK_set {priK A}"
by (simp add: priK_set_def)
lemma priK_set2 [iff]: "priK_set {priK A, priK B}"
by (simp add: priK_set_def)
subsubsection\<open>sets of good keys\<close>
definition good :: "key set => bool" where
"good Ks == \K. K \ Ks \ agt K \ bad"
lemma in_good: "[| good Ks; K \ Ks |] ==> agt K \ bad"
by (simp add: good_def)
lemma good1 [simp]: "A \ bad \ good {priK A}"
by (simp add: good_def)
lemma good2 [simp]: "[| A \ bad; B \ bad |] ==> good {priK A, priK B}"
by (simp add: good_def)
subsubsection\<open>greatest nonce used in a trace, 0 if there is no nonce\<close>
primrec greatest :: "event list => nat"
where
"greatest [] = 0"
| "greatest (ev # evs) = max (greatest_msg (msg ev)) (greatest evs)"
lemma greatest_is_greatest: "Nonce n \ used evs \ n \ greatest evs"
apply (induct evs, auto simp: initState.simps)
apply (drule used_sub_parts_used, safe)
apply (drule greatest_msg_is_greatest, arith)
by simp
subsubsection\<open>function giving a new nonce\<close>
definition new :: "event list \ nat" where
"new evs \ Suc (greatest evs)"
lemma new_isnt_used [iff]: "Nonce (new evs) \ used evs"
by (clarify, drule greatest_is_greatest, auto simp: new_def)
subsection\<open>Proofs About Guarded Messages\<close>
subsubsection\<open>small hack necessary because priK is defined as the inverse of pubK\<close>
lemma pubK_is_invKey_priK: "pubK A = invKey (priK A)"
by simp
lemmas pubK_is_invKey_priK_substI = pubK_is_invKey_priK [THEN ssubst]
lemmas invKey_invKey_substI = invKey [THEN ssubst]
lemma "Nonce n \ parts {X} \ Crypt (pubK A) X \ guard n {priK A}"
apply (rule pubK_is_invKey_priK_substI, rule invKey_invKey_substI)
by (rule Guard_Nonce, simp+)
subsubsection\<open>guardedness results\<close>
lemma sign_guard [intro]: "X \ guard n Ks \ sign A X \ guard n Ks"
by (auto simp: sign_def)
lemma Guard_init [iff]: "Guard n Ks (initState B)"
by (induct B, auto simp: Guard_def initState.simps)
lemma Guard_knows_max': "Guard n Ks (knows_max' C evs)
==> Guard n Ks (knows_max C evs)"
by (simp add: knows_max_def)
lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard_spies [dest]: "Nonce n \ used evs
\<Longrightarrow> Guard n Ks (spies evs)"
by (auto simp: Guard_def dest: not_used_not_known parts_sub)
lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard [dest]: "[| evs \ p; Nonce n \ used evs;
Gets_correct p; one_step p |] ==> Guard n Ks (knows (Friend C) evs)"
by (auto simp: Guard_def dest: known_used parts_trans)
lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard_max [dest]: "[| evs \ p; Nonce n \ used evs;
Gets_correct p; one_step p |] ==> Guard n Ks (knows_max (Friend C) evs)"
by (auto simp: Guard_def dest: known_max_used parts_trans)
lemma Nonce_not_used_Guard_max' [dest]: "[| evs \ p; Nonce n \ used evs;
Gets_correct p; one_step p |] ==> Guard n Ks (knows_max' (Friend C) evs)"
apply (rule_tac H="knows_max (Friend C) evs" in Guard_mono)
by (auto simp: knows_max_def)
subsubsection\<open>regular protocols\<close>
definition regular :: "event list set \ bool" where
"regular p \ \evs A. evs \ p \ (Key (priK A) \ parts (spies evs)) = (A \ bad)"
lemma priK_parts_iff_bad [simp]: "[| evs \ p; regular p |] ==>
(Key (priK A) \<in> parts (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
by (auto simp: regular_def)
lemma priK_analz_iff_bad [simp]: "[| evs \ p; regular p |] ==>
(Key (priK A) \<in> analz (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
by auto
lemma Guard_Nonce_analz: "[| Guard n Ks (spies evs); evs \ p;
priK_set Ks; good Ks; regular p |] ==> Nonce n \<notin> analz (spies evs)"
apply (clarify, simp only: knows_decomp)
apply (drule Guard_invKey_keyset, simp+, safe)
apply (drule in_good, simp)
apply (drule in_priK_set, simp+, clarify)
apply (frule_tac A=A in priK_analz_iff_bad)
by (simp add: knows_decomp)+
end
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